

# AFME awards Iranian Congress Fellowship

American Friends of the Middle East (AFME) today announced award of the Congressional Fellowship to Mr. Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari. Mr. Matin-Daftari, Director of the Office of Information and Press Relations of the Ministry of Justice, will leave Iran next month for Washington, D.C. where he will spend nine months working as an assistant to one or several of the members of the United States Congress and Senate. He is the first Iranian to be honored by this grant which is worth \$4000.

The American Friends of the Middle East, which is sponsoring this fellowship, is a private, non-profit American organization dedicated to improving understanding between the people of America and the countries of the Middle East.

American Friends of the Middle East in Tehran operates a Student Counselling and Orientation program to assist students going to America; another program called the Individual Resources Development Program to assist these students to obtain employment and re-adjust when they return to Iran; and John Bruner Memorial Periodical Library of technical and scientific literature to help Iranian graduates of American Universities keep abreast of the latest developments in the field in which they studied while in the United States. AFME also sponsors People-to-People programs, of which this award is a typical one.



MR. MATIN-DAFTARİ

The purpose of the Congressional Fellowship which Mr. Matin-Daftari has received, is to enable outstanding young men to gain experience in democratic government by working with a Senator or Representative throughout one complete session of Congress. In past years, persons from Malaya, Formosa, and Japan, as well as selected Americans, have been chosen to participate in this program.

Mr. Matin-Daftari is son of Senator Dr. Ahmad Matin-Daftari, former Prime Minister. He was educated at Firooz Bahrām Secondary School in Iran and Ellesmere College and Cambridge University in England. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics and Law from Cambridge in 1956. Since his return to Iran, he has worked in the Ministry of Education and as a faculty assistant at the University of Tehran. He assumed his present position of Director of Information and Public Relations at the Ministry of Justice in 1953. Mr. Matin-Daftari also serves as Secretary to the Society for the Protection of Prisoners and their families, and is a member of the Executive Committee of the Iranian Association for the United Nations.

Mr. Matin-Daftari is married to the former Miss Mariam Vaseh-Noori. She is planning to accompany him to the United States along with their small son. Together they will be received upon arrival in the United States by Harold Minor, former United States Ambassador in Lebanon and now President of American Friends of the Middle East in Washington, D.C. At this ceremony Mr. Matin-Daftari will meet the Congressman with whom he will be working.

P-10 704  
JK

## FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Iran

REPORT NO. NIT-6006

SUBJECT Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari

DATE OF REPORT 8 October 1962

NO. OF PAGES 1

REFERENCES 0

DATE OF INFO. 1 October 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Iran, Tehran (1 October 1962)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: A well-educated Iranian (C) who is a National Front committee member.  
Appraisal of Content: 2.

Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, the member of the National Front publications committee who was recently arrested then released, is one of the members of the National Front sub-committee responsible for writing the articles which appear in the National Front News. As a member of this committee, he has cooperated to a great extent with Mohammad Ali Keshavars-Sadr, the propaganda committee chairman, in giving the National Front newspaper its anti-American slant. In fact, Matin-Daftari has frequently boasted at propaganda committee meetings that he has been able to put "the cap over the eyes" of the stupid, gullible Americans. Matin-Daftari claims to have close friendships with members of the American Embassy Political Section. As an example of his attitude, Matin-Daftari at a recent propaganda committee meeting told how he propagandizes the Americans, making them think he is their friend and giving them nationalist secrets, while all the while they are courting him, he is actually the one writing the anti-American propaganda.

Field Comment: Several reports have been received which clearly indicate that Matin-Daftari is the man who writes much of the anti-American propaganda which appears in the National Front News. Matin-Daftari, the grandson of Mohammad Mossadeq and the son of Senator Ahmad Matin-Daftari, a former Prime Minister, spent one year in the United States on a grant as a Congressional fellow.

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Chief, Political Section

23 September 1964  
P-464/64

CAS

### State of the National Front

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control NOFORN but need not cite CAS as the source. The source is a member (B) of the National Front with access to National Front leaders.

1. Hedayat Matin-Daftari, grandson of former Prime Minister Mosadeq, stated that he thought Allahyar Saleh, Dr. Karim Sanjabi and other former National Front (NF) leaders were being very uncooperative in the last few months. Hedayat Matin-Daftari thought that these leaders had given up because they were frightened. He stated that the NF is now doing nothing, and felt that the NF would need the assistance of these former leaders if the NF is to do anything. He stated that the only thing the NF was doing was trying to keep the idea of the National Front alive and see what would happen in the future. Matin-Daftari stated that the NF had lost one of its mimeograph machines by SAVAK seizure within the past few days.

2. Dr. Karim Sanjabi openly criticised Hedayat Matin-Daftari, Darius Foruhar, and Keshavara-Sadr. For the first time Dr. Sanjabi stated that he thought that Keshavara-Sadr might be working for the Iranian Government and might have as his mission the destruction of the National Front. Sanjabi stated that Foruhar is young, thoughtless, hot headed, and not a leader. Sanjabi stated that Hedayat-Matin-Daftari is young, overly ambitious, and has been feeding false information to former Prime Minister Mosadeq. Sanjabi stated that the NF could not follow the plan of former Prime Minister Mosadeq as outlined in Mosadeq's recent letters. For this reason the National Front was doing nothing--"just sitting and waiting." Sanjabi stated that he personally was not engaging in any political activity.

Group 1

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downgrading and declassification.

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*Matin-  
Daftari*CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI, Lawyer and National Front Member  
Archib M. Bolster, Second Secretary

Place: Caspian Hotel for Lunch

Date: October 14, 1964

Allahyar Saleh

Matin-Daftari is obviously totally opposed to Saleh's leadership. Just as obviously he is loyal to his grandfather, Mossadeq, and the influence Mossadeq exerts on the National Front. He said that Saleh's greatest error was in urging the Front to become a political party and attempting to forge a unified political ideology from divergent political expressions of the member groups. Matin-Daftari insisted that Saleh has already lost whatever right to leadership he once had, and that after great forbearance Mossadeq finally stepped in and gave orders that Saleh's leadership should no longer be recognized. When asked who leads the National Front today, he replied "Mossadeq." When asked who, then, could be said to be the organizational leader on a day-to-day operational basis, he replied "the leaders of the groups which make up the National Front." Matin-Daftari went on to add that Saleh is not the leader of the Iran Party as he once was, and thus should not even be included in this collective leadership group.

National Front Goals

Matin-Daftari viewed the goal of the National Front as the achievement of liberty for all Iranian citizens. As a corollary he added the goal of a return to constitutional government. He emphatically stated that the Front does not want to gain office, but only to influence the existing government or a successor government to allow more freedom and to honor the constitution. He expressed the organizational theory of the Front as that of a grouping of autonomous political organizations possessing heterogeneous political philosophies but cooperating in order to work toward the Front's common goals. When asked what programs the Front desired to put forth as its proposals for the future of Iran, Matin-Daftari answered that the Front could not afford to bicker over the details of programs because of its wide spectrum of political philosophy and thus must avoid formulating specific political platforms and concentrate on the need for freedom and constitutional government.

Groups Within The National Front

Matin-Daftari pictured the Freedom Movement of Iran as a militantly Moslem group which has a substantial following because of its religious

Group 4

Downgraded at 4 year intervals.  
Declassified after 12 years.

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orientation. He referred in passing to the trial of its leader Mehdi BAZARGAN and stated that the Government has a policy of arresting all of the leaders of the various member groups of the National Front.

Darius FORNAR is another National Front member in prison, continued Matin-Daftari. His Mellat-e-Iran Party (Iranian Nation), successor to the defunct Pan-Iran Party, is a well-organized, militant party.

Matin-Daftari stated that Khalil MALEKI is only the titular head of the Socialist League; the real leaders of that group are Mamuchehr SAFA and (fmu) AQALIADEH, who are both in prison and were secretly tried recently by a military court in what was falsely called a "public trial."

Although (fmu) BERELIAN is also a member of the Socialist League, he is primarily an organizer of student National Fronters at Tehran University, explained Matin-Daftari. Another student (fmu) NARAQI, has a much smaller student following. Last year, when National Front students at Tehran University desired to commemorate the 1954 killing of three students by security forces during the Zahedi Government, Chancellor Jehanshah SAIEH urged them to be satisfied with a small ceremony and his brother Allahyar SAIEH also used his influence to veto a large political demonstration. According to Matin-Daftari, both Berelian and NaraqI were arrested when they met at the home of a friend to plan such a small commemoration, and they are still in prison. Arrested along with them were seven followers of NaraqI. Since Berelian's arrest, thirteen of his followers have been drafted into military service, not as officers or NCOs, as would have been appropriate, but as common soldiers. One of them, Fereidun TAQIZADEH is now serving as an orderly in the Army tuberculosis sanatorium east of Shirvan.

Shades Of Political Opinion

Matin-Daftari divided politically-aware Iranians into three groups: pro-government politicians who cooperate for personal reasons such as the procurement of better employment; National Fronters; and other non-violent oppositionists, and the Communists who would overthrow the government by violence if they were only prepared to do so. He placed Khodadad FAHMANFARMAIAN in the first category, Cyrus QANI right between the first and second with friends in both, and Hossein MAHDAVI in the second category, for examples. Predictably he charged that government persecution of the non-violent oppositionists plays into the hands of the Communists by removing the middle road and causing the non-violent oppositionists to cooperate with the Communists or at least move closer to them. Matin-Daftari placed himself, of course, in the second (non-violent oppositionist) category, but explained that, like many people who must think of their economic situation, he keeps in touch with the government in order to have work.

National Front Factions

The picture Matin-Daftari painted of the economic position of middle and lower class Iranians was bleak indeed. Even as a lawyer, he said,

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he had to struggle to make ends meet, and he claimed that things are tougher now, due to inflation, than they were four or five years ago, despite increases in income. He concluded from this that dissatisfaction with the economy would play into the hands of the National Front to an ever-increasing extent. There were no further tactics mentioned, so the reporter assumes that "watch and wait" is the one and only tactic. Although "non-violence" was referred to, Matin-Daftari cited no front intentions to call strikes or demonstrations.

Suppression

Apart from the arrests of National Front leaders which were mentioned earlier, Matin-Daftari claimed that students at Tehran University and in other Iranian universities who had National Front sympathies were being persecuted. He said students with pro-National Front records had difficulty obtaining employment because of SAVAK harassment. Students were called in almost every week for questioning about Front activities, and many were told that the next time National Front activity breaks out they would be imprisoned. The Front is so closely watched, said Matin-Daftari, that even printing activities are too dangerous to be carried on.

Comments

It is interesting that Matin-Daftari made no references to American involvement in Iran during the interview, neither to criticize our support of Iran and the Shah nor to urge support of opposition groups in any way. He was frank in his discussion of internal Front affairs, personalities, and policies. The reporter was left with the impression that the National Front is experiencing the lowest ebb of its influence since 1953. Despite his criticism of Saleh for organizational errors and for failing to capitalize on alleged recent dissatisfaction with the government, it was obvious that Matin-Daftari himself had no program mapped out which would remedy these ills and make the Front more viable. Indeed, on the matter of Organization he seemed to advocate such a loose grouping of political parties that only such nebulous goals as freedom and constitutionality would serve as common denominators. Led by a free grouping of party leaders, many of them now in jail, racked by dissent over leadership and policies, constantly harassed by the government, and lacking commonly-shared plans of action, the National Front seems to be in danger of losing entirely its once formidable influence.

POL:AMBolster:jcp 10/15/64

Orig - Mr. Herz/Rdg. File

2 - Bio

3 - AMBolster

1 - CR

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI, lawyer, grandson of Mosadeq,  
member of the National Front  
Archie M. Bolster, Second Secretary

PLACE : Caspian Hotel

DATE : February 4, 1965

The Mansur Assassination

Matin-Daftari said he had been surprised at how little public display of emotion there was over Mansur's death. He had expected the announcement of some official mourning period. He said he was convinced that the three young men involved in the assassination were not directly linked with any religious or political group, although he thought it possible that the crime would be "pinned on" one such group or another. Matin-Daftari claimed that many bazaar merchants only vaguely connected with the three were being picked up for interrogation, a development which was causing animosity in the bazaar, and he observed that the bazaar is an institution which it is difficult for the authorities to control.

Changes in Security Officials' Assignments

Matin-Daftari thought General Hasan PAKRAVAN had a good deal of potential to be an effective Minister of Information. He interpreted Pakravan's recent promise to tell the people the truth as a frank admission that Pakravan's predecessors had lied to the public. Matin-Daftari respected Pakravan as an intellectual who gave some relief to SAVAK's harsh reputation, and said that in the past opposition figures were better off in SAVAK hands than they were when they were sent over to the Police. Pakravan had occasionally ordered the release of people in the temporary custody of the Police only to find later that his orders had been disregarded. Matin-Daftari said Pakravan headed a group of enlightened security types who were opposed by General FARDUST and Colonel MOLAVI, the official who specializes in interrogating students and political opposition leaders.

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It was Matin-Daftari's opinion that General Nematollah NASIRI would be a ruthless SAVAK chief, but that Nasiri's replacement, General Mohsen MOBASSER, would be an even tougher Director of the National Police than Nasiri had been because Mobasser was both a trained policeman and a ruthless army officer.

Mellat-e-Iran Party

Darius FORUHAR is still in prison awaiting trial, according to Matin-Daftari. Since sometime in November he has not even been allowed visitors. The militant Mellat-e-Iran (Iranian Nation) Party is still the most active group in the National Front and has not been incapacitated by Foruhar's arrest because there is a group leadership concept developing there. Although the plans for an Iranian Nation Party Congress were given up when Foruhar was arrested, Matin-Daftari said the party was continuing to hold meetings.

Freedom Movement of Iran

Matin-Daftari said General MUSAVI and Colonels ELMIEH, MASUDI, GAFARI, and RAHIMI (P-472/64), who defended some FMI leaders at their trial and later spoke out against the treatment those leaders received in prison, were able to do so because they had already been retired from the army for having sentiments similar to the FMI members. Since their pensions cannot legally be withheld for political activity, those officers felt they could speak out without reprisal. (The four Colonels were arrested for their action in complaining on behalf of the FMI leaders - P-472/64.)

The Socialist League

Despite the imprisonment of Mammohehr SAFA and Abbas AQALIZADEH, the Socialist League, like the Iranian Nation Party, continues to function because it has a collective leadership. Matin-Daftari said this group leadership concept was being increasingly used to counter Government attempts to subdue opposition groups by arresting their principal leaders.

The Pan Iran Party

Matin-Daftari minimized the importance of Mohsen PEZESHKPUR's Pan Iran Party. He said it counted no more than 20 members and had been disowned by the former Pan Iran Party in 1961 when that group formally met and changed its name to the Mellat-e-Iran Party. Matin-Daftari said Pezeshkpur had little influence. He theorized that Colonel Molavi had tricked Pezeshkpur into making a public statement against Nasser in return for a promise of increased freedom of operation to expand party activity and membership, a promise which was then not honored.



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Berelian and National Front Students at Tehran University

Berelian and eleven other Tehran University students had been in prison for 13 months when they were finally tried in January. They were sentenced to 13 months imprisonment, which they had by then already served, and were subsequently drafted into military service as privates despite the fact that Berelian lacked only four months of study of being a doctor and others were in a similar situation in other fields. Matin-Defdari attributed the Government's decision to try these students to articles by Bertrand Russell which called to the attention of the people of Britain, and of the readers of National Front literature in which the articles were reprinted, the shameful imprisonment without trial of opposition leaders in Iran.

Mosadeq

Matin-Defdari said his grandfather was well. Mosadeq is allowed to receive only immediate family members, and it was clear that Matin-Defdari made periodic visits to see his grandfather. According to him Mosadeq is unhappy about the tightening security situation, but optimistic about the National Front's future. Mosadeq is not visited by Government representatives interested in his thoughts about current events and trends, which Matin-Defdari thought unfortunate because he thought Mosadeq was eager to serve his country even if he did so at the request of those in power. Matin-Defdari pointed out that Mosadeq is a patriot and a constitutionalist, and was willing to work for his country if only the Government would strictly observe the constitution.

Amini

Matin-Defdari volunteered that he and the National Front members with whom he had contact were all agreed that the Front had made an error in opposing Amini during the early months of his tenure of office. Looking back on that period, Matin-Defdari thought Amini was the strongest Prime Minister since Qavam Sultaneh (who, he observed, solved the Azerbaijan question and then got no credit for it.)

He pointed out that Amini was handicapped by the Shah's control of the Army, SAVAK, and the Police and was thus prevented from building up adequate support for his policies. He thought Amini should have organized free elections in the cities, and controlled elections in the rural areas, and thus gotten a Parliament elected which would have been loyal to him. A Parliament thus constituted, Matin-Defdari's reasoning ran, would have given Amini the support he needed to stand up to the Shah, who would have been reluctant to go against a popular parliament. As it was, Amini's agreement to dissolution of the Parliament left him with no support and forced the National Front to oppose him on constitutional grounds.

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He said Amini was talking himself up as a potential Prime Minister even now, and was plugging a so-called "United Front" as a broadly-based political party to further his ambitions. Should Amini become Prime Minister, said Matin-Daftari, the National Front would at least support him initially until it had a chance to observe and analyze his actions as Prime Minister. Matin-Daftari would not say what he thought Amini's chances of becoming Prime Minister were.

Tightening Security

Matin-Daftari agreed that the security situation had tightened up considerably during the last year and observed that there was no way for opposition groups to let off steam if the lid clamped on the boiling pot were simply reinforced from time to time against the growing pressure. He said Amini had in mind the use of a "United Front" as a safety valve to let some of the steam escape, but that Amini wanted more than just a re-named National Front, he wanted a complete spectrum of opposition groups. Matin Daftari thought that Mansur's assassination was an inevitable consequence of the increasing repression in Iran, and while he had not foreseen that particular action he was not surprised by it. Looking back to Mansur's unpopular price increases, Matin-Daftari observed that if the taxi strike had continued for one or two more days, the National Front would have been able to capitalize on public unrest.

Comment

Matin-Daftari is a reliable source for information about opposition political activity. He talks freely and seems willing to discourse on any facet of opposition activity about which he is informed. He is short of stature, wears glasses, and has a moustache. A lawyer, he has a wide range of acquaintances and is rather well informed about events of the day. He is married to the former Miss Mariam VASEH-NURI and has two children.

POL:AMBolster:alw (2/6/65)

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

0005: September 29, 1965

**PARTICIPANTS:** Mohammadtahir MATIN-DARTARI, Lawyer and Young National  
Front Leader  
Archib M. Balster, Second Secretary

**PLACE:** Constable Restaurant

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Recent Arrests of Oppositionists

Matin-Dartari talked at length about the recent arrests once the subject arose. He gave the names of those arrested as Khalil MALEKI, Reza SHAFAR, Hossein SAHSHAN, and Alijan SHARI of the Socialist League; Abbas SAHMI of the Freedom Movement of Iran; Ali Asqar RHEBAN of the Ballad-e-Iran Party; Hossein KALI, Dr. MANJALI, Dr. SAMI, and Dr. Habibollah PEYMAN of the Mardom-e-Iran Party; and Engineer Ehsan HASIBI of the Iran Party. He said Eng. Hasibi had been released after one day, but as far as he knew the others were still in detention. Matin-Dartari also listed three students as being among a group of students arrested at the same time: Tagavi BATAT of the Agriculture Faculty, MOHAMMADZADEH of the Science Faculty, and SHAJA of the Law Faculty. Last but not least, Matin-Dartari said he himself had been arrested and detained for a day.

Matin-Dartari said a SAVAK Colonel and four men arrived at his home at 4:00 a.m. and began a search of his apartment which lasted until about 9:00 a.m. Among the items seized were notes he had prepared on the legal aspects of loss of nationality which happened to show "political" headings, a copy of the book My Eyes by the Iranian author Behzad ALAVI (a book which criticized Reza Shah's autocratic methods and is well known among oppositionists in Iran), and an article by his father, Senator Matin-Dartari, entitled "Three Weeks in Three Communist Countries", a harmless travelogue of a brief visit to Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. During the remainder of the day he was questioned about his alleged friendship with opposition figures, his functions in the old National Front, and about his activities in National Front III. Matin-Dartari said he was visited during the day by Colonel Molavi, head of the Tehran Province SAVAK office, and others, and was told that he might be freed later in the day if he were cooperative. He said he replied to his questioner that those who had ordered his arrest would keep both him and his interrogator as long as directed, so rather than intimidation it might be more productive to try politeness. After answering some questions and parrying others, he was finally released about 7:00 p.m.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

### San Francisco

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Matin-Daftari stated that a friend of Maleki who had assisted his interpreter when Maleki met Mrs. Margaret McKay, a member of the Labor Party in England and a delegate to the meetings of the UN Commission of the Status of Women held in Tehran this past summer, was shown by SAVAK a paper allegedly given to McKay by Maleki. The paper requested Mrs. McKay's services in furthering the cause of Iran's Socialist League by enlisting Labor Government support for an appeal to the Socialist International to publicize socialist activities in Iran. According to Matin-Daftari's sources, Mrs. McKay violated Maleki's confidence and turned over to SAVAK the paper he had given her. (Matin-Daftari showed me a clipping from the London Sunday Observer of August 28 or 29 which commented on Maleki's arrest and ascribed it to his contact with Mrs. McKay and with a man named Carty of the Socialist International. The clipping also carried items about the expulsion of Bulforce and Rosa and about the exile from Tehran of two Kayhan staffers. In discussing Maleki's arrest the clipping said no part of it had been allowed to appear in the Iranian press, which Matin-Daftari assumed had prompted the Government to belatedly plant the story in Kayhan on September 5.)

Matin-Daftari thought the main purpose of the arrests was to blunt recent efforts to rejuvenate the National Front. When asked why a recognized participant in such activities, Reza KAZEMI, had not been arrested, he replied that there was no need to go after the older and less active National Fronters when you could be more effective by picking up the "young bloods" who are providing what motive force there is behind the movement. In the case of Masini, Matin-Daftari said he had been picked up because it was rumored that the Iran Party planned to hold an annual meeting at his house, but after watching the house all day long without result, SAVAK released him. Matin-Daftari thought it was more than coincidence that these various arrests took place just before the promotion lists of the Iranian armed forces came out, his assumption being that Colonel Maleki was more active than usual in an effort (unsuccessful) to keep his name in the limelight so as to be promoted.

### National Front III

When asked what the National Front III was doing these days, Matin-Daftari answered that it was inactive in the wake of these new moves to suppress its activity. He was discouraged about the position of the nationalist opposition and remarked that these days there is barely breathing space for anyone not on the Government's side.

San Francisco

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SAVAK Surveillance

Matin-Daftari suggested that I not call by phone to arrange meetings because he was being particularly closely watched after his recent arrest and he was sure his phone was tapped. He said he assumed SAVAK knew that we were having lunch together. I answered that I also assumed SAVAK knew this and that the fact did not worry me because it was certainly perfectly normal that Embassy officers should meet Iranians of all political persuasions. Matin-Daftari then mentioned that the Caspian Hotel was not a good place to meet for lunch because Colonel Molevi himself often lunches there. Not only that, but SAVAK's Tehran Province office has been moved into the building on the southeast corner of the Tahrir-Jamshid-Iranshahr intersection, a few doors away from the Caspian Hotel.

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9/30/65

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

March 17, 1966

In reviewing my notes today I found one I made on Tourgeman's comment re Khalil Maleki, which had slipped my mind.

It seems that about nine months ago in "a debate" with Maleki and his associates who were ready to cooperate with the "religious extremists" the Israelis cautioned and advised against this. Rather they advised Maleki that continued irrational opposition to the regime was useless and that they should realistically admit that the regime's reforms had some validity and that they should start thinking how they could cooperate with the regime rather than joining with supporters of Barzargan "or worse".

There was a split among the Socialist League and Maleki himself was undecided. A small group of young people who called themselves "Marxists" opposed such an accommodation and referred to Maleki and his collaborators as "poor" Marxists. This group of "extremists" felt that they preferred a complete reorganization of the socialist movement into an "independent" revitalized group "liberated" from Soviet influence and taking its inspiration from the Chinese Communists.

This was the thinking among these groups nine months ago when Darial decided to call off Tourgeman's contacts with them because "he felt it was becoming too dangerous."

Comment: It seems the regime took action to make up Maleki's mind, but apparently also took cognizance of his reluctance to cooperate with the extremists of either the "left" or the "right".

POL:GHRassias/mjs

Distribution:

MFH/POL Reading  
TAH/POL Subject  
BIO-2  
GHR chron.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

July 27, 1966

SUBJECT: National Front Reactions to Rumored GCI Arms Deal with USSR

PARTICIPANTS: David TOURGEMAN, 1st Secretary Israeli Mission  
William A. Holseth, First Secretary  
Charles W. Rassias, Second Secretary

PLACE: American Embassy

COPIES TO: RMB/DCM  
OR  
SA  
IRM/Mr. Elliot

POL BY  
✓ BIO (2)  
CHRCM

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During the course of a conversation devoted primarily to his fishing for details on the GCI-US arms negotiations (reported separately previously), TOURGEMAN remarked that he was surprised and impressed by the reactions of the young National Fronters, such as Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI, to the rumored GCI approach to the USSR for arms. Tourgeman said he was surprised that the National Fronters seemed concerned that a military relationship with the USSR would be against Iran's interests. Tourgeman had felt that the National Front would be pleased that the US military presence might be diluted by the influx of a Soviet military presence. They seemed to be quite worried that the Shah would perhaps make a fatal error if in fact he went ahead with any such deal with the USSR.

POL:CHWRassias:jaa:8/10/66

GROUP 3  
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

*high file*

Participants: Medayatollah Matin-Daftary, grandson of Mossadeq  
Martin F. Herz, Counselor of Embassy

Place : Caspian Hotel

Time : January 23, 1967

Subject : State of Health of Former Prime Minister Mossadeq

Distribution: LCM/Ambassador; Ok; POL Bdg.; IRN-Eliot; IRN-Bolster;  
MPH chron.

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I ran into Matin-Daftary by accident and asked him about the health of his grandfather. He said that while Mossadeq is indeed receiving cobalt treatments, people have jumped to the conclusion that he has cancer. Actually the condition in his upper jaw (or lower sinus) was termed "pre-cancerous" by the doctors. It was at the point where it might have become a cancer, but it is believed that the treatment will prevent this. Mossadeq is amulatory and, aside from the general debilitation that comes from his age and perhaps also the effects of the treatment, is just about as vigorous and healthy as might be expected.

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BIO file  
Hedayatollah Matin-Daftary

30, Kucheh Mohtasham,  
Kh. Kakh,  
Teheran, 4th. Farvardin 1346

~~POC 106~~  
~~21/10/46~~

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Herz,

My wife and I would like to express our deep appreciations for your condolences on the occasion of the passing away of my grandfather.

He was indeed a great man and above all for those who were closely associated with him a super human — "his life was gentle and the element so mixed in him that the nature might stand up and say to all the world, this was a man."

We are not so grieved for losing a grandfather, as we are sad and heartbroken as Iranians for having lost the Great Mossadegh — our National Leader. Dr. Mossadegh's death is indeed an irreparable loss for our nation as well as all lovers of liberty and freedom. Though gone from our midst his teachings and ideas will remain as a precious national heritage for us and generations to come.

Yours sincerely,

Hedayatollah Matin-Daftary

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Sharokh Pirus, Iranian Businessman  
John A. Armitage, Counselor of Embassy

TIME & PLACE: April 11, 1968, Armitage's Residence

SUBJECT : Beating of Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari

DISTRIBUTION: POL/RF; POL/SF; BIO; NEA/IRN; CHRON; CRU

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Pirus, who said he had seen Matin-Daftary shortly before, gave me the following information:

Matin-Daftary was seized one evening (apparently during the first week of April) as he came from his law office on Lalezar Street, had a sack thrown over his head and was thrown into a waiting automobile. He was taken to the Lashkarak area outside of Tehran and was soundly beaten by several men. No bones were broken but Matin-Daftary suffered multiple bruises and had a fever four days after the attack, when Pirus saw him.

In response to my question Pirus said that Matin-Daftary had almost certainly been associated with those at the University of Tehran who had circulated leaflets apparently of Chiccom inspiration.

NOTE: John Chere's version of the incident varies somewhat from the above. Chere's informants indicate the accident occurred early in April but state that Matin-Daftary was seized outside Tehran University and had "something put over his eyes" before being thrown into the car. Chere's sources report that Matin-Daftary was driven around town, beater thrust out of the car and made his way home. They suggest that there were three or four assailants, one of whom Matin-Daftary stated disguised his voice (apparently suggesting that he was a person known to Matin-Daftary). These sources also report that Matin-Daftary was badly bruised but not hospitalized and had no broken bones. They also report Matin-Daftary as desiring to publicize this incident, possibly through communicating this information to the United Nations.

POL:JAArmitage:pc:sgl:4/17/68

b.c.

Tehran, Iran

April 17, 1968

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL  
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Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Esquire  
NEA/IRS  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ted:

Enclosed is a memo which contains what we know about the beating of young Matin-Daftary (your letter of April 11).

On general grounds, we would fervently hope that you would be able to tell Bill Miller only that we had heard that Matin-Daftary had been beaten up but that he had not been seriously hurt and is reportedly now mended. Even for Senator Cooper's assistant, I don't think we want to get in the business of confirming or commenting on Hossein Mahdavy's reports.

But more to the point right now, we have some indications that Matin-Daftary is hoping to get some public attention drawn to this incident and has muttered something about getting information about it to the UN. With the Human Rights Conference coming up in Tehran this very week and with Senator Matin-Daftary an active candidate (with possibly better than his perennial chance) for the Presidency of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the possibility for a minor league cause celebre could be considerable. We will want to avoid being involved, if we possibly can.

All best regards,

Sincerely,

John A. Armitage

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FOL:JAArmitage:pc

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Hedayatollah MATIN-Doftari, Lawyer (Grandson of Former  
Prime Minister Mosadeq)  
Larry W. Semakis - Second Secretary of Embassy

DATE & PLACE: May 2, 1968 - Matin-Doftari's Residence

SUBJECT: Beating of Hedayatollah Matin-Doftari

DISTRIBUTION: POL/SF; POL/RF; CRU; OR; BIO; CHRON;

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In early April, Matin-Doftari was picked up in front of a Tehran University building by three men, blindfolded, tied, and driven to Lashkarak where a severe beating was administered. His assailants avoided bruising his face. After beating him they dumped him out of the car and he went tumbling down a steep incline. Tattered and bruised, he managed to get a lift home from a passing motorist. Matin-Doftari believes the men were SAVAK agents doing their "usual dirty work" against persons who disapproved of the Shah. Asked the reason for the beating, Matin-Doftari said that he had no idea what was behind it. He had not engaged in any political activities, nor had he been involved in any way with student disturbances at Tehran University.

Matin-Doftari's wife, Mariam, said that she had learned about Hedayatollah's seizure, almost immediately, from a witness who observed the men forcing Matin-Doftari into a car. She called persons with influence to work for his release. The Matin-Doftaris have been unable to learn for sure who was behind the action nor the reasons for the beating, but Iranian "sources" have told them that the US had put SAVAK up to the attack.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Hedayatollah Matin-Daftary, Lawyer  
Timothy W. Childs, Second Secretary of Embassy  
Michael A. G. Michaud, Second Secretary of Embassy

DATE & PLACE: July 3, 1968 - Mr. Child's Residence

SUBJECT: The Matin-Daftary Approach to Nationalism

DISTRIBUTION: /POL; ECON: TWC Chron; MM Chron

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During the course of the evening, Matin-Daftary made some interesting remarks including the following:

1. There is an influential group of "freemasons" in Iran. These people, who are often the rising young members of Iran's new managerial class, are in close contact and assist each other in obtaining good jobs and influential positions. The "freemasons" have strong ties with the British.
2. Many members of the court rejoiced on hearing the news that Robert Kennedy had been shot. In this connection, Matin-Daftary observed that it was "well known" that the Shah had contributed heavily to Richard Nixon's Presidential campaign in 1960.
3. Many of the younger Ulema (e.g. those in theological studies at Qom) are "progressives," not reactionaries.

COMMENT: Daftary's views reflect certain continuing obsessions: the pervasive influence of the British, exercised through such puppets as Alam, Egbal, and Hoveyda; the just cause of nationalism a la Mossadeq; and the need for change because Iran is too "established" (when asked to identify the establishment, Matin-Daftary gave as examples the Farmanfarmaians and certain rich contractors). One gets the feeling that Matin-Daftary resents the fact that he is "out" while these other people are "in"; he noted that he and his wife are no longer invited to "establishment" parties.

ECON: *MM* Michaud/TW Childs: pm 7/10/68

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CLASSIFICATION  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

POST  
**Tehran**

DATE  
**July 3, 1968**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Foreign Service of the United States of America

REPORTING OFFICER  
**Larry W. Benakis**

# BIOGRAPHIC DATA FORM

## INSTRUCTIONS

For full instructions on submission of biographic data and use of this form see 4 FSM 500.

COPIES TO

NAME  
**Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI**

NATIONALITY  
**Iranian**

PRESENT POSITION  
**Lawyer**

## DATA AND REMARKS

### Birth

<sup>1933</sup>  
Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, who was born in ~~1933~~, is the son of Senator Ahmad Matin-Daftari (International Lawyer and former Prime Minister) and the grandson of former Prime Minister Dr. Mohamed Mosadeq.

### Education

After schooling in Tehran he went to the U.K. where he studied at Cambridge University and in 1956 received a B.A. degree in Economics and Law.

### Career

Upon his return to Iran he was employed by the Ministry of Education and joined the faculty of Tehran University. In 1958 he became Director of Information and Public Relations at the Ministry of Justice. In 1960 the American Friends of the Middle East gave him a Congressional Fellowship which provided for a nine month stay in Washington, D.C. working on Capitol Hill where he was able to observe the activities of Congress. On his return he became a practicing lawyer specializing in nationality cases.

Matin-Daftari was close to his grandfather and has long been associated with the National Front movement in Iran. In 1962 he served as a member of the National Front publications committee. During the years before Mosadeq's death in 1967 he served as a channel of contact between the village-exiled former Prime Minister and National Front members. He is in close touch with those who are National Front minded, particularly among university students and other young elements. Matin-Daftari is well acquainted with the US and admires its principles; but, like many American-connected Iranians, he often feels constrained to adopt a critical attitude when in the presence of other Iranians.

### Comment

Matin-Daftari is about 5'6" tall, wears glasses, has dark brown hair and a moustache. He smokes cigarettes, drinks moderately and is an avid-reader. On February 11, 1959 he was married to the former Marian Veseh-Nuri (an attractive and lively conversationalist schooled in the U.K. who shares her husband's political views), and they have two children.

Submit to Department in Triplicate

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Continue Data and Remarks on Plain Sheets

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Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI - Continued

Matin-Defteri is one of the Shah's most bitter critics. He is in active contact with other oppositionists, particularly Nation of Iran Party leader Dariush FORUHA, and is well known by dissident minded students at Tehran University. Matin-Defteri still clings to the hope that a radical change will come about in Iran's domestic political picture and that he will be called upon to play a leading role in whatever forces emerge. He has nothing but contempt for those who he regards as having sacrificed their political ideas for the sake of a comfortable life within the establishment. His family's stature and connections, while insufficient to protect him from being the target of occasional government harassment (and a beating in April 1968) nevertheless are influential enough to keep his person relatively safe.

POL: LWSemakis:gh 7/3/68

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Bio Files

FROM : POL - Charles W. McCaskill *W*

SUBJECT: Biographic Report on Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI

DATE: May 11, 1971

Matin-Defdari continues his intense interest in politics, and presumably maintains his excellent contacts to various elements in the Iranian opposition. The thing that bothers me most about both Matin-Defdari and his lovely, charming and very bright wife is the fact that they tend to see everything in blacks and whites, to oppose for the sake of opposing: nothing the Shah does is any good, while everything National Front or Mossadeq is good. His wife is inclined, at the slightest provocation, to become more passionate about the present political situation than her husband.

I have the feeling that Matin-Defdari and his wife want to maintain contact with Embassy officers. We have been to their house twice for dinner. They seem to move fairly widely in diplomatic circles, their closest friends apparently young liberal or young Turk types (Iskit of the Turkish Embassy, Weston of the British, Ravindranathan of the Indian, Yagi of the Japanese.)

While Matin-Defdari no doubt maintains good contacts in oppositionist circles, I have the decided impression that neither he nor his wife would tend to distort the facts for the sake of their listeners. While it is only an impression, I feel that he moves a bit more freely now, and perhaps is not watched as closely as he was at one time.

The Matin-Defdari's have two children, a boy and a girl about 10 and 8 or 11 and 9. Mrs. Matin-Defdari had a third baby about two years ago but the baby developed a respiratory ailment of some kind soon after birth and died.

## Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
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~~SECRET~~  
BIOGRAPHY - Daftari

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October 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Rights of Defendants Under Iranian Law

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Hedayatollah A. Amin-Daftari  
Attorney, Tehran

Mr. John L. Washburn  
Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy

DISTRIBUTION: ADMIN (Mr. Hedberg)  
POL - 2 (Mr. McCaskill, Mr. Rouse)  
ECON - 2  
CONS (Mr. Springer)

TIME & PLACE: Residence of Mr. Charles W. McCaskill,  
First Secretary, U.S. Embassy - October 28, 1971.

Dr. Amin-Daftari is a leading lawyer in Tehran with an active criminal practice. From my own interest and in light of recent arrests of American citizens in Iran, when a natural opportunity came up in our conversation, I asked him to describe briefly the ostensible rights of an accused person under Iranian law.

He said that a person arrested by the regular police must be charged before a presiding magistrate (Iranian law uses the French term *juge d'instruction*) within 24 hours of his arrest. In a significant improvement over the civil law system as it still exists in most of Europe, under Iranian law the arrested person is entitled to consult with, and have the services of, an attorney immediately after he has been charged. This is important because the first period of interrogation which follows can last as long as 60 days before any petition to end it may be made. The interrogation is conducted by the police and supervised by the presiding magistrate. Although it is a matter of hot dispute between the police and the bar as to whether the right to counsel's services includes the presence of counsel at interrogations, Dr. Amin-Daftari said that he believes the latter right is in fact included in the general right to counsel and that active and influential criminal lawyers do succeed in being present at their clients' interrogations.

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At the end of the first sixty days of interrogation, the accused's counsel petitions the court of first instance which has jurisdiction over the case for a review. This court asks the presiding magistrate for the case file and a memorandum, and then decides whether the accused should be released or brought to trial, or the interrogation continued for another sixty days. Counsel may appeal a decision to extend the interrogation, especially in the case of second and subsequent extensions.

Dr. Amin-Deftari also pointed out that SAVAK and the military also have written regulations concerning the ~~rights~~ of persons arrested under their authority. Where their regulations are silent on any matter affecting an accused the regular criminal procedure applies.

COMMENT

Dr. Amin-Deftari said that any competent bi-lingual Tehran attorney with experience in criminal cases could prepare an English summary of the rights of defendants under Iranian law, with references, in a few hours. Since I understand that the Consular Section does not now have such a summary, it seems to me that the Embassy should consider having one prepared.

ECOM:JWashburn:jm

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July 25, 1976

CONTACT LIST

Archie M. Bolster

The names and biographic sketches given below are arranged by functional categories for easier reference. I readily acknowledge indebtedness to the excellent contact list compiled by Larry Semakis in 1969, from which I have extracted information on some of the contacts we have shared over the years since my Tehran tour of 1963-66.

NATIONAL FRONTERS

Dr. Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari is the grandson of National Front hero Mossedegh. At present he makes a living as a lawyer. His opposition background is well known but now generally ignored. On the other hand, he appears to be reluctant to maintain contact with the Embassy, as my efforts to follow up our chance meeting at an Indian Embassy party have come to naught. (He expressed willingness to meet, but every time I called there was some reason why it would not be possible just at the time I suggested.) Matin Daftari has had his share of interrogations and torture which, in part, accounts for his anti-regime views, but like so many Iranians he has been able to reach a comfortable accommodation to the existing power structure. Although his wife Mariam shares many of her husband's anti-regime views, she has become more socially-acceptable over the years and is now frequently referred to in the society columns.  
Home telephone: 311648.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, Prominent Dissident  
Lawyer (and grandson of former Prime  
Minister Mossadeq)  
George B. Lambrakis, Political Counselor  
American Embassy, Tehran *GBL*

SUBJECT : Dissident's View of the Present Situation

DATE : December 12, 1977

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, POL/M, OR, BIO AMCONSULS  
SHIRAZ, ISFAHAN, TABRIZ, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA,  
INR/OIL/B, AMEMBASSY LONDON (KINSOLVING)

Following a chance meeting at a diplomatic function, Matin-Daftari agreed to come to lunch and discuss his views with me. He did so on December 12, showing no particular nervousness and, as far as I could see, not being shadowed or harrassed in any particular way even though we had set the appointment over his telephone which we assume is being listened to. Over three hours he commented on a number of things as reported below:

Oppositionist Meeting on Karaj Road

Matin-Daftari described the meeting of about a thousand people on Eid-e-Ghorban holiday November 22 (See Tehran 10428). Invitations had been sent by the owner of a property where the two old roads from Tehran to Karaj meet, about one-half way to Karaj. The affair was partly social and the only man to speak was an Ayatollah, as is customary on that holy day. Matin-Daftari admitted the Ayatallah was likely to yield to other speakers who would have informally explained the present political situation as they saw it and what they might do about it. As he warmed up to his subject, Matin-Daftari also admitted the group consisted of a wide variety of old National Fronters, young followers (some with their wives or children) and others who were attracted by the presence of prominent National Front and other oppositionists. As the Ayatollah started speaking, a large number of men (he put the figure at over 500) broke into the garden and formed ranks. They smashed windows and doors and invaded the house. They threw furniture around at those gathered in the house and started beating them indiscriminately with clubs, chains, and similar weapons they were carrying. Some who stayed behind were badly beaten, but Matin-Daftari, accompanied by an older judge named "Banisadr", (phonetic) and another man named Tabini made their way out to the

street. No one tried to stop them, but they had to run the gauntlet between orderly ranks of club-yielding men who hit at them. The same was true in the road until they got to the main highway where Gendarmes carrying machine guns were barring their way. They opened to allow Matin-Daftari and his companions through, but shortly after, further down the main road, they were accosted by a very rude-speaking man who asked where they had been, being so bedraggled and beaten. The elderly, distinguished judge protested they had been doing nothing illegal. The man then ordered his companions to attack the group at which point Matin-Daftari was badly beaten. He said he was hit on the spinal column and felt numb for about 10 seconds. He was also hit on the head and passed out for a few seconds on the ground. The judge was hurt much worse and is still in the hospital, as was their other companion.

Eventually, they were picked up and given a ride by another man who had been at the meeting and saw their condition. Matin-Daftari had not driven his own car, which he considered to be fortunate since all cars parked outside had systematically been smashed prior to the attack on the house. Matin-Daftari had no doubt the attackers were disciplined men, trained in beating without causing fatal injuries. He knew one man who had gotten off lightly and managed to take shelter in his own car, though this probably was because he was accompanied by his 10-year-old son.

#### Lahejan Incident

Lahejan is a town on the Caspian where there is a small college. Students had invited well-known pathologist Manuchehr Kherazkhanie to speak on the effects of radiation--his field. As Matin-Daftari heard the story (for he was not present on that occasion), there was an effort to break up the speech by hecklers, but the other students in the audience did not permit this to happen. When Kherazkhanie and another man who had come with him (see Tehran 11098) left the college in the company of a few others, they came upon a group of about forty men armed with clubs, chains, etc. (the same situation as the Karaj incident) and were subsequently beaten. Matin-Daftari admitted that Kherazkhanie was a well-known dissident, who had signed a variety of petitions and letters currently circulating in Tehran.

#### Anti-American Incident Involving Wrestlers

Matin-Daftari had run into a lawyer at court the day before who was waiting to defend a few of the young men arrested for the anti-American incident described in Tehran's 10815. As the lawyer told the story, group numbers were well below the 70 reported in the press. They were apolitical athletes who said they had been joined on that day by two or three unknown agitators. The agitators talked up an anti-American storm which involved blaming the Americans for pushing so many arms on the GOI. The athletes then went out to tear down the American flag, etc, but were sorry about what they had done afterwards. In Matin-Daftari's opinion, this<sup>29</sup> incident was instigated by

Savak for its own purposes.

#### Foruhar and the Moderates

Matin-Daftari readily answered questions about Foruhar, whom he identified as a colleague and friend. He described Foruhar as a very dignified, sturdy, and energetic man who expresses his views directly and forthrightly on the need for more liberty, but is basically a moderate. On the many occasions he has been to prison he has gained the respect of the guards by his demeanor and has berated those who are imprisoned for terrorism and extremist views. He has not been tortured, as far as Matin-Daftari knows, probably because he had no great secrets to impart and also perhaps because of his dignified demeanor. Matin-Daftari had heard of no recent cases of torture but could not be sure since he was no expert on that matter. Foruhar's new group consists of old Iran party liberals, who are the most numerous, Foruhar's own "Melliyat Iran" and the Socialist League. It is not a party but an action group somewhat similar to the old National Front. Some Iran party leaders are Hassibi, Bakhtiar, and Ghassemi. The lawyer Shayan heads the Socialist League. Matin-Daftari gave his affiliation as non-party, but somewhere between the Iran party and the socialists--not as far to the right as Foruhar.

#### Religious Dissidence

As he had the first time we met him, Matin-Daftari lauded the late Islamic reformer, Shariyati, whom he described as the most enlightened religious leader of recent days who was trying in effect to rid Islam of its clergy. Shariyati had been attacked both by the mullahs of the right and the left wing followers of Khomeini. Being no expert on the subject, Matin-Daftari described religious political movements as fragmented, which is the way the Government likes to keep them. He noted that the Government through its reforms had come into conflict with only a part of the conservative religious establishment, and has been buttering them up heavily ever since. He continued to attribute some of the recently published incidents to Savak "agents" provocateurs. One noted speaker is Bazarghan who recently got up in a mosque on old Shemiran road to preach what was, in appearance, a sermon on the unity of God. He was very indirect in his suggestion that there is no God on earth, but the political point was made. This mosque was closed down shortly after. However, Bazarghan had been allowed to preach last summer in the same area for about three nights running. His people were well organized with loudspeakers so they could reach a crowd which at times numbered 20,000 in Matin-Daftari's estimation. Going among them, he saw they were young and fairly well to do. They had crowded in and closed off several roads to traffic. Bazarghan himself is a dentist and a psychiatrist, not a member of the Islamic establishment.

Amendments to Legal Procedure for Trying Anti-Security Prisoners  
Matin-Daftari's comments on this subject were reported (without attribution by name) in Tehran A-189.

Possible New Trials for Old Prisoners

Matin-Daftari confided that he has been approached to act as defense attorney for a group of anti-security prisoners who are to be brought to trial in a few weeks. These are people who have been in prison for some 10 years now. They were tried and sentenced to long prison terms of about seven years, as their case was described to him, and when their prison terms ran out they were immediately re-arrested. They are now to be tried again. He is not sure if he will take this case but is considering it.

Current State of the Judiciary

In a brief discussion of the judges' petition (Tehran A-176) Matin-Daftari remarked that recent judicial amendments have made justice even harder for people to get. The judges were intimidated by the Government and told what verdicts to reach. An example is the Tehran Examining Magistrate, Judge Khagandesli (phonetic), before whom the students arrested in university disturbances are brought. He is a good man but he has been told what he has to do, as have so many other judges in Iran's judicial system today.

General Outlook

Matin-Daftari summed up the present situation by saying that, if the Government continues to crack down as hard as it has on dissidents and students, this will force the moderates to go back to their hearths and do nothing. It will leave the field open to the extremists and the terrorists. When asked whether the moderates could not reach a consensus on changes they would like to see which might not be too alarming to the Shah and the present authorities, Matin-Daftari said most of them would be happy with a Parliament in which they could speak freely. Warning to his subject, he thought the Government could approach this problem in several different ways. One would be to reform the electoral system so that there is some real choice in candidates for election to Parliament. Another would be for the Shah to give his Prime Minister and the Government more real power so that they could attack Iran's problems more efficiently. He gave the impression that the moderates have gotten used to "thinking little" and would settle for relatively minor changes to regain some semblance of political life.

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Bio

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Recent Student Trials and Other Dissent

PARTICIPANTS: Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, prominent dissident lawyer  
677 George B. Lambrakis, Political Counselor, AmEmbassy Tehr

DATE & PLACE: April 11, 1978, Cellar Restaurant

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM OR ISFAHAN NEA/IRN  
POL USIS BIO INR/RNA  
POL/M TABRIZ DAO INR/OIL/B  
ECON SHIRAZ CON

This was the second luncheon discussion meeting with Matin-Daftari, our first discussion having been December 12, 1977. He was hosting at a restaurant of his choosing and was quite happy to sit at a prominent table near a group of three Iranians who occasionally showed some slight interest in our conversation. Again there was no overt indication of monitoring of the conversation by the authorities. (Protect)

Trial of student demonstrators

Matin-Daftari had just completed his role as defense attorney for one of sixteen students tried in civilian court in connection with disturbances near Tehran University last December. When I noted the press reported as many as 43 defense attorneys for the sixteen defendants, he said this case was looked upon as an important benchmark in which broader issues were involved than just the defendants' future. He was in fact very disappointed that eleven of the defendants were found guilty of disturbing the peace and sentenced to five months imprisonment (his client among them) with only five acquitted (the three girls involved among them). He said the prosecution was carried out by an assistant prosecutor who was not very good or active. Prosecution presented no evidence of physical destruction or other illegal behavior on the part of defendants. Even the policemen who had sustained some scratches testified they did not know how they got the scratches and therefore could not testify against any of the accused. Most of the defendants were in a group marching quietly with placards carrying demands and slogans such as the return of Ayatollah Khomeini. This is neither disturbing the peace nor illegal, according to Matin-Daftari, since anyone has a right to ask or petition for anything in Iran, as long as he commits no illegal acts. The authorities

MATIN-DAFTAR, HEDAYATOLLAH

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POL:GBLambrakis/bjh

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do not have to give it to him. In this case, the group disbanded and fled when they heard police sirens. Police then chased them, rounded them up, released most of those who were not students, and locked up the students. There was one fellow who was visiting from out of town and claimed to have been just a bystander. There was another case of a student picked up in another part of town who was sent to stand trial at the same time. While their approximately 100 days detention counted against their sentence, they will have another 50 days to go, will miss their university examinations and, therefore, have to repeat a year--and probably have to petition university authorities to be allowed back into school. (They were not all from Tehran University, he told me.) All the students said they had been severely beaten at the time of their arrest, although he admitted that some months after their arrest few have any bruises to prove it. Matin-Daftari summed this up with his usual comment that such treatment of students only motivates them to become extremists and firm opponents of the regime.

#### Legal system in Iran

In response to a number of prodding questions Matin-Daftari gave his opinions of recent events and legal procedures here. He said many judges are afraid, such as the one who sentenced the students he helped defend; this was done under considerable pressure and without any evidence. Two of them were suspended when they petitioned the government last year (as reported by the Embassy at the time) and have never been reinstated. They will probably be dismissed in time as an example to the others. Two lawyers for NIOC were recently called in by Houshang Ansary personally who interrogated them on their reasons for signing a petition critical of the government. When they refused to sign a paper which would have incriminated them (by admitting anti-government activity but saying they were sorry) he demanded their resignations. One of them (a Mr. Akmadi) was quitting for other reasons anyway. His resignation, which had not been accepted before, was suddenly accepted. The other (a Mrs. Ramjpour) was dismissed even though she had six years tenure at NIOC.

In reply to my question, he said he was not aware of any trials of dissidents in military court in which the defendant was represented by a civilian counsel, at least by any counsel of prominence, for he was sure he would have heard of it. He did not rule out the possibility of a defendant being represented by retired military officers who were now civilian lawyers. When I referred to a case he had suggested last time he might take, involving prisoners who had been released at the end of their sentence, but were being brought up for trial again, Matin-Daftari said his name had been

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submitted by the father of a prisoner, but it was refused by the military authorities. Matin-Daftari was not especially anxious to defend anyone before a military court, since the regulations as written would make it very easy for him to be accused himself of anti-state behavior in the process and perhaps end up as defendant in another trial himself. Nevertheless, he thought it scandalous that a prisoner would have completed his sentence and not been released at a time when the government was claiming liberalized procedures. The man he would have defended was one "Shanechi" whose father is a rather distinguished bazaari merchant. Shanechi completed his original three-year sentence two years ago, but has been kept in prison ever since, and according to his father has been retried and resented to five more years in prison recently. Matin-Daftari claimed he did not know what the offense was beyond "anti-state activities" and had not studied the man's dossier. (Comment: I thought this a bit disingenuous since I find it hard to believe he was never told by the prisoner's father what the offense was, though it is true we have heard of cases where the prisoner himself is often in the dark as to the exact nature of the charges.)

#### Recent bombings

Matin-Daftari asked if I was aware of the recent bombings. I indicated I knew about the three bombings of homes of opposition leaders. He said there was a fourth the same night. It was the home of Mahmoud Manian, a prominent Bazaar merchant, who is one of the shareholders and a member of the board of "Hosseini al-Shatr." The latter is the organization and place near the mosque on Old Shemiran Road where Ali-Shariati used to speak and which the government closed down. The organization itself was cleverly formed as a commercial company rather than a non-profit organization so that it would not require registration with the authorities in order to own property or carry out other key operations. (This was contrary to the approach taken by the Iran Writers Association formed about eight years ago, which had formally applied for registration but its application had never been approved by the police.)

Apart from the leaflets signed by the so-called "vengeance" group left at the site of these four bombings, these people have been getting telephone calls in the last day or two threatening further reprisals and calling them "spies of the Americans." He briefly joked about the American angle, suggesting this was a dramatic and amusing twist. The targets themselves blamed Majidi, who recently announced the formation of Rastakhiz party "action squads."

#### Press protest and recent spy story

Matin-Daftari asked if I was aware (I was not) that about 100 journalists have signed a letter to Amouzegar protesting censorship.

and saying they are ashamed to have to keep printing lies. An example (which Matin-Daftari gave me near the end of the discussion) is the recent "spy story." He said he knew General Darakhshani's family very well. Darakhshani had died of heart attack quietly in the Queen Mother's Hospital when, about ten days later, the family was shocked to see in the press these articles that he had an attack in the process of being arrested for espionage and taken to a military hospital where he died. He was accused of receiving a monthly salary from the Soviets of 2000 tomans. This in itself was ridiculous: his daughter alone makes more than 20,000 tomans a month. Matin-Daftari knows the husband of the daughter very well. It also was ridiculous to say the General was a Soviet agent. When the Soviets put pressure on him as commander in Tabriz in 1946, he saw resistance would be useless and surrendered to save lives. The colonel commanding troops in Rezaiye choose to lose a few lives before he surrendered. This was an error in judgment by the general and he was tried for it and imprisoned. However, he was released a couple of years later, hardly the treatment one would expect for a spy.

#### Tabriz demonstrations and the religious situation

Matin-Daftari asked if I had enjoyed the "school boy essay" Amouzegar delivered in Tabriz a couple of days before. He said Amouzegar runs around with these perfect little speeches as if he were waiting for some professor to grade him, but they do not amount to anything. He said the large crowd that came to hear him were not Tabrizis. They had mainly stayed at home. Instead the crowd was made up of people brought in from the countryside. Such people will accept a ride into town as a lark. Also, when gendarmes are sent out they can bring in many people. He gave as example a recent case when Governor General Valian in Mashad needed some mullahs to attend a ceremony. He sent gendarmes out. One of the mullahs said the gendarmes had simply told him to get on the bus. He obeyed, in trepidation. To his surprise, he and other mullahs were then treated to a very nice dinner and taken to the ceremony. After it was over they were dismissed. Matin Daftari noted this behavior is not unusual in Iran. He had been out in the countryside recently in connection with complaints from farmers that they had been cheated out of land. It turned out the owners of a racing association had gone around to see farmers owning land surrounding the new racing ground (which was expected to raise land value) and simply demanded the land. The only document they had presented was a brief letter with a letter-head containing the word "Imperial." The letter simply said that the officer in military uniform (who accompanied these land owners on their visits) demanded the presence of the land owner at a certain notary's office at a certain date for the purpose of turning over this land to the association. The farmers

were too scared to argue and formally turned over the land. It was now too late to do anything about it, Matin-Daftari said.

In discussing Khomeini, Matin-Daftari said Ayatollah Shariatmadari had a much stronger following in Tabriz (where people care very much about their religion) and would outshine Khomeini today on purely religious grounds if Khomeini had not become so political. In fact, one of the rumors in connection with Amouzegar's rally in Tabriz April 9 was that Amouzegar would bring Ayatollah Shariatmadari with him so that Amouzegar could apologize in public for the Tabriz deaths. A further rumor at the time said this would be done by Amouzegar in order to fool the Tabrizis into attending his meeting. In any case, Matin-Daftari characterized Shariatmadari as more modern and enlightened than Khomeini. However, followers of Shariatmadari, like those of the reformer Ali Shariati, do not dare to stand up to edicts from Khomeini, particularly as they are both under attack from government quarters.

#### Prison conditions and ICRC visits

Matin-Daftari mentioned the hunger strike presently under way in Qasr Prison. He thought the prisoners take water and some sugar but nothing else. Yet they are striking only for better treatment. One can imagine the quality of food they get for the 30 rials a day allotted by the government. They also complained that the newspapers they get have been chopped up so that there is practically no news in them. On the other hand, he has heard that conditions at the (SAVAK-run) Evin Prison in Tehran are quite acceptable. He noted Evin Prison was visited by ICRC delegations. However, he generally dismissed those visits since they do not make their findings public in any case.

Comment: As before, I found Matin-Daftari an impressive spokesman for dissent. He was energetic and outspoken, at times lapsing almost into a courtroom voice, and showed no signs of wear and tear from the trial he had been involved in or any other vague "trouble" I had heard he might have been in recently. Indeed, he seemed invigorated by the present climate here and quite openly criticized the government to me, where he had been considerably more hesitant in our first meeting. He obviously has many blank spots in his information, but he is an interesting interlocutor and obviously has stature among moderate dissenters.

Bio

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Meeting with Oppositionist Lawyer

PARTICIPANTS: Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, prominent dissident lawyer  
George B. Lambrakis, POL Counselor, AmEmbassy Tehran

DATE & PLACE: Cellar Restaurant, June 20, 1978

DISTRIBUTION: CHG OR CON NEA/IRN  
POL USIS Tabriz INR/RNA  
PM BIO Shiraz INR/OIL/B  
ECON DAO Isfahan

I met Matin-Daftari for lunch. He was looking and feeling more chipper than usual. We bumped into Majles Deputy Pezeshpour, who has just announced he is restarting his former Pan-Iran Party, outside the Rastakhiz, and Matin-Daftari congratulated him on that. Matin-Daftari commented to me afterward that, with liberalization being announced by the government, it was incumbent for people to take such steps as Pezeshpour had, so as to test the limits of government tolerance. If the opposition did not do this the government could rightly say it had provided them the opportunity and they had not taken advantage of it.

In that connection, Matin-Daftari said there will be an effort to register the Iranian Free Jurists Association soon. Expanding on procedures, he explained that, at the time that the Iranian Writers' Association had made an effort once again to register officially, orders had been given to the Ministry of Justice office (in early 1977) not to accept any more applications for registration unless police permission had already been received. The procedure previously was for an application to be taken after which the office would request police permission. Under the new procedure, there is no way to prove that an effort to register an organization has ever been made. At police headquarters, potential registrants are not allowed to enter the premises, nor will anybody sign anything indicating receipt of an application. Nevertheless, the Free Jurists will go through the process and, if refused, lodge legal complaint.

This brought us around to a discussion of the recent Bar Association elections, in which Matin-Daftari's group had come out winners (see Tehran 5944) and he himself given the highest number of votes. He confirmed he was not eligible by the rules of the association to serve as president, since he was not yet 50 (born in 1933) and has not had 20 years of legal practice. He attributed the honesty of the election to a procedure by which some seven observers and

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poll counters had to sign the back of every ballot as received. Thus a false ballot would require the forging of seven different signatures. He also noted that it helped to have fellow (dissident) lawyer Lahidji as one of the observers. That was why Lahidji himself had not been a candidate for the Board.

I asked him whether he was aware of any changes in legal procedures following the visit of the ICJ's Bill Butler, and his audience with the Shah. Matin-Daftari said the atmosphere changed afterward, as evidenced by the Shah's interview given to local newspapermen (Tehran 4584). Matin-Daftari thought that interview conciliatory. It had been followed by an announcement from the Ministry of Justice that all lawyers accredited with the Iranian Bar would be allowed to practice in military courts without further permission required, and that they could be present at the initial hearing before the examining magistrate when charges are lodged (see Tehran septel).

I asked if there had been any change to make sure someone arrested appears before the examining magistrate within 24 hours. This launched Matin-Daftari on a long explanation. He said that law is already on the books, but it has been bypassed in practice by SAVAK with the collusion of the military courts. Since SAVAK is not required to keep a record of the date of arrests, there is no way for the defendant to prove he was arrested more than 24 hours before the time he appears before the examining magistrate and is charged. Another favorite trick has been for the examining magistrate to look at the defendant's file only and approve his detention. This order from the magistrate is then shown the detainee. Most detainees, instead of refusing to sign anything, will sign the order, writing that they protest. That is then held to be proof that they have seen the examining magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. All this could change only if there were the will to apply the law on the part of government agencies, Matin-Daftari said.

I asked if he and his associates had any current estimate of the numbers of political prisoners in Iranian prisons. He said a survey has recently been made of the prisons in Tehran, using people released and relatives of prisoners, and the count amounts to about 3,800. No survey has been made of prisons in other cities, though there are thought to be large numbers in cities such as Tabriz, Mashad and Isfahan. There are small numbers probably scattered in other jails around the country too. Students arrested in recent months who have been convicted by civilian courts are not included in this count. Thus he thought the number several times the 2,000 or so being used as a ball park figure by the Shah and the Government in recent interviews.

In reply to another question, he said the group which carried out this survey was the "Committee for the Defense of Rights of Political Prisoners in Iran," formed in March this year. It consisted of 500 interested people of whom Matin-Daftari himself is one, and the most prominent leader is Dr. Askar Sehjavadi. I have heard of Sehjavadi before as one of the top oppositionist leaders. Matin-Daftari explained he is an essayist on social and political subjects who was formerly a member of the "Toilers Party" in the National Front, and later left it to join the "Third Force Party." He is in his 40s.

On current problems, Matin-Daftari gave us his version of a recent incident at the Amirabad dormitories for Tehran University students. He noted, in passing, this was the old American military camp which had been turned into student dormitories by the government. He said some 1,000 students were on their way to the Tehran University supervisor's office to protest the constant searches of their rooms carried out by security forces, particularly the girls' dormitories. Guards met the group and laid into them, dispersing them. That night, around midnight, special security forces broke into the dormitories, beating students and looting them. Many tried to run away in their night clothes. Many were injured and hospitalized. Seven are still missing. This was a recent instance of police brutality (which we have heard about from other sources as well).

Matin-Daftari himself is involved in a current law suit on behalf of a lady teacher at the faculty of Social Sciences who is bringing suit for fraud against the Tehran University chancellor, along with many other students and professors. The fraud is alleged to involve giving failing grades to some 700 students without the knowledge of their professors. Those bringing suit point out that only a professor has the authority to grade a student in a particular subject.

Comment: Matin-Daftari is clearly on the warpath and feeling his oats much more than in my previous meetings with him. I understand he has become a regular appointment for many visiting foreign journalists and is considered by them an important link among the oppositionists (perhaps since the time he organized meetings for several of them with the ICJ's Bill Butler).

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**ACTION**

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 256130/1

I.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SFUM, PINE, IR

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF OPPOSITIONIST, MATIN-DARTARY

REF: TEHRAN 9254

1. DEPTOFF PAD 45-MINUTES TELEPEON- CONVERSATION WITH MATIN-DARTARY WHO WAS UNABLE TO VISIT WASHINGTON. HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS REMARKS FOLLOW:

-- GOI'S BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT IT IS NOT "HONEST" WITH PEOPLE. IT TAL'S LIBERALIZATION, BUT PRESENTS BILLS TO MAJLES ON ELECTIONS, PRESS, ASSEMBLY, UNIVERSITIES WHICH ARE QUITE RESTRICTIVE, IN SOME CASE MORE SO THAN PRESENT PRACTICES. UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE BEEN STRUGGLING FOR YEARS FOR INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT. UNDER PROPOSED LAW, FREEDOMS THAT SOME UNIVERSITIES NOW HAVE WOULD BE NULLIFIED BY CREATION OF BOARD THAT EVEN ORDINARY LAYMEN CAN SEE WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY GOI.

-- GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING WITH NEW LEGISLATION TO ENACT STRIPS OF TOUGH LAWS SO THAT WHEN MARTIAL LAW EVENTUALLY LIFTED REGIME WILL, IN FACT, HAVE MEANS OF MAINTAINING TIGHT CONTROLS.

-- WHEN ASKED WHAT GOI SHOULD DO TO EFFECT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, MATIN-DARTARY LISTED FOLLOWING:

-- GENERAL AMNISTY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS WHICH HE ESTIMATED AT NOT LESS THAN 12,000 PERSONS. GENUINE CRIMINALS SHOULD OF COURSE BE CONFINED, BUT OPPOSITIONISTS, EVEN THOSE WHO HAD ENGAGED IN VIOLENCE AGAINST GOI, SHOULD BE RELEASED. VIOLENCE WAS EXCUSABLE UNDER CONDITIONS RESEMBLING WAR BETWEEN GOI AND PEOPLE.

-- MEANINGFUL AND MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE CAMPAIGN ON CORRUPTION.



FILE 3

BIOG. - M-D

-- SOCIAL JUSTICE--NARROWING GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR & COMBATTING MAFIA-LIKE GROUPS THAT HAD SPRUNG UP.

-- PUNISHMENT FOR THOSE OFFICIALS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST POPULATION, I.E., RANDOM KILLING OF DEMONSTRATORS OR KILLING OF PERSONS SEEKING REFUGE IN HOMES OF CLERGY IN QOM AND ISFAHAN. (HE DESCRIBED TORTURE OF THREE YOUTHS IN POLICE VEHICLE DURING DAYLIGHT IN MASHAD BEFORE NUMEROUS WITNESSES WHO SUPPORTED BAR ASSOCIATION COMPLAINT TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES. COMPLAINT FILED IN SEPTEMBER, BUT NO RESPONSE HAD COME FROM GOI. CONSEQUENTLY, POLICE COLONEL WHO DIRECTED BRUTAL TREATMENT WAS MURDERED IN MASHAD FEW DAYS AGO.)

-- MATIN-DARTARY REJECTED COMPLETELY THESIS THAT TEHRAN DEMONSTRATIONS JUST PRIOR TO MARTIAL LAW WERE PERHAPS ORGANIZED BY OUTSIDE POWERS. PEOPLE, HE SAID, HAD LEARNED FROM EXPERIENCE HOW TO CONDUCT THEMSELVES, RECALLING THAT IN 1952 POLICE HAD DISINTEGRATED AND FOR THREE DAYS PEOPLE OF TEHRAN HAD DIRECTED TRAFFIC AND MAINTAINED ORDER. DID ANYONE SERIOUSLY THINK THAT FOREIGN AGENTS COULD CONTROL OR DIRECT IRANIANS AT THIS STAGE IN THEIR REVOLT AGAINST GOI?

-- ASKED WHETHER IN FACT PRESS HAD NOT BECOME MUCH MORE FREE THAN IN RECENT YEARS, MATIN-DARTARY SAID GOI CENSORSHIP NOW MORE SOPHISTICATED. TRUE, PRESS REPORTED ON NATIONAL FRONT, BUT ONLY WHAT GOI WISHED PUBLIC TO READ. PRESS WOULD SOMETIMES PRINT NATIONAL FRONT RELEASES SIX MONTHS LATE IN DIFFERENT CONTEXT. PRESS WOULD NOT ALLOW NATIONAL FRONT TO HAVE PRINTED WHAT OPPOSITION WISHED. TIME ON RADIO/TV WERE DENIED NATIONAL FRONT. CLEARLY, THERE COULD BE NO FREE ELECTIONS IF OPPOSITION DID NOT ENJOY ACCESS TO MEDIA EQUAL TO GOI.

-- DEPTOFF CITED CRITICISM OF SAVAK BY SENATOR JALALI-MAINI AS EXAMPLE OF GREATER FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. MATIN-DARTARY REPLIED MAINI WAS THROWN OUT OF PAR ASSOCIATION OFFICE PRECISELY BECAUSE HE CLOSELY FOLLOWED GOI DIRECTIONS. HE HAD NOW BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ATTACK SAVAK IN ORDER TO BUILD HIMSELF UP SO THAT GOI WOULD HAVE ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATES TO STAND FOR ELECTION. REGIME WAS CONSTRUCTING "CHARACTERS OR PLAYERS" FOR ELECTION IT WILL STAGE MANAGE.

-- ASKED ABOUT SITUATION IN COURTS, HE SAID ABILITY OF LAWYERS TO DEFEND POLITICAL OFFENDERS STILL "NOT FREE, NOT EASY." SPECIAL RULES WERE IMPOSED BY JUDGES TO PRE-

WENT LAWYERS FROM SERVING AND CLIENTS WERE INTIMIDATED  
NOT TO REQUEST LAWYERS,

-- ASKED WHETHER GOI ARMS PURCHASES REPRESENTED A ISSUE  
WITH OPPOSITION. HE SAID SUBJECT 'OT REALLY DISCUSSED  
IN DETAIL. PRINCIPLE APPLIED THAT GOVERNMENT'S MAJOR  
EXPENDITURES SHOULD BE DEBATED AND DECIDED BY MAJLES  
IN CONSTITUTIONAL MANNER. INFORMATION WAS KEPT FROM  
PUBLIC, WHICH OF COURSE WANTED TO SEE IRAN STRONG; HOW-  
EVER, BECAUSE THERE WERE NO CONSULTATIONS MANY PEOPLE  
THOUGHT GOVERNMENT WAS WASTING IRAN'S WEALTH ON  
EXPENSIVE PURCHASES.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 256133/2

-- BEST ESTIMATE WAS SOME 3000 PERSONS HAD BEEN KILLED  
BY MARTIAL LAW TROOPS THROUGHOUT TEHRAN ON SEPTEMBER 9,  
HE DISPUTED GOI RELEASE OF 333 POLITICAL PRISONERS,  
SAYING NOTHING WAS KNOWN OF ANY OF THEM.

2. EMBASSY MAY WISH TO COMMENT. VANCE

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET  
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Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI  
(Phonetic: mahteen-dahftAREE)

IRAN

National Front Leader

Addressed as:  
Mr. Matin-Daftari

OFFICE OF  
CENTRAL REFERENCE



A prominent lawyer, Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari has long been associated with opposition activities. Although he is not one of the top leaders of the National Front (NF), he is close to those who are. In the past, various observers have asserted that he could play a major role in the NF if there were dramatic changes on the Iranian political scene. (The NF is an umbrella organization whose members are mostly white-collar, middle-class professionals. NF members are generally united in calling for the Shah's adherence to the Constitution of 1906, but they differ widely otherwise.) (S)

Matin-Daftari is the grandson of the late Prime Minister (1951-53) Mohamed Mosadeq, who was a founder of the NF. During the 1960s, while Mosadeq was under house arrest, Matin-Daftari acted in a liaison capacity between him and NF elements. An impressive spokesman for dissent, he is one of the leading members of the Iranian Bar Association and the Association of Iranian Jurists. He has been one of the more active protagonists of the Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Iran since it was formed in early 1978. Matin-Daftari has been under surveillance by SAVAK (National Intelligence and Security Organization) for years and has on occasion been the subject of severe government harassment. He is well acquainted with the United States (he came here in 1960 on a Congressional Fellowship from the American Friends of the Middle East) and often confers with US Embassy officials. He apparently respects this country, but he has on occasion criticized it for "failing to live up to its ideals" in Iran. (S)

(cont.)

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REVIEW ON *E. D. 1978*

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Cambridge-educated, Matin-Daftari holds a B.A. degree in economics and law. Before setting up his law practice in 1961, he was a member of the faculty of Tehran University; during 1958 he also worked as director of information and public relations at the Ministry of Justice. He is about 47 years old. (U)

8 December 1978

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A P I E N T I A L T E R R A N 14235

CAGE: SPACE 1/5/73  
APPN: MIN: CNAAS  
DEPID: POL: STESCUERO  
CLEAR: VONY  
DIST: POL-3 AMB MIN  
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2. THE PROBLEM, MAIN-DASTARI WAS QUICK TO POINT OUT, IS NOT SO MUCH WITH BAKHTIAR AS IT IS WITH THE SHAH. 15 YEARS OF REPRESSION, CORRUPTION, LIES, AND SHAM DEVELOPMENT HAVE PUSHED THE PEOPLE BEYOND THE LIMITS OF MORAL ENDURANCE AND THE MONARCH MUST QUIT IRAN SOON, OR THE SAVAGERY WHICH HAS BEEN VISITED UPON MASHAUD AND QAZVIN WILL RISE UP IN OTHER CITIES. THE SHAH HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO MORE THAN JUST A HATED RULER; HE HAS BECOME A SYMBOL FOR THE DISGRACE AND STRIFE THAT PLAGUE IRAN. THE ONLY SYMBOL OF NATIONAL UNITY AT PRESENT IS IRAN (SIC) SOMETIME. WHILE THE REVERED AYATOLLAH (MAY HE BEAT HIS SHADOW) SHOULD BE SEEN AS MORE OF A SOCIO-POLITICAL GUIDE THAN A POTENTIAL POLITICAL LEADER, NO GOVERNMENT WILL SUCCEED IN PRESENT-DAY IRAN WHICH DOES NOT HAVE HIS STAMP OF APPROVAL.

3. THE GOVERNMENT WHICH FINALLY SUCCEEDED IN IRAN WILL  
BE ONE WHICH PASSES ITS ACTIONS ON THE BELIEF THAT THE  
IRANIAN PEOPLE ARE WORTHWHILE AND TAKES THEIR WIVES INTO  
ACCOUNT. THE UNITED STATES, THROUGH ITS SNEAKING AND IN-  
APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES INCOMPREHENSIBLE SUPPORT OF A  
REGIME WHICH SURPRISED THE PEOPLE, HAS SACRIFICED ITS IN-  
FLUENCE IN IRAN. MANY PEOPLE (PROBABLY INCLUDING MANY OF  
THE TARIKAT) ARE IN THE SALE TO IRAN OF MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF  
IMPERIAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT AT INFLATED PRICES AND THE  
PRESENCE IN IRAN OF TROOPINGS OF BARBERS, HIGHLY PAID  
WHICH THE ARMY HAS TO HANDLE THIS EQUIPMENT AS A RE-  
ESTABLISHMENT IS A LOST STEP OF THE CONSIDERABLE  
CAPITULATION WHICH CHARACTERIZES THE LAST THREE DECADES  
OF THE PAST DYNASTY AND CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY  
TO THE NATIONALIST REVOLUTION. THE PRESENT IRANIAN  
REVOLUTIONARY RESULT IS AN UNQUALIFIED REJECTION OF  
THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN IRAN SINCE 1953.

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IN COLLESSION WITH THE U.S. IN OPPOSITION TO THE IRAN INTERESTS OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. IN THE U.S. HAS ANY HOPE FOR A FAVORABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW IRAN, IT MUST REALIZE THAT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP MUST BE BASED ON EQUALITY.

4. COMMENT: MATIN-DAFTARI'S COMMENTS CONTAINED LITTLE THAT WAS NEW OR DIFFERENT FROM WHAT EMBOFF HAS HEARD FROM ANY NUMBER OF IRANIANS. HOWEVER, AS THE SON OF A FORMER PRIME MINISTER AND THE NEPHEW OF THE LATE MOHAMMAD MOSSADEGH, MATIN-DAFTARI OCCUPIES A RESPECTED POSITION AMONG THE RANKS OF THE OPPOSITION EVEN THOUGH HE IS NOT TERRIBLY ACTIVE POLITICALLY. PEOPLE FROM ALL ELEMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY ARE FREQUENT CALLERS AT HIS OLD CAJAR MANSION TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE, ADVICE, OR JUST TO TALK. CONSEQUENTLY, MATIN-DAFTARI'S VIEWS CONSTITUTE A DISTILLATION OF A VERY BROAD SPECTRUM IN IRAN AND MAY BE CONSIDERED MORE NEARLY REPRESENTATIVE THAN THOSE OF MANY OTHER IRANIAN OPPOSITIONISTS WHO LACK HIS TRADITIONAL BASE. END COMMENT SULLIVAN

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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL  
CHRG: STATE 8/30/79  
APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETI  
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CLEAR: NONE  
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R.O. 12065: GDS 8/30/85 (SWIFT, E. ANN) OR-P  
TAGS: SHUM, PINT, IR  
SUBJECT: ARREST ORDERS FOR KEDAYATOLLAH MATIN-DAPTARI

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING THE VIOLENCE WHICH BROKE OUT DURING DEMONSTRATIONS ON AUGUST 12 SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (NDF) IN SUPPORT OF PRESS FREEDOMS, TEHRAN'S ISLAMIC PROSECUTOR AYATOLLAH AHMAD AZARI-QOMI ISSUED WARRANTS FOR THE ARREST OF NDF LEADER MATIN-DAPTARI IN CONNECTION WITH "COMPLAINTS BY PEOPLE INJURED DURING THE DISTURBANCES." ON AUGUST 15, THE FIRE-EATING ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COURT JUDGE KHALEHALI TOLD A CROWD IN QOM THAT HE THOUGHT MATIN-DAPTARI SHOULD BE EXECUTED FOR "INITIATING ANARCHY."

3. IN REPLY THE NDF LEADERSHIP AUGUST 16 PUT OUT A STATEMENT STRESSING THAT MATIN-DAPTARI HAD NO PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MARCH AND THAT IN ANY CASE THE VIOLENCE WAS NOT THE FAULT OF THE NDF WHOSE MARCHERS WERE ATTACKED BY RIGHT-WING TOUGHS.

4. WHILE THERE WAS SOME QUESTION IN BEGINNING IF ISLAMIC PROSECUTOR QOMI WAS SERIOUS IN HIS ARREST WARRANT, EMBASSY SOURCES CONFIRM THAT BOTH ISLAMIC PROSECUTOR AND AUTHORITIES IN QOM ARE INTENT ON ARRESTING AND TRYING MATIN-DAPTARI. SOURCES ALSO SAY THAT WHILE SOME IN FORMAL PGOI STRUCTURE WOULD LIKE TO PROTECT MATIN-DAPTARI THEY ARE POWERLESS TO DO SO.

5. ON AUGUST 22, NIOC CHAIRMAN NAZIH MET WITH KHOMEINI IN QOM AND DURING THE MEETING PRESENTED KHOMEINI A LETTER FROM THE BAR ASSOCIATION WHICH NAZIH CHAIRS APPARENTLY ON MATIN-DAPTARI'S BEHALF. NAZIH'S APPEAL; HOWEVER, APPEARS TO HAVE HAD LITTLE SUCCESS.

6. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY SOURCES MATIN-DAPTARI IS NOW IN HIDING AND HIS FAMILY ARE REFUSING TO ANSWER TELEPHONES OR TO GIVE INFORMATION EVEN TO FRIENDS. WHILE THERE IS SOME SPECULATION HE MAY ALREADY HAVE LEFT COUNTRY, MOST SOURCES FEEL HE IS STILL IN TEHRAN AREA.

7. COMMENT: WE ASSUME MATIN-DAPTARI COULD LEAVE IRAN OVER ONE OF WELL ESTABLISHED ESCAPE ROUTES IF HE WISHED BUT HE MAY WISH TO REMAIN IN IRAN IN HOPES THAT ANGER OVER HIS ROLE IN OPPOSING PRESS CLOSURES WILL ABATE.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Eng. Rahmatollah Moqadam, ex-Majlis Deputy from Miandoab.  
Dr. Khalil Falsafi, ex-Majlis Deputy from Gorgan.  
Fernando E. Rondon, Third Secretary

PLACE : Eng. Moqadam's Residence.

DATE : January 11, 1964.

After not having seen Mr. Moqadam for about nine months, he invited me over for lunch. Mr. Moqadam is now with the Ministry of Agriculture. He was previously a colonel in the Iranian Army and later in the Majlis (20th Majlis) as Deputy from Miandoab. There I met Khalil Falsafi, who was once a Gorgan Deputy to the Majlis and now with the Ministry of Justice. Both speak English.

During the conversation the following comments were made on several different subjects:

1- Bazargan Conviction. Both felt this was terrible. "A blow to freedom in Iran".

2- Land Reform. Moqadam felt that it all started after the Shah read about the reforms Kennedy expected in connection with the Alliance For Progress. At that time, Moqadam said, the Shah decided to appear as the great reformer and leader of intellectuals. After visiting with President Kennedy, the Shah launched his reforms at a rate so fast that "not even the students could keep up with him".

However, despite American applause, disillusion came to the Shah when he realized the Iranians themselves would have to carry out these reforms. This disillusionment was even greater when the Shah realized he might undermine the throne itself.

Both Falsafi and Moqadam felt the US had been the "pusher" behind Land Reform. Neither could figure out why, if the US was behind Land Reform, that reform had now stopped. I countered that Land Reform was not over to my knowledge, but they seemed to feel the departure of Arsanjani had ended Land Reform.

3- Irrigation Projects. Moqadam cited as evidence that the Government was not behind Land Reform the fact that money was still going to big dams, not to small irrigation projects from which farmers would benefit. (Moqadam works in the Irrigation Branch of the Min. of Agr. I believe).

4- The Constitution. Mr. Rondon, Dr. Falsafi said, if you will read our Constitution you will know why we are unhappy with our Government.

5- Elections. If the previous elections had been free, both of them would have been elected, but the people were not allowed to choose candidates.

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CONFIDENTIAL

6- US Military Aid. Both were bitter about this subject. They felt if the US would not pay for the Shah's soldiers, there would be no dictatorship. After all, they said, if the Army had not been paid by you it would not have fired on our people (in the June riots).

7- Mosadeq's Overthrow. I tried to explain that Iran was our ally and that we did not choose their Government. However they quickly retorted, especially Falsafi, that we (the US) had put the Shah into power when we (the US) overthrew Mosadeq. They said Mr. Eisenhower himself in some interview had admitted that the US overthrew Mosadeq.

I denied that our Government overthrew the Government's of others and stated that this would indeed make us most powerful and mighty, but that to my knowledge we simply did not have such omnipotence.

8- Vice. Moqadam spoke of the opening of a "key club" at the Darband, which he indicated was very immoral. Both Malek Husin and the Shah had attended the opening of this club. Falsafi had not heard about this and was most interested.

9- Comment. Obviously Eng. Moqadam and Dr. Falsafi feel the Regime is "unconstitutional", corrupt, supported by American dollars, and after some success at Referendum time, once more the same old Regime.

I did not attempt to argue with these true "representatives" of the Iranian middle class other than stating my belief as to what American policy is, that is support of reform, territorial integrity, and non-intervention, etc. But it boiled down to "you support the Shah, we don't, you mistakenly think you are right, but we just wanted to inform you that you are wrong."

FRondon/

**IRAN EXPERTS GROUP MEET IN TEHRAN:** The Water, Power and Agricultural Experts Group of Iran has held its second monthly meeting. Eng. Rahmatollah Mogaddam addressed the second meeting, giving a brief history of the formation of the Group, originally formed by a number of agricultural experts. A talk on Iranian water resources and the results of the Group's Water Study Committee, was given by Eng. Mohammad Ali Rejali. (For text of talk please refer to IRAN TRADE). (Ech0)

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: April 28, 1965

PLACE: Sandy's Restaurant  
PARTICIPANTS: Bahmatollah MOQADDAM  
Archib M. Bolster

BID

The Assassination Attempt:

In analyzing the affect which a successful attempt on the Shah's life would have had, Moqaddam theorized that there have been no widespread unrest and the Army and security forces would have taken over immediately, but he thought this initial period of calm would soon be disturbed by intense power struggles behind the scenes. Should the Shah at some point decide voluntarily to resign rather than rule, Moqaddam thought such an act would result in chaos.

US Prestige

Moqaddam considers US prestige to have been low since 1953 and not to have been particularly affected by such matters as the status bill and the military equipment and other such support given the Shah. Moqaddam pressed this well-worn line in a new way. He likened Iran to a drowning man in 1953 and said the rescuer (the US) had behaved perfectly properly in knocking out the would be victim in order to save him. After the rescue, however, Moqaddam said, the rescuer hit the would be victim again and again, meaning that the US had dashed Iranian hopes for better and more responsible governments by its policy of supporting the Shah to the hilt even to the extent of supporting his corrupt governments. When asked what he would suggest the US should do, Moqaddam admitted that we had a difficult job to do to both carry on relations with a regime and to try to reform it at the same time. Moqaddam said most Iranians with whom he is in contact credited the US for pushing such programs as land reform, and that they now placed some blame on us for the lack of continued progress of that reform.

Mosadeq

Moqaddam remarked that he was in correspondence with Mosadeq through certain means at his disposal and he had suggested that Mosadeq

GROUP A  
Downgraded at 3-year intervals.  
Declassified after 12 years.

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use his still great influence with the Iranian people to urge the change in the political climate in Iran. He said Mossadeq had replied to his letter and asked for specific suggestions. Moqaddam said he planned to reply in the near future, and to suggest such action as the issuance of statements or leaflets. When asked how such steps could be taken in view of government security precautions, Moqaddam said it would be all to the better if some leaflets, for example, were confiscated after being distributed because that would merely increase their popularity and circulation.

The Soft Life

Moqaddam is listed officially as an advisor to the Irrigation Authority within the Ministry of Water and Power. He explained that being an advisor involves staying home and drawing one's regular salary. He remarked that until the day before this conversation, an office had been available for him at the Ministry but now even that facade has been removed. Moqaddam did say once or twice a year he is required to make certain inspection trips to projects in various parts of Iran, the most recent such trip being to Mahabad.

POL:AMB:ster:jan4-29-65

copies to: POL:Mr. Herz/Rdg.File

" :Mr. Helseth

CHU

OR

BIO

AMB

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*in the Majlis*LIMITED OFFICIAL USEMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Rahmstollah MOQADAM, Ministry of Water and Power  
 Archie M. Bolster, Second Secretary

Place : Reporting Officer's Residence

Date : October 17, 1964

Vienna Convention

When the subject of the Vienna Convention and its application to American military personnel in Iran was brought up, Moqadam volunteered that after the near-unanimous vote in favor of the Government's bill in the Senate the Shah, according to current rumors, remarked to Senate President Jafar SHARIF-EKAMI that the vote had been rather one-sided. Moqadam said he knew from other sources that the opposition to the bill had had the Shah's blessing, that Sharif-Ekami was involved, and that Mardon Deputy Molaku RAMBOD had been asked by the Shah to lead the Majlis opposition. Moqadam made no further comments about the bill.

Development Corps and Other Corps

Moqadam remarked during a discussion of the ministry in which he works that the Ministry of Water and Power had not even been included in the group of ministries (Agriculture, Economy, Development and Housing, and Interior - A-161) assigned the task of organizing the Development Corps. He commented that this was a mistake because development in Iran must involve the provision of water, and irrigation and well-drilling come under his ministry. He further commented that he thought the proliferation of various corps was a rather superficial handling of developmental projects, the corps being like playthings of the Shah which kept His Majesty's attention away from more basic developmental works.

POL: A Bolster:jcp 10/20/64

cc: Orig - Mr. Kern/POL R&G File  
 3 - Bio  
 1 - ECON  
 2 - AMBolster

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Declassify after October 19, 1964

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POC - Mr. Martin P. Hara

May 11, 1962

POC - Fernando E. Rondon

*Mo. Files*

**Alleged Meeting between Ali AMINI and Allahyar SALEH**

According to Eng. Rahmat MOQADAM (ex-Majlis Deputy from Miandob, presently a minor official in the Ministry of Water and Power), he arranged for a meeting between Allahyar SALEH and Ali AMINI to take place in his house. This meeting would have taken place shortly before Amini's departure, but did not take place. Moqadam, who claims to see Amini often, did not elaborate.

cc: CR  
Bio/Moqadam ✓

Group 4  
Downgraded at 3-year intervals.  
Declassified 12 years after date of origin.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Charles M. Rassias, Political *FR*

FROM : *FR* Fernando E. Rondon, Administration

SUBJECT: Rahmat MOGHADAM ✓

*april*  
DATE: *March* 22, 1963

I first met Mr. Moghadam in Washington in early 1962. Upon my arrival in Iran, Mr. Moghadam invited me out, and we have met socially several times since July, 1962.

Mr. Moghadam, although apparently very mild mannered and friendly, appears to be violently opposed to the present Regime. During the early days of the Yemen revolt, when the Imam was believed dead, Mr. Moghadam mentioned to me- Why couldn't this happen in Iran?

He apparently has close contact with some Tehran University students. He once told his group that they should attend my conversation class at the IAS Student Center. They responded that they simply could not because it was sponsored by IAS.

After the Referendum, Moghadam admitted that the Shah's opposition presently had to wait and see what would happen. He refused to admit that the Shah had scored a major victory, but did admit that much of the opposition thunder (land reform, women's rights, etc.) had been taken.

Moghadam appears to be friendly to America. I have never noticed him to have Communist leanings. He is well read on current events, especially likes to talk about revolts in other countries, and speaks good English.

He gives the impression of being sincere, honest, and deeply opposed to the present GOI. He has never mentioned any alternative forms of government for Iran to me.

FR/

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FILES

May 28, 1966

POL: Larry W. Senackis

Memorandum of Conversation

During the course of a conversation at the Halsey's between Mr. Bahmatollah MOQADAM and Mr. Mahmud TOLUSE of ~~Rhondania~~, Mr. Moqadam noted that while in the U.S. Mr. AMIRANI of ~~Rhondania~~ had managed to write some rather lengthy and interesting articles for the magazine. Mr. Toluse replied that the articles had been even longer and that he was obliged to cut out some of the more provocative parts in the original drafts. Without giving any details, Mr. Toluse stated that what Mr. Amirani had written in his original drafts would not have been well received in certain quarters.

COMMENT:

Mr. Moqadam and Mr. Toluse appear to be on very friendly terms. Mr. Moqadam told me that he occasionally writes articles for ~~Rhondania~~ which he submits to Mr. Toluse for publication.

POL:LWSenackis:jaa:5/31/66

Distribution

Mr. Hara/RF  
SAH/POL SF (C&C)  
BIO (3) - (Amirani, Toluse, Moqadam)  
CHRC

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Downgraded at 3-year intervals.  
Declassified after 12 years.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: June 11, 1966

SUBJECT: Iranian Political Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Rahmatollah MOJADAM, UN Food and Agricultural Org.  
Mr. Larry W. Senekis, Second Secretary

PLACE: Mr. Moqadam's Residence

COPIES TO: Mr. Mera/RP CHRON  
POL SF - (2) BIO  
OR

During the course of an evening's chat, Mr. Moqadam expressed his views on the current political situation in Iran and noted that political controls were tighter today than at any time in the recent past. Iranians, he said, were becoming more and more reluctant to discuss politics - even amongst themselves - lest the wrath of the authorities be aroused and cause them to suffer unpleasant consequences for boldness unbecoming loyal subjects of the Shah. While there is opposition to the Government, particularly among the intelligentsia in Tehran and those who in the past had engaged actively in politics, Mr. Moqadam described these people as being in disarray and leaderless. According to Moqadam, those opposed to the Government's policies are in disagreement among themselves on how to make their sentiments known, and perhaps more important, are frustrated by their inability to rally support in the present political climate.

Mr. Moqadam stated that in the past, Iranian Governments had been attacked by domestic critics on issues falling under three basic categories - to wit: (1) foreign policy; (2) oil; and (3) internal policy. He noted that at the present time Government policy in the first two categories was not vulnerable to criticism by those opposed to the regime. The Government's internal policies, however, were fertile areas for attack and appeared to be the cause of considerable discontent in the country. At this point, I expressed surprise at his words and noted that the Shah had embarked upon a revolutionary program of internal reforms. I remarked that in some circles it was believed that the Shah had captured the nationalist mantle in Iran. Mr. Moqadam replied that initially the Shah's programs had injected

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Downgraded at 12-year intervals.  
Not automatically declassified.

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a feeling of hope in the people but that the initial enthusiasm created by the reform program had now been dampened by the growing problems involved in executing the various reforms. Mr. Moqadam noted that while he made no claims to omniscience in such matters, it was his impression that there was discontent in Iran, particularly in Tehran - despite the current economic prosperity in the capital. The Tehranis are unhappy about the way the money now being made in the capital finds its way into the pockets of the Shah's favorites, and in the rural areas the farmers are "growing cold" to the land reform program which has run into difficulties. Mr. Moqadam stated emphatically that the Shah has not captured the nationalist mantle and noted that it is still widely believed that the Americans are behind the Shah. According to Moqadam, the Shah has no real political support in the country other than from the army and security forces and from those around him who gain materially from various enterprises launched in the name of economic development. Mr. Moqadam noted that should an assassin's bullet find its mark, those now supporting the Shah would quickly follow a new leader of whatever political persuasion since these currently supporting the Shah have no real commitment to anything but their own safety and prosperity.

In this connection he added that while Mossadeq is too old to play any positive role personally in Iranian politics, his name still has a magic attraction in Iran. Mr. Moqadam said that he communicates from time to time with Mossadeq and has in the past included excerpts from Mossadeq's letters in his own articles for publication in various journals. Moqadam opined that should the Shah disappear from the scene, anyone with pretensions to leadership would have to get Mossadeq's blessing to achieve some degree of real popular support. Moqadam feels, however, that at the present time there is no one with sufficient leadership qualities and courage to challenge the present regime even though in his opinion the Government is vulnerable to attack on domestic issues.

POL:LM:Smakls:jac 16/16/66

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

August 1, 1966

SUBJECT: The Possible Purchase of Soviet Arms by the Shah

PLACE: The Samakia Residence

PARTICIPANTS: Bahmetollah MOQADAM, UN Food and Agricultural Organization  
Larry W. Samakia, Second Secretary

COPIES TO: Mr. Harza/RP  
NAM/ST -2 (Soviet; Arms Purchases)  
CR  
CROON - 2  
WFO  
NEA/IRN - Elliot NEA/INR - Bolster

During the course of an evening's chat, Mr. Moqadam made the following comments on Soviet arms purchases by the Shah. Mr. Moqadam stated that he had recently talked with Dr. Abdoh (Iranian Ambassador to India) and to former Prime Minister Amini about the Shah's policies and had noted concern on the part of both. According to Moqadam, Dr. Abdoh, during an audience with the Shah, had found the Shah convinced that he knew what he was doing and unwilling to discuss Iran-Soviet relations. Dr. Abdoh, who according to Moqadam feels that the Shah has gone too far, reportedly came away from the audience with the strong impression that the Shah was in no mood for counsel or advice. In his talk with Amini, Moqadam noted that the former Prime Minister was of the opinion that the Shah had already made up his mind to purchase Soviet weapons.

Moqadam questioned the wisdom of the Shah's move, particularly in the light of historic Russian designs on Iran, but stated that when he had first heard of a possible Soviet arms purchase he had interpreted it as a bluff on the part of the Shah to get more from the U.S. He felt that many Iranians were of the same opinion. By publicizing the imminence of a deal, however, Moqadam felt that the Shah had "checkmated" himself into going through with something which perhaps until recently he had meant only as a bluff. Mr. Moqadam confessed that he personally was of two minds on the matter. On the one hand, as an Iranian nationalist, he was concerned about the potential threat to Iran's national integrity posed by the introduction of a Soviet military presence. On the other hand, he and his close friends (unidentified, but presumably the dozen or so intellectuals with strong National Front sympathies with whom Moqadam meets periodically) hoped that the Shah had at last overstepped himself and that forces would come into play to unseat him and free Iran. According to Moqadam, Iranians are now standing by and awaiting the reaction of the U.S. Should the Shah purchase

GROUP A  
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Soviet arm, there are predictions in some quarters that a displeased US will see to it that the Shah's days are numbered.

I replied that the sooner Iranians disabuse themselves of such illusions the better. I emphasized that the U.S. had long worked for the creation of an independent Iran and was therefore fully prepared to accept the independent decisions of the Iranian government even when in the U.S. government's judgment such decisions were ill advised. Moqadam, somewhat taken aback by my reply, expressed his disappointment and stated that my words had made him "pessimistic" about Iran's future because he felt that the Soviets would surely seize the opportunity to sell arms to the Shah and thereby increase their influence in Iran. I asked Moqadam if the purchase of Soviet weapons by the Shah might not be popular with Iranians since it could be interpreted as tangible evidence of an independent monarch leading an independent country. Moqadam replied that most people in Iran would still see an "American hand" behind the Shah and would interpret the move, if it comes about, as one agreed to by Washington to enhance the Shah's image as an independent leader.

Moqadam, sipping on an after dinner brandy, warmed to the subject of the Shah's image in Iran and harked back to the "good old days" of Mosadeq when Iran was "truly independent". He cautioned me not to confuse the so called "independent" policies of the Shah with the independence shown by Mosadeq who was in fact the acknowledged nationalist leader of Iran and who enjoyed the active support of the Iranian people. He noted that the Shah's foreign policy maneuvers were futile efforts on his part to gain the support of the populace. Thus far, Moqadam felt, the Shah had made little if any impact on Iranians.

Moqadam told me that he was planning to send Mosadeq two La Monde articles on Iran discussing the Shah's economic and foreign policies. He noted that he and his friends were interested in finding out Mosadeq's views on the Shah's policies, particularly on Soviet arms purchases, and said he would pass on to me what he learns.

COMMENT

Mr. Moqadam's remarks are I believe a sample of the thinking in those Iranian circles which still cling to the memory of the National Front and look to Mosadeq for inspiration.

POL:IL-Semakis:jaa:2/2/66

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**MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION**

**SUBJECT:** Former Prime Minister AMINI Urged to Organize a Political Grouping

**PARTICIPANTS:** Mr. Rahmatollah MOQADAM, UN Food and Agricultural Organization  
Larry W. Semakia, Second Secretary of Embassy

**DATE:** October 12, 1966

**PLACE:** Mr. Semakia's Residence

**DISTRIBUTION:** DCM - Mr. Thatcher  
CR  
POL

NEA/INR - Mr. Bolster  
Bio✓  
Chron

During the course of a general discussion on the Iranian internal political situation, Mr. Moqadam mentioned that he had talked with former Prime Minister AMINI the day before and had urged him to look into the possibility of organizing a political grouping that might be permitted to participate in the 1967 general elections. Mr. Moqadam said that he was not alone in pressing Amini in this direction and noted that other friends and associates of the former Prime Minister, including several followers of Socialist Party leader Hosein MALEKI, had been suggesting the formation of a new political grouping under Amini's leadership.

Mr. Moqadam (who is himself sympathetic toward the National Front) explained that various persons who in the past had been active politically were now endeavoring to rally around Amini because they respected his independence of mind and prestige. Moqadam noted further that those around Amini were hopeful that permission to move politically would be granted Amini because they believed the Shah could trust Amini not to challenge his authority or let things get out of hand. Moqadam was quick to note also that no one around Amini contemplated any political activity without prior consent from the Shah.

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I asked Moqadam about Amini's attitude toward the urgings of his friends. Moqadam replied that Amini, in talks with various people, had indicated interest, but only on condition that the Shah would approve of his political activity.

COMMENT: Although Moqadam stated that others were urging Amini to take action, it is not unlikely that Amini himself has decided to let the word get around that he is available to play any role the Shah might see fit for him in next year's elections. Nevertheless, it appears highly unlikely that the Shah would be agreeable to a party leadership role for Amini, and the optimism expressed on this score by those around Amini appears to be based on wishful thinking alone. It is interesting to note, however, that those not well disposed toward the present regime now appear ready, indeed eager, to seek an accommodation with the Shah even though any arrangement would permit, at best, a bare minimum of political activity within a tightly controlled system.

PQ:LWS:makia/10:10/18/66

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*Bid*

MEMO TO THE FILES

Participants: Mr. Mahmatolah MOQADAM  
Mr. Larry W. Semahie

Distribution: LHM/RF  
WAM/SF  
RIO  
Chron

Place : Iran-America Society Luncheon

Date : February 18, 1967

Subject : "Join At Your Own Risk"

Mr. Moqadam has been fired from his job with the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (working under the Ministry of Water and Power). He claims that his role in organizing a professional grouping of Iranian engineers over a year ago, and an incident having political overtones which arose last summer in connection with this grouping, led to his dismissal.

Until last summer the engineer's group - said to number some 50 individuals - met on the average of once per month with the full knowledge of the authorities. At one session in the late spring of 1966 it was decided to write a letter to the Shah asking him to make greater use of Iranian engineers in carrying out agricultural reform. The letter was obviously interpreted in certain quarters as critical of the Shah's "White Revolution" for, when the members congregated at the Vena Hotel for their next meeting in June 1966, the security authorities moved in and told everyone to go home. A letter protesting the action of the security authorities was subsequently sent to the Shah's Secretariat requesting that the group be permitted to meet again.

According to Moqadam, nothing happened until December 20, 1966 when he was presented with a note signed by Water and Power Minister Ruhani telling him that his services were no longer needed. Moqadam claims that from informants within the Ministry and elsewhere he had learned that his dismissal was a direct result of his activity in the engineer's group.

Ironically, while Moqadam was fired, (presumably for engaging in activity not considered appropriate for a government employee) the engineers during the first week of January 1967 received a letter from the Shah's Secretariat giving permission for the group to resume its periodic meetings to discuss matters of professional interest.

COMMENT: Those who are members of the engineer's group will not soon forget their experience of last summer, nor will Moqadam's lesson be ignored by those engineers in the group who are on the government payroll.

FCI:LWSemahie:it  
February 20, 1967

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MEMO

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**PARTICIPANTS:** Bahmatollah MOQADAM - Engineer (sympathetic towards the National Front, but not actively a member of any group)  
Larry W. Samakis - Second Secretary of Embassy

**DATE:** February 26, 1968

**PLACE:** Moqadam Residence

**SUBJECT:** Former Prime Minister Ali AMINI

**DISTRIBUTION:** PCL/SP; PCL/RF; BIO; CRU; CHRON

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According to Moqadam, Amini heard ten days ago that SAVAK had submitted a report to the Shah saying that Amini was engaging in political activity. Amini mentioned the report to Moqadam and others some days ago and commented that something ominous was in the air. Amini also said that he had heard from a friend that Alam was telling people that Amini was making a bid to return as Prime Minister. Amini interpreted this too as a sign that something was afoot against him.

Moqadam, who has not been in touch with Amini since last week, believes that the ground was being layed for the current legal move against Amini. Moqadam heard from a friend that Justice Minister Sadr does not want to be a party to this move against Amini; that Sadr has chosen to leave the country to avoid involvement; and that Yeganeh was put in charge of the Ministry to do the dirty work.

Moqadam then proceeded to speculate on what might be behind the move. He believes that it is becoming clearer and clearer to the Shah and those close to the throne that Hoveyda is getting the country into deep economic troubles. This has led to rumors that a change in Prime Minister is in the offing. Amini's name as a possible successor has been making the rounds, and Iranians have interpreted Hoveyda's outburst recently against "those who are tools of foreigners" to be an attack on Amini. The move against Amini suggests to Moqadam that the Shah has been persuaded that Amini needs to be cut down to size. Moqadam does not believe that anything will come of any court proceedings, and feels that those behind it will have achieved their purpose if the public is left with the

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impression that Amini in some way was guilty of malfeasance. Normally, Amini would have the right to rebut the charges through the press. Moqadam, however, doubts that the government will allow the press to give Amini's side of the story.

Comment

Moqadam is an Amini disciple so his speculation should be regarded with caution.

POL:LWSemakis:gh 2/27/68

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PARTICIPANTS: Rahmatollah MOGADAM - Engineer (sympathetic towards the National Front, but not actively a member of any group)  
Larry W. Semakis - Second Secretary of Embassy

DATE : February 28, 1968

PLACE : Mogadam Residence

SUBJECT : ALI AMINI

DISTRIBUTION: POL/SE; POL/NF; BIO; CRU; NEA/INR; INR/NEA; CHRON;  
AMB/DCM

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Amini told Mogadam on February 27 that the Shah, before leaving for Europe, had instructed Hoveyda to take action against Amini. According to Mogadam, Amini had learned this from someone who is in touch with Hoveyda.

Mogadam described Amini as the one political leader in Iran who can cause the Shah difficulties. Amini's feeling that the Iranian economy is in for trouble; his belief that the Shah has moved too far in the direction of economic relations with the U.S.; and his disagreement with the Shah's attitude toward the Arab world are well known in influential political circles. Amini's opposition to the Shah's policies make him an attractive candidate for various political groups searching for a leader. Mogadam believes that the Shah has judged the time right to put Amini back in his place and thus cut any potential threat to Iran's current form of political stability.

In addition, Mogadam heard that when Iranian Ambassador to the US, Ansari, was in Tehran, he had reported to the Shah that the Consortium was unhappy with the Iranian government and it is now set up. Mogadam speculates that the Shah believes Amini to be the "fair haired boy" of the Consortium, and that the Shah, therefore, decided to cut Amini down.

POL:LWSemakis:gh 2/29/68

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SECRET/NO FORM

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Bahamtollah MOQADAM - Agricultural Engineer  
Larry W. Semakia - Second Secretary of Embassy

PLACE : Chetnik's

DATE : June 6, 1968

SUBJECT : Carliner Visit to Khalil Maleki

DISTRIBUTION: POL/RT, POL/CF, OR, INR/RMA, NEA/INM, SIO, CNU

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Khalil MALEKI (leader of Iran's Socialist Party whose activities are under SAVAK surveillance) told Moqadam that he had had a call from Carliner asking for an appointment. A meeting was arranged but sometime before it actually took place, Maleki received a call from Dr. Mohamed BAKRI (Undersecretary in the Ministry of Court) who, after telling Maleki that the government was aware of the Carliner meeting, advised Maleki to watch carefully what he said to his guest if he knew what was good for him. Maleki told Moqadam that he heeded the "advice" during his talk with Carliner.

POL:INSemakia:gh 6/8/68

SECRET/NO FORM

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO

PARTICIPANTS: Rahmatollah MOQADAM  
Larry W. Semakis, Second Secretary of Embassy

DATE: October 7, 1968

PLACE: Moqadam's Residence

SUBJECT: Alexis de Tocqueville Bites the Dust in Iran

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM; POL/SF; ~~POL/PRO~~ CHRON; CRU; OR; USIS; NEA/IRN; INR/IR

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Moqadam, whose French is fluent, spent several years working on a translation of the first volume of de Tocqueville's "Democracy In America". The translation work was done under the auspices of Franklin Publications and under the watchful eye of the Pahlavi Foundation. When the translation was complete, Moqadam submitted his work to the Franklin people for correction and approval. Senator Mohammad Saïdi, a solid member of the establishment who also has fluent command of French, was responsible for assuring that the Persian rendition of de Tocqueville's classic would not offend current Iranian political sensitivities.

Senator Saïdi, according to Moqadam, was thorough and took great care to change or eliminate wording even remotely critical of the institution of monarchy. For some unexplained reason, Saïdi changed the title of the book on the cover in Persian to read "Democracy in the New World", although the more accurate title was allowed to stand at the top of the inner pages. The term "absolute monarchy" in the text was changed to read "authoritarian government" thus distorting de Tocqueville's meaning in certain passages.

Moqadam accepted the changes with good grace and about a month ago was pleased to receive copies of the first published Persian text of de Tocqueville's work. Shortly after the publication was printed and distributed, the authorities reversed themselves and moved quickly to stop further distribution. They also picked up as many copies as they could get their hands on of those already distributed. Moqadam does not yet know why this was done, but he speculated that someone close to the Shah must have had difficulty with the text, even after Saïdi's changes, and that action was deemed necessary.

Meanwhile, Moqadam claims that intellectual circles in Iran are aware that the translation exists and are paying considerably more than the 450 rial price to get copies which escaped the collection efforts of the authorities. Moqadam personally gave a copy to his friend former Prime Minister Amini who pointed to the affair as one more clear manifestation of how heavy handed and clumsy the Shah's regime has become.

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Comment

It seems unlikely that the ban on the translation will last too long, particularly as the word gets around that it exists and since a large sum of money was expended to print several thousand copies. On the other hand, the current translation might well be subjected to further changes before publication.

Mogadishu feels that the changes already made by Saidi distort the true meaning of the author. Dare we hope that the authorities recalled the book to undo the evil that censor Saidi had done --- ?

*gh*  
POL:LWSemak:is:gh 10/15/68

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PARTICIPANTS: Rahmottolah MOGADAM - Agricultural Engineer  
Larry W. Senakis - Second Secretary of Embassy

DATE : December 14, 1968

PLACE : Mogadam Residence

DISTRIBUTION: CHARGE; POL/SF; POL/KF; HHS; OR; CINCH; CMU

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Arrests

Mogadam heard about the arrest of 14 young Iranians. He said the arrests took place about a year ago. One of the arrested, Bidjan JAZANI, is the younger brother of Rahmottolah Jazani. Mogadam described Rahmottolah Jazani as an extreme leftist (if not an active Tudeh member) who for some reason is in the good graces of the regime and sits on the Revolutionary Committee set up last year after the Administrative Congress to oversee administrative reform. Rahmottolah Jazani is also the husband of Deputy Prime Minister Safi ASFIA's sister. Bidjan Jazani shares his older brother's leftist orientation. According to Mogadam Jazani and the other 13 were picked up for possession of Chinese Communist literature and for having contact with Chinese Communist "elements".

Mogadam has also heard that 30 literacy corps members were arrested by SAVAK about a week ago also for possessing Chinese Communist literature and for having contact with Chinese Communist "elements".

Iran-Saudi Arabia

Mogadam said that passports currently issued to Iranians for travel abroad contain a restriction on travel to Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. A businessman friend of his was told that he could not travel to Saudi Arabia. Mogadam felt the restrictions on travel to Lebanon were due to the Gen. Bakhtiar issue between Iran and Lebanon, but he was mystified by the restriction on travel to Saudi Arabia which reportedly went into effect after the Shah's visit to Saudi Arabia.

POL:LMWsenakis:gh 12/17/68

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PARTICIPANTS: Bahattallah MOQADAM - Agricultural Engineer  
Larry W. Senakis - Second Secretary of Embassy

PLACE : Iran-American Society

DATE : February 25, 1969

SUBJECT : Censorship; Former Prime Minister Amini

DISTRIBUTION: POL/SF; POL/NF; RIO; CNU; CINCH

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Censorship

Mr. Moqadam, an avid reader of Foreign Affairs, said he had found the article "Force and Counterforce" which appeared in the October 1968 issue of the periodical very interesting. He decided to translate it into Persian and submitted it to Yanadegan for publication. The article was published by the newspaper but not before a portion critical of the Soviet Union had been deleted by Iranian censors.

AP Correspondent Parviz Rasin has a brother who did research on the Freemason movement in Iran and wrote a book about it. The book is very critical of Freemasonry and reportedly has offensive things to say about several prominent Iranians living and dead. The book apparently passed the censors and was printed for distribution. At the last minute, however, the authorities decided to block distribution (presumably as a result of pressure from influential persons connected with Freemasonry). According to Moqadam, however, a representative of Court Minister Alam has assured Rasin that distribution will be permitted shortly.

Former Prime Minister Amini

Moqadam said he had seen Amini in the morning and that the former Prime Minister had indicated that the Iranian economy was headed for deep trouble. The pessimistic outlook was based on Amini's review of the budget and estimates of Iran's income. Amini also predicted that the Shah will drop Moweyda in the very near future, perhaps after Now Ruz.

Comment

Amini has always been a Cassandra on economic matters. Unlike Cassandra's predictions, however, Amini's have yet to prove true.

POL:LWSenakis:gh 2/26/69

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECTS: Terrorism, Minister of Commerce Mahdavi, Air Force Corruption, Agricultural Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Rahmatollah Moghadam, Consultant to Ministry of Water and Power and former National Front Member  
Archie M. Bolster, Political Officer, Amembassy Tehran

PLACE & DATE: Tiffany's Restaurant -- January 28, 1976

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, ARMISH/MAAG, POL (2), POL/MIL, ECON, ON, DAO, Amconsuls Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, BIN, INR/OIL/B

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NOTE: Moghadam is an unreconstructed National Frontist and always sees the worst in governmental operations. His negative comments on GOI officials and policies should, therefore, be looked at with this in mind.

Terrorism

According to Moghadam the public is skeptical about guilt of the nine terrorists executed January 24. Many believe that the GOI may have arranged the killings of Colonels Shaffer and Turner in order to justify the Shah's public statements that there are no political prisoners in Iran, only terrorists, and to justify the regime's harsh repression of oppositionists. The story concludes that the GOI had to kill these nine defendants in order to cover its tracks. The fact that the trials were secret in his view bears out the government's reluctance to let the true situation be known.

Newspaper reports about the killings of terrorists in Sari, Amol, and Gorgan were partially inaccurate, said Moghadam. A girl arrested in Amol gave police a lead to a hideout in Gorgan, so they surrounded the suspected house, attacking it when they heard the sound of gunfire coming from within. When they stormed the house they found only a tape recorder inside which continued to play sounds of gunfire. The terrorists had escaped and are still at large. Moghadam said this story had come from a friend who lived in Gorgan, and he insisted that it was true.

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Minister of Commerce Mahdavi

One of Moghadam's friends said it was widely believed that Mahdavi would eventually succeed Hoveyda as Prime Minister. In very Persian fashion, Mahdavi was said to have been put in his present position because of American support for his technocrat image. Continued American support would assure him the Prime Ministry. A rumor is circulating that Mahdavi is under investigation for an alleged 300 million Rial shortage discovered in the books of the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, which Mahdavi headed before becoming Minister of Commerce in 1974.

Air Force Corruption

Moghadam said he had heard there were some 30 Air Force officers in custody for corrupt activities. These investigations might implicate the late General Khatemi, adding fuel to rumors that his hang-gliding death had been arranged to spare the GOI embarrassment when the facts came out.

Lagging Agricultural Production

Returning to a frequent theme of his conversations, Moghadam commented that Iran's agricultural production continues to lag far behind what it should be. He had just returned from Ahwaz, January 27, where he learned that one of the largest agro-business firms in the area is selling off its land. He said it was widely known in Ahwaz that Managing Director Jamshid Mehdat was trying to sell all of the land holdings of his Iran-California Company, probably in lots of 1,000 hectares which could be farmed by individuals or families. To Moghadam, this failure shows that large-scale agriculture in Iran needs assistance from the government if it is to be turned around and made profitable. Moghadam had just received a copy of a comprehensive report on Iranian agriculture done by the Bookers Agricultural and Technical Service Company of England recommending a "master plan" for Iran's agriculture. Although he had not yet studied it in detail, Moghadam thought this consultants' report was too general to be of much practical value. Moghadam recently had printed in "Khandanfa" magazine an article pointing out some of the weaknesses in GOI agricultural policy. He commented that Editor Amirani had been obliged to seek GOI approval for its publication, which showed how sensitive the government was to the poor state of Iranian agriculture.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Rahmatollah MOGHADAM MARAGHEH  
George B. LAMBRAKIS, American Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: October 14, 1978, Mr. Moghadam's Residence

SUBJECT: Internal Situation

DISTRUBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, BIO, OR, ECON, NEA/IRN,  
INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

I dropped by to see Moghadam on the Imam Reza holiday to chat after his release from prison. (He was among the opposition leaders arrested shortly after imposition of martial law in Tehran.) After noting he was in reasonably good shape and not too pale, I asked how he had been. He said he was well treated although his first 11 days were spent in solitary confinement and he never got out in the sun during that month. Later he had been moved to a cell with others, mostly mullahs, who were brought in and taken out regularly. Among them was Imam MOFATEH, of the Old Shemiran Road mosque. Mofateh is still in jail. I then said I was puzzled why he was held so much longer than the other political leaders, most of whom were released the same day they were arrested. Moghadam said he had asked his namesake (but no relative) General Moghadam of SAVAK the same question. General Moghadam kidded pleasantly, then said it was because, after imposition of martial law, they had wanted to break communications between various opposition groups. I asked Moghadam if that sounded like a good reason; was Moghadam that much more effective than other leaders in maintaining communication between groups? He smiled and said he was.

Moghadam said he was interrogated entirely by SAVAK people. When asked about the aims of his group, he explained these were within the constitution. Various pamphlets put out by his party and contacts made with others also constituted permissible political activity. He made no secret of the people working with him, as he has nothing to hide, being a constitutional party. (COMMENT: This is amore definitive stand by Moghadam, who has been hesitating over the better part of the past year as to whether he has not shown his hand prematurely should the "thousand flowers" suddenly be chopped off in a reversal of the Shah's policy.)

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Moghadam volunteered that he had been to Kayhan earlier in the day at the invitation of the gathered newspaper editorial and technical staff there. He had talked about his party and its policies. He seemed happy about his reception.

When I asked about the situation among the opposition at present, Moghadam said they were puzzled and did not know what to make of it. He added that to be perfectly frank (as I think he was, at least in part) the opposition is bothered by what lies behind President CARTER's two messages of support for the Shah. He then rehearsed for me again his basic thesis that the Americans were responsible for foisting the Shah on Iran in 1953 and keeping him in power by helping him build a strong army and police. This upset the balance of power between the Shah and his people. It behooves the U.S. to stay out of the Iranian situation, but Carter's two messages indicate the U.S. is intervening in the Shah's side once again.

I took this occasion to say that, frankly, we have expressed support for the Shah insofar as he is head of state of Iran and Iran is an important friend and ally of the U.S. in whose stability and continuing progress we have a stake. At the same time we have indicated our support for continuing liberalization in this country. Such liberalization should come gradually and not in a revolutionary manner so as to maintain this stability. Free elections next summer seemed to us a good goal for a start. I then asked him how he viewed the future role of the Shah.

Moghadam said he agreed the Shah was needed, both to keep the army under control and to prevent any possible chaos that might result from a sudden collapse of authority. I asked if this did not mean he agreed with me? He did not demur directly but repeated another basic theme of his that the Shah is not sincere and is just fooling around, hoodwinking us Americans. U.S. Presidents come and go and the Shah knows how to take advantage of them. For example, KENNEDY had indicated some helpful desires in connection with internal political liberalization and thought the Shah was applying them. Then came JOHNSON and NIXON who reversed this policy and gave the Shah everything he wanted. He recalled an occasion when a USIS officer has asked him if he would be interested in meeting with President Nixon at the Iran-America Society during the President's visit

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to Iran, to which Moghadam had assented. Nixon never visited the IAS, and he had a letter from the USIS officer explaining that no one in the Embassy had been involved in Nixon's only activity here, a private audience with the Shah. When President Carter came in he had raised hopes, but the recent messages puzzled Moghadam and his friends.

I again went through our policy, suggesting that Moghadam and his friends would do best to organize themselves to take advantage of the promised free elections. I added that it was unrealistic of them to believe that the Shah and his supporters would yield power to the oppositionists simply because the oppositionists asked for it. The oppositionists must show they have something to contribute. I noted he himself had told me a couple of months ago the trouble they were having in pulling together a common program. If the opposition had a set of specific goals and an organization the Shah could negotiate with them and speed their participation in internal political situation. As long as individual leaders present a inchoate approach, what could he expect Shah or anyone else to take them seriously? Moghadam appeared to accept these remarks.

He reverted to the theme that the Shah had no intention of liberalizing as witness the appointment of Sharif-Emami -- "a corrupt man" -- instead of choosing someone more suitable. He rejected my argument that the Shah is preparing the succession of his son; the Shah is far too selfish to worry about his son, Moghadam said. He also referred to the killing of so many people in Jaleh Square on September 8. He said the situation now was "worse than before." Then they tortured, now they killed people. He did not press this argument further, however, when I reminded him of some of the horrors he had accused the government of when we just began our talks a year ago.

After some further discussion we agreed to meet again once Moghadam has had a chance to sound out others among his colleagues (e.g. Engineer BAZARGAN, who Moghadam said just returned from Mashad).

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COMMENT: Moghadam was certainly feeling me out with his remarks about the Carter statements, but I believe he reflects true concern among the constitutional opposition as to whether U.S. policy has shifted in the last few months. I expect to have this question brought up again and will deal with it along the lines indicated.

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10/16/78

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Rahmatollah MOQADAM-MARAQEI  
(Phonetic: mohgADAHM mahrahgeh-EE)

IRAN

Leader, Radical Movement  
of Iran (since 1975)

Addressed as:  
Mr. Moqadam

OFFICE OF  
CENTRAL REFERENCE



An irrigation engineer and cartographer, Rahmatollah Moqadam-Maraqei helped to found the Radical Movement of Iran and has led it ever since. Politically active in opposition to the Shah for over two decades, he has been jailed for dissident activities since September 1978. Moqadam classifies himself as a moderate and insists that he has always striven for freedom within the limits of Iran's Constitution. He describes his political philosophy as being somewhere between those of the socialists and the centrists in France. In addition, he notes that the term radical in his organization's title was inspired by the moderate Radical Socialist Party in France, and he resents any attempt to associate his party with extremism. (C)

US officials with whom Moqadam has met assess him as a balanced, pro-American, intellectual man who is sincere and communicates frankly. They also note that in mid-1978 Moqadam, because of his moderate stance, had difficulties in his meetings with other opposition leaders who were trying to formulate a unified opposition program. Moqadam has always been friendly to US officials and is willing to carry on substantive dialogues. He admired former Prime Minister (1951-53) Mohammad Mosadeq but was not a member of the National Front, a coalition that supported Mosadeq in his power struggle with the Shah. He has told US officials that the US image has suffered in Iran because of American support for the Shah and lack of understanding for Mosadeq's historical significance. (C)

Born in Tehran, Moqadam is a graduate of the Iranian Military Academy. He studied cartography and geography in France from 1949 to 1953, graduating from the French Army College and the University

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of Paris. He returned to Iran and served as an officer in the army until 1955. He was a member of the now defunct Mardom (loyal opposition) Party for a short period beginning in 1955. In 1961 he served as a deputy in the Majles (lower house of Parliament) from Azerbaijan. He has held several positions dealing with irrigation in the Ministry of Agriculture. (U)

Moqadam, about 58, has published articles on agriculture and land use. In 1962 he spent two months in the United States observing American political processes and agriculture as a Foreign Leader Grantee. He speaks French and English. (U)

13 December 1978



Hasan NAZIE  
(Phonetic: naZEEeh)

IRAN

Chairman, Bar Association  
(since about July 1978)

Addressed as:  
Mr. Nazie

OFFICE OF  
CENTRAL REFERENCE



Hasan Nazie, a lawyer and a longtime political activist, has promised to make the Bar Association a more active institution than it has been. Shortly after taking office, he associated the organization with a call for the retrial in civilian courts of political prisoners who had been convicted in military courts. He signaled his intention to introduce such organizational reforms as holding more meetings, circulating a monthly report to the country's lawyers, prosecuting corrupt lawyers, and attacking bureaucratic red tape. Nazie is ambitious and something of a political opportunist; in 1966 he reportedly believed he could use Tudeh (Communist) Party support in advancing his political fortunes. (S)

In the 1950s Nazie, an ardent nationalist, was one of the founders of the Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI), a rightwing, religious, nationalist organization that was at various times associated with the National Front (NF), a coalition that supported Prime Minister (1951-53) Mohammad Mosadeq in his struggle with the Shah. After the FMI withdrew from the NF in May 1961, Nazie emerged as the leader of a party majority that favored a more peaceful effort to assume power and argued against the use of violence in removing the Shah. During that period, he and his party advocated an end to the acceptance of foreign military aid, the installation of a neutralist (but non-Communist) government, and reasonable control over the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Consortium, a group of 17 international oil companies working in partnership with the NIOC. After the FMI rejoined the NF in October 1961, he served

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on the Central Council and the Central Executive Committee of the FMI and headed its Propaganda and Publications Commission. (S)

Little career or personal information is currently available on Nazie. Now in his early fifties, he apparently was one of the leading figures among the younger nationalists in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1960 he worked for the Workers Social Insurance Corporation, and in July 1961 he was imprisoned for a short time for anti-government activity. In 1962 Nazie was a member of the council of the Association of Azerbaijani Citizens Resident in Tehran. (C)

13 December 1978

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1005 GDS 7/16/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

FROM: ECRG, IR

SUBJECT: IRANIAN INTERESTS IN PURCHASE OF REFINED PETROLEUM

(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

1. YOUR BACKGROUND IN YOUR MEETING WITH NIOC'S NASI  
YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING. ON JULY 14, 1985, NASI  
ACTING ON BEHALF OF NASIH, ASKED AMERADA-HESS TO CELL  
100,000 BARRELS TO BE ALLOCATED BETWEEN KEROSENE AND  
HEATING FUEL. AZIMI EXPLAINED THAT BOMBING OF  
CRUDE PIPELINE FOLLOWED BY A SIMILAR BOMBING OF PRODUCT  
PIPELINE HAD RESULTED IN A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN ABADAN  
REFINERY OUTPUT TO 100,000 BARRELS A DAY. REDUCTION WAS  
DUE TO NIOC'S INABILITY TO STORE ABADAN'S PRODUCT. IT  
IS VERY UNLIKELY TO BEGIN OPERATIONS. IRANIANS  
REQUISITION OF A PANTER WITHOUT ADEQUATE FUEL  
2. 100,000 BARRELS WILL HAVE NO LONG-TERM IMPACT.

3. AMERADA-HESS HAS AGREED TO SUPPLY ABOUT  
100,000 BARRELS DIVIDED ROUGHLY BETWEEN HEATING FUEL AND  
KEROSENE. THERE WILL BE NO REDUCTION IN US DOMESTIC STOCKS,  
DEMAND BY HESS, AND FOREIGN SUPPLIES WILL BE DRAWN  
FROM THE OIL MARKET. IRANIANS HAVE CONTRACTED FOR TWO TANKERS

(100,000 TONS EACH) WHICH ARE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN LOADING VERY  
SOON.

4. NASIH HAS BEEN INFORMED BY HESS OF USS ARMY L AND  
HAS BEEN APPRECIATIVE OF THE FACT THAT USS  
WILL COME SO QUICKLY. EMERGENCY NEED FOR FUEL INTENSIFIED  
SLIGHTLY BY ARRIVAL OF TWO TANKERS. NASIH  
MAY PERHAPS THE TWO TANKERS REFERRED TO  
(GLOVE), SO HESS PLANS TO SPACE ITS SHIPMENTS OVER  
THE PERIOD ABADAN REFINERY EXPECTED TO BE OPEN.

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 21 OF TEHRAN 07514

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL  
CHRG: PROG 7/19/79  
APPRV: CDA:EBLAINEN  
DRFTD: ECON:RBASH  
CLEAR: NONE  
R: ECON-3 CDA  
POL RF CHRON

NO. 12065: XPS-4 7/13/99 (BASH, RICHARD M.) OR-E

TAGS: ENRG PINT IR

SUBJECT: CHARGE'S CALL ON NIOC CHIEF NAZIH

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

SUMMARY: ON JULY 17, CHARGE, ACCOMPANIED BY PETOFF, CALLED ON NIOC MANAGING DIRECTOR HASSAN NAZIH. DISCUSSION CENTERED ON 1) THE NOW FAMILIAR (TO US AT LEAST) LITANY OF UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOLUTION AND OUR PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AN INDEPENDENT AND STRONG IRAN, 2) THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF NAZIH'S POLITICAL ROLE AND BELIEFS, AND 3) PETROLEUM AND THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN. NAZIH DEMONSTRATED A FRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE U.S.; HE IS A SECULARIST WHO IS WILLING TO CHALLENGE SOME OF THE CONCEPTS OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (AND THE PEOPLE WHO ADVOCATE A "PURE" FORM OF SUCH A GOVERNMENT); AND, WHILE RECOGNIZING SOME PROBLEMS IN KHUZESTAN, HE TENDED TO MINIMIZE THEIR IMPORTANCE. LAST PARA INCLUDES NAZIH BIO. END SUMMARY.

2. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S EXPRESSIONS OF USG ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOLUTION AND OUR DESIRE TO ESTABLISH A GOOD AND REGULARLY-BASED BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, NAZIH COMMENTED AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH ON OUR TWO COUNTRIES' MUTUAL INTERESTS IN DESIRABILITY OF "REMAINING" GOOD FRIENDS, ETC. SIGNIFICANTLY, NAZIH PRAISED PRESIDENT CARTER'S INITIATIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAD "MADE THE SHAH'S POSITION HOPELESS." IN AN INTERESTING ALLUSION TO THE RUSSIANS, NAZIH SAID THAT IF WE (IRAN AND THE U.S.) HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WE (IRANIANS) SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THE U.S. IS THERE FOR US AND THAT THE USG WOULD HELP IN RESOLVING PROBLEMS CAUSED BY OTHER FOREIGNERS.

3. NAZIH DID NOT SAY ANYTHING OF PARTICULAR NOTE ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION. HE SAID THAT HE MIGHT BE A CANDIDATE FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE TIME FRAME FOR THE PROCESS OF ELECTING AND INSTALLING A NEW GOVERNMENT WAS TOO SHORT AND THAT HE INTENDED TO INSIST ON A SHORT SILENCE. NAZIH, THE HEAD OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION, SAID THAT THE ASSOCIATION IN A MEETING JULY 16 HAD DECIDED TO ADVISE THE GOVERNMENT AND KHOMEINI TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE.

4. CHARGE GAVE NAZIH A SUMMARY OF THE NEW ENERGY POLICIES AND GOALS ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT AS WELL AS A COPY OF THE FACT SHEET ON THE POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS. NAZIH EXPRESSED THE GENERAL TRUST OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVES, BUT APPEARED TO BE ILL-PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE ENERGY PICTURE IN MORE THAN GENERALITIES. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S REQUEST THAT IRAN MAINTAIN AN AMBIGUOUS

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SUPPLY OF OIL TO THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET AND THEREBY MAKE THE TRANSITION IN THE U.S. AWAY FROM AN EXCESSIVE DEPENDENCY ON IMPORTED OIL POSSIBLE AND SMOOTH. NAZIH STATED THAT IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN NIOC THAT SET THE LEVEL OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS BUT THAT THE PRODUCTION LEVEL FOR 1979 WAS 4.0 MMBD. HE ALSO SAID THAT THIS FIGURE MIGHT BE CHANGED FOR 1980.

1. IN REGARD TO SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN AND ITS PRESENT AND POTENTIAL FUTURE IMPACT ON THE OIL SECTOR, NAZIH WAS UNWILLING OR UNABLE (PROBABLY THE FORMER) TO BE VERY SPECIFIC. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PROBLEMS EXISTED, BUT HE MAINTAINED THAT ONLY A FEW PEOPLE WERE RESPONSIBLE AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PASDARANS SHOULD BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS. NAZIH DENIED THAT THE ARAB DISTURBANCES OR THE SABOTAGE HAD HAD ANY IMPACT ON CRUDE PRODUCTION OR EXPORTS (SEPTEL).

2. NAZIH GRADUATED FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY (LAW) IN 1944, WORKED AS A LAWYER IN IRAN FOR A TIME, AND THEN CONTINUED HIS STUDIES IN SWITZERLAND FROM 1950 TO 1953. DURING HIS MEMBERSHIP OF MOSSADEGH, NAZIH SERVED AS LEGAL ADVISOR TO AN ILLEGALLY PUBLISHED SOCIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION. DURING THIS PERIOD, NAZIH WAS ALSO ACTIVE IN SUPERVISION OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM. HE WAS A FOUNDER IN 1963 OF THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND HAS BEEN AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE NATIONAL FRONT SINCE 1963. ACCORDING TO AN UNCLASSIFIED BIOGRAPHY (FROM WHICH INFO ABOVE WAS OBTAINED), NAZIH WAS ARRESTED AND IMPRISONED SEVERAL TIMES. NAZIH HELPED FOUND THE SOCIETY FOR THE DEFENSE OF

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 07514

ANIGHTS AND THE SOCIETY OF IRANIAN LAWYERS. DURING  
A 17 MEETING WITH CHARGE, NAZIH WAS VERY FRIENDLY AND  
HOSPITABLE. HE WAS WILLING TO CONDUCT MEETING IN FRENCH  
HE SAID THAT HE DOES NOT SPEAK ENGLISH AND HE APPEARED  
TO UNDERSTAND VERY LITTLE ENGLISH. (NIOC'S DIRECTOR FOR  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, REZA AZIMI, TRANSLATED.) NAZIH  
IS VERY SOFT AND SLOW-SPOKEN. DESPITE HIS APPOINTMENT AS  
HEAD OF NIOC, NAZIH OBVIOUSLY REMAINS FAR MORE INTERESTED  
IN LAW AND POLITICS. HE PROBABLY LEAVES THE DAY-TO-DAY  
RUNNING OF THE OIL COMPANY, LARGELY TO HIS EXPERIENCED  
NIOC STAFF. LAINGEN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 07514

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

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1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

... .. C. A. ...

1. The first group of variables includes the following:

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...and the fact that the ...

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  solution on the amount of the  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  consumed in the reaction of the  $\text{H}_2\text{O}_2$  with the  $\text{Fe}^{2+}$  ion in the presence of the  $\text{Fe}^{3+}$  ion.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

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1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*)

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1. ... OF PERPETUATING 'PACIFIC' ...

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TO A. L. ALTRISIO, DEBATE, THE DATE OF . . .

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UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

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SHAPAS

HE IS CHINESE WHO WAS BORN IN 1945 ABOUT 40 MILES FROM HONG KONG, AND AT THAT TIME HIS NAME WAS ON THE LIST OF CHINESE WHO WERE LEAVING THE COUNTRY. HE WAS BORN IN HONG KONG AND WAS BORN IN 1945.

HE IS CHINESE WHO WAS BORN IN 1945 ABOUT 40 MILES FROM HONG KONG, AND AT THAT TIME HIS NAME WAS ON THE LIST OF CHINESE WHO WERE LEAVING THE COUNTRY. HE WAS BORN IN HONG KONG AND WAS BORN IN 1945.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10548

I.O. 12065: GDS 10/1/85 (SENS. A.D.) OR-E  
TAGS: ENR7, IR  
SUBJECT: NAZIH OUT AS NIOC DIRECTOR?

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE IRANIAN PRESS OVER THE WEEKEND HAS DEVOTED MUCH SPACE -- AND ENGAGED IN MUCH SPECULATION -- OVER THE SUMMONING OF NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY CHAIRMAN HASSAN NAZIH BEFORE THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. NAZIH HAS NOT BEEN RELIEVED OF HIS DUTIES, AND HE HAS NOT BEEN CHARGED SPECIFICALLY: RATHER HE HAS BEEN TOLD TO ANSWER ATTACKS BY THE CLERGY THAT HE HAS ACTED "AGAINST ISLAM AND THE NATION. AND THE

3. ALTHOUGH INSTRUCTED TO APPEAR IN COURT SUNDAY MORNING, NAZIH HAS NOT DONE SO; NOR HAS HE RETURNED TO HIS HOME. OIL INDUSTRY SOURCES HAVE TOLD US THAT HE HAS IN FACT CONTACTED THE COURT DIRECTLY, BY PHONE, TO ARRANGE AN APPEARANCE LATER, AFTER EMOTIONS HAVE COOLED. (NAZIH IS HIMSELF A LAWYER, AND IS PRESIDENT OF THE IRANIAN BAR ASSOCIATION.) THERE HAS BEEN NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS, ALTHOUGH AYP QUOTED NAZIH'S WIFE AS SAYING HE HAD SPOKEN TO PRIMUM BAZARGAN'S OFFICE.

4. NIOC PERSONNEL SEEM STUNNED BY THE ATTACKS ON NAZIH. HOWEVER, THERE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN NO STRIKES IN SUPPORT OF NAZIH AND REPORTS ARE THAT PRODUCTION IN KHUZISTAN CONTINUES NORMALLY.

5. COMMENT: KHOMEINI MAY HAVE DECIDED TO SIDE WITH THOSE WHO BELIEVE NAZIH HAS GONE TOO FAR TO PROTECT NIOC PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH THE FORMER REGIME. THE APPOINTMENT ON SATURDAY OF ALI AKBAR MOINTEFAR AS THE NEW OIL MINISTER WILL BE SEEN TO DILUTE NAZIH'S POWER. WHETHER THIS WILL PERMIT NAZIH TO BE RETAINED AS NIOC DIRECTOR IS NOT CLEAR. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO REACH INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT CONTACTS FOR THEIR VIEWS, AND WILL COMMENT FURTHER AS THE ISSUE DEVELOPS. LAINGEN  
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TEHRAN 10695

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4095  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10695

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL  
CHRG: STAT 10/4/79  
APPRV: ECON:ADSENS  
DRFTD: ECON:AGROSSMAN:BR  
CLEAR: NONE  
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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/4/85 (SENS, A.D.) OR-E  
TAGS: ENRG, IR  
SUBJECT: NAZIH OUT AS NIOC DIRECTOR?

1. (C) THE CASE OF FORMER NIOC CHAIRMAN HASSAN NAZIH CONTINUES TO MAKE HEADLINES IN IRAN. ALTHOUGH HE REMAINS AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE COMPANY, HE HAS NOT APPEARED IN PUBLIC SINCE SEPT 28 AND WAS WIDELY RUMORED TO HAVE FLED THE COUNTRY. (WE HAVE BEEN RELIABLY TOLD HOWEVER THAT HE IS STILL IN TEHRAN AND IN TOUCH WITH HIS FAMILY.) IT IS REPORTED THAT HARRASSMENT OF HIS FAMILY BY REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS HAS DIMINISHED ALTHOUGH HIS HOUSE CONTINUES TO BE WATCHED AND HIS TELEPHONE, IT IS ALLEGED, TAPPED.

2. (C) THE NEW OIL MINISTER, ALI AKBAR MOINFAR, AND PRIMIN BAZARGAN FOUND IT NECESSARY TO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY ON MONDAY THAT THE POLITICAL BROUHAHAS WOULD NOT AFFECT IRAN'S POLICY ON CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND EXPORT. THIS WAS CONFIRMED TO ECONCONS TODAY BY REZA AZIMI-HOSSEINI, HEAD OF NIOC'S INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, WHO ADDED THAT ONLY ONE MAN -- MOINFAR -- HAS "AUTHORITY TO SPEAK FOR THE COMPANY. MEANWHILE A CERTAIN PARALYSIS CAN BE NOTED AT THE HIGHER LEVELS OF NIOC HEADQUARTERS. AZIMI SURMISED THAT BY NEXT WEEK HE--AND WE-- WOULD HAVE "A CLEARER IDEA OF WHO WILL BE IN SENIOR POSITIONS". THIS LATTER COMMENT REFERS TO MOINFAR'S PROMISE, QUOTED IN THE PRESS, OF A "CLEAN SWEEP" OF THE NIOC RANKS -- WITH THE TIMING YET TO BE DETERMINED.

3. (C) IN A LETTER TO PRIMIN BAZARGAN, MORTEZA AQDAMI, SECRETARY OF THE ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF THE OIL INDUSTRY, SAID "THE OIL WORKERS DO NOT SEE EYE TO EYE WITH NAZIH BECAUSE IN PRINCIPLE HE HAS NO FAITH EITHER IN ISLAM OR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OR THE LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION." THE LETTER WENT ON TO BASE THIS ACCUSATION ON NAZIH'S ALLEGED OPPOSITION TO CERTAIN POLICIES (INCLUDING BANK NATIONALIZATION) DECLARED BY KHOMEINI TO BE "REVOLUTIONARY ACTS."

4. (C) WRITING TO THE TEHRAN TIMES, NAZIH REJECTED ALL CHARGES AGAINST HIM. ACCORDING TO THE PAPER HE QUESTIONED WHETHER HE COULD SECURE A FAIR HEARING BEFORE THE REVOLUTIONARY COURT BECAUSE OF INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE PARTIES. NAZIH EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO SUBMIT TO INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY A COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF A TOP RELIGIOUS LEADER (PREFERABLY AYATOLLAH SAYED KAZEM SHARIATSSADAM) THE PRIME MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND PROSECUTOR-GENERAL AYATOLLAH ALI MODDOUSI, UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI.

5. (U) NAZIH'S REPLY TO THE 14 CHARGES AGAINST HIM WAS

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TEHRAN 10695

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TEHRAN 10695

PUBLISHED IN THIS MORNING'S VERNACULAR "BAMDAD" AND IS BEING TRANSMITTED TODAY BY UNCLASSIFIED TELEGRAM.

6. (C) REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF HIS CASE BEFORE THE ISLAMIC COURT, A WELL-PLACED SOURCE IN NIOC TOLD ECONCOUNS THAT NAZIN "HAD TO GO" FOR 3 REASONS:

A) HE WAS EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF THE "INTERFERENCE" OF THE CLERGY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS,

B) HE WAS INSENSITIVE TO THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTRACTS WORKER'S CRITICISM OF HIM AND HE GLOSSED OVER THEIR CHARGE THAT THE REVOLUTION WAS PERMITTING THEIR CONTINUED EXPLOITATION, AND

C) HE WAS A WEAK ADMINISTRATOR IN MANY RESPECTS, TRYING TO PLEASE EVERYONE WITHIN NIOC WITHOUT, IN THE END, SOLVING THE FIRM'S REAL PROBLEMS. LAINGEN

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TEHRAN 10695

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 - 201-582

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TEHRAN 10712

DE RUQMHR #0712 280 \*\*  
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4109  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10712

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL  
CHRG: STAT 10/6/79  
APPRV: E/C:ADSENS  
DRFTD: E/C:AGROSSMAN:G  
CLEAR: NONE  
DISTR: ECON3 CHG POL  
CHRON 6/WEB

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/6/85, (SENS. A.D.), OR-E  
TAGS: ENRG, IR  
SUBJ: HASSAN NAZIH AFFAIR

1. A HIGHLY-PLACED SOURCE IN NIOC TOLD ECONCOUNS THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN MADE NOT TO NAME A NEW MANAGING DIRECTOR UNTIL THE NAZIH CASE HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF. MEANWHILE THE DIRECTORS ARE WORKING WITH THE NEW OIL MINISTER ALI AKBAR MOINFAR DIRECTLY, ALTHOUGH THE MINISTER DOES NOT MAINTAIN AN OFFICE AT NIOC PREMISES. WE ARE TOLD THAT DR. MOHAMMAD-ALI NABECH IS ACTING AS "SHADOW" MANAGING DIRECTOR FOR THE MOMENT.

2. MEANWHILE PETOFF HAS LEARNED FROM INDUSTRY SOURCES THAT THE NIOC BOARD WROTE A LETTER TO AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI EXPRESSING "100 PERCENT SUPPORT" FOR NAZIH AND EMPHASIZING THAT COMPANY DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE BY THEM AND NOT JUST BY NAZIH. NAZIH IS SAID TO BE STILL IN HIDING AND IN DAILY CONTACT WITH HIS FAMILY AND FORMER ASSOCIATES.

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TEHRAN 10712

Post..... **Iran**

Date of preparation **November 20, 1950**

## CONFIDENTIAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Note.—Consult *Diplomatic Serial 3565 of April 10, 1941*, and references therein. Forms are to be prepared on typewriter in triplicate, one copy for files and two for Department.

Name..... **BAGHAI**..... **Baghai**  
(Surname) (Given name)  
Nationality..... **Iranian**..... Title, if any, **Doctor of Philosophy**  
Date and place of birth..... **1906, Kerman**  
Position..... **Deputy to 16th Majlis**..... Date appointed..... **February 1950**  
Party affiliations..... **National Front**  
Previous career..... **See below**

Languages spoken..... **Persian, French, a little Arabic**

Attitude toward and service in the United States **U.S. Baghai disapproves of intervention by any foreign power in the internal affairs of Iran. Currently he is sharply critical of the U.S.**

Family details..... **Son of the late Mirza Shams Bahmani, famous Iranian patriot, who died in the Constitutional fight of 1906. Divorced.**

**REMARKS:** (Should present a brief word picture of the individual, including race, religion, fraternal affiliation, education, reputation, personality, influence, attitude toward other nations, etc.)

Education:..... **Primary education at Kerman.  
Secondary education in Tehran.  
Sorbonne University, Paris, degree in Philosophy and Pedagogy.**

### WORK:

- 1936-date:** Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Pedagogy, University of Tehran.
- 1939-41:** Two years' military service, as reservist officer.
- 1947-49:** Deputy to 15th Majlis from Kerman, member of Budget Committee and Education Committee.
- Dec 1949:** Arrested on charge of intriguing against the Imperial Army and imprisoned.
- Feb 1950:** Tried by Civil Court and released from prison.
- Feb 1950:** Elected deputy to 16th Majlis, member of Education Committee and Oil Committee, member of National Front.

Prepared by..... **Mary R. Carroll**

Remarks:

Dr. Baghai's name first became prominent on the political roster during the first term of the 15th Majlis. He gained wide-spread popularity at that time for his opposition to Golestan's Supplementary Oil Agreement and his attacks on the Army for interference in general elections.

The latter grievance became almost obsessive, and in March 1949 he delivered a nine-day filibuster before the Majlis, accusing Ali Razmara, then Chief of Staff, of illegal interference in non-military affairs. He sent an open letter to the Shah on the same subject and filled his daily paper, Shahed, with similar attacks. This all-out campaign earned him immense popular acclaim but eventually led, in December 1949, to his arrest. He was tried by a military court and sentenced to one year's imprisonment, on rather flimsy charges of intriguing against the Imperial Army. Popular resentment ran so high that he was tried again by a civil court and acquitted. Re-elected to the Majlis in February 1950, Dr. Baghai is currently one of its most vocal deputies.

He makes no secret of the fact that he is still out for Razmara's neck and accuses him of five specific offenses: (1) ignoring Constitutional law; (2) acting as accessory to the assassination of Mohammed Masud, late editor of Mard-e-Gorus; (3) playing GAI with any foreign power that supports his position, however injurious to the country's interests; (4) suppressing the press and otherwise infringing upon civil liberties; (5) promoting a return to dictatorship. During the recent trial of Mohammed Jafari, alleged assassin of Dehghan, Dr. Baghai spoke in Jafari's defense, reportedly not because he believed in Jafari's innocence but because the trial offered a dramatic means of slashing at Razmara's regime.

Toward the same ends, his tactics in the current Majlis are conspicuously obstructionist, and his editorials in Shahed defy the government on any pretext. (Shahed, which toes a straight National Front line, was recently suppressed because of persistent attacks on the Court and the government, but promptly reappeared under the name of Ahang-Sharg.)

There is no doubt that Dr. Baghai is intensely ambitious, and many American observers feel that he would grasp any opportunity to further his plans for a political career. Opportunism outweighs his sincerity, and he probably is using the National Front as a convenient vehicle to carry his power. Although he charged, during the Jafari trial, that Communism was a "devilish doctrine, the teaching of which is the root of all evil," he has been accused of extreme leftist views — at any rate, he can be expected to dance to any tune. Opportunism even carries over into personal affairs: he has stated publicly that he divorced his wife because politicians could operate better as bachelors.

Although there is little confidence in the stability of Dr. Baghai's thinking, he is generally considered intelligent, well-informed, the brains of the National Front movement. In popularity and influence, he ranks next to Dr. Mosadeq in the National Front group.

A big stocky man, Dr. Baghai — pleasant and soft-spoken socially — is a fiery orator on the Majlis floor and becomes almost frenetic in disagreements. There is little evidence to refute his reputation for integrity; but his sincerity is doubtful, with opportunism so obviously a determining factor in all his actions.

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**AMEMBASSY TEHRAN**

**529**

**October 18, 1951**

**Air Pouch**

**The Iranian Workers' Party**

Recently the Embassy's Labor Attache, Mr. C. C. Finch, discussed the Iranian Workers' Party and problems related to it with Mr. Nosafar Baghai, the founder of the Party. Mr. Finch had met with him twice in July in Abadan. The discussions at that time were particularly related to the oil crisis. The latest conversation, because of its interest, is summarized in this despatch. Dr. Issa Sepahbodi, a close colleague of Dr. Baghai in the work of the Iranian Workers' Party, participated in this meeting. He impressed Mr. Finch as being at least the equal of Dr. Baghai in his intimate knowledge of the past history, present operations, and anticipated future of the Party.

During the course of this interview, Dr. Baghai discussed with Mr. Finch his reasons for going to Abadan last summer, the political aims of his party, its membership and the methods by which it is financed. Dr. Baghai also described the source and numerical strength of his support and commented in detail on specific leaders of the non-communist Iranian trade unions.

Dr. Baghai stated that he has now established branches of his party in Ahwaz, Qum, Karaj, Tehran, Shushtar, Disful and Ram Hormoz. He proposes to establish branches at Isfahan, Zanjan, and Savah.

Dr. Baghai rather defensively introduced the subject of his visit to Abadan which he allegedly made in order to establish a branch of the Workers' Party in that city. As the Department knows, he failed in that effort and was in fact said to have had his car stoned in a visit he made to the Fields Area. He now states that his visit to Abadan was not to establish a branch of the Party, but was purely a private visit and that he went with no special encouragement or instructions from the Prime Minister, contrary to the rumors current at the time of his arrival in Abadan. He stated that he hoped to establish a branch of his party in Abadan in the future, but has no present plans concerning it.

Dr. Baghai described his party as "socialist in attitude in so far as socialist policy is consistent with the policies of the Iranian Government." He especially noted that the policies of his party are linked to those of the National Front and that the party opposes the aims and the policies of the Tudeh. He claimed a membership of about 10,000 for the Workers' Party in Tehran and defined membership in terms of those supporters who are registered as party members and including only those who pay a monthly subscription of five rials or more. He also claimed that there were about a million supporters of his party in Iran, but he was unwilling to comment on how a proportion of these could be described as supporters if one used this Tehran definition. He did estimate that his hard core of enthusiastic supporters numbered about 300. Dr. Baghai estimated that about 1,000 of the 10,000 members claimed for Tehran were workers who belonged to trade unions. He stated that he had no idea how many trade union members throughout the country supported his party, although he did admit that the interest and participation of trade union members was most limited. He believes that the limited participation is actually not a result of the weak and uncertain leadership of the trade unions.

His comments on specific leaders were as follows:

Messrs. Kheirou Hedayat, the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers of Iran (ESKI), Azis Gheselbash, the Iranian Trade Union Congress (ITUC) and Mohammad Meshaver (ITUC) were all characterized as "insecure leaders." He believes that Mr. Cyrus Majd (now flirting with his own version of a trade union supporting National Front policies) has a more impressive personality but Mr. Majd was described as "being worthy of no credit in trade union activities." Mr. Amir Qavan (originally the Central Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Peasants of Iran) (EMKA), now an officer in the ITUC, is thought by Dr. Baghai to be a Tudeh leader, in spite of his protestations to the contrary. Dr. Baghai thought it unlikely that Mr. Qavan would be able to win any real workers' cooperation since, according to information received by the Iranian Workers' Party, Mr. Qavan has been repudiated by the workers.

The other outstanding trade union leader in Isfahan, Mr. Shams-e-Sadri, is also thought by Dr. Baghai to lack the confidence of the workers.

Dr. Baghai stated that there were only four Iranian trade union leaders who had even limited confidence of the workers. They were Mr. Gheselbash, who, despite personal shortcomings,



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Tehran Despatch No. 529,  
of 18, 1951, page 3.

is thought by Mr. Baghai to have "a little confidence" of the workers; Mr. Abbas Mirzai, formerly of the Tobacco Workers' Union; Mr. Ghodai; and a man in Yazd, not previously known to the Labor Attache, by the name of Gatafan.

**FOR THE AMBASSADOR:**

Arthur L. Richards  
Counselor of Embassy

**CONFIDENTIAL**



THE FOREIGN SERVICE .  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEMORANDUM

*P.S. File*

*Dec 10*

TO : Mr. Roy M. Melbourne  
Mr. John H. Stutesman

FROM : C. C. Finch

SUBJECT: C. C. Finch conversation with Dr. Sepahbodi

Monday, December 10, I had a conversation with Dr. Sepahbodi. He is an officer of the Iranian Workers Party and is a close friend of Dr. Bagai. Both Sepahbodi and Bagai have been members of the faculty of the University of Tehran for some years. They have a close personal relationship. I believe that it can be a safe assumption, therefore, that Sepahbodi speaks with some authority about the Iranian Workers Party.

Dr. Sepahbodi opened our conversation by stating that the Iranian Workers Party is supporting four candidates, under its own aegis. They are Mr. Yasserli (Ahvaz constituency); Dr. Gousheguir (Mistfol); Dr. Barai (Tehran) and Dr. Sepahbodi (Tehran).

Dr. Sepahbodi emphasized repeatedly the fact that the National Front was not itself a political party but, rather, represented the "broad interests of all classes of people". In an apparent effort to give the National Front certain practical political support Sepahbodi and Bagai have been instrumental in calling together a special committee, with between 10 and 12 members to "advise" Dr. Mosadeq and to give him support. The four principal groups represented on the committee are, in the order given by Sepahbodi, (1) the followers of Kashani, (2) the Iranian Workers Party, (3) the Iran Party, and (4) the corporations of the bazaar.

Among those attending the meetings are Messrs. Hassibi, Alayar Saleh, Nariman, Moshar, Makki, and Kashani. The group has no regular officers, no parliamentary procedure and no fixed time or place to meet. Dr. Mosadeq does not attend meetings of the group because, according to Sepahbodi, he is the head of government and cannot become involved in politics. When Mullah Kashani attends meetings he is always, by acclamation, made chairman of that particular session because of "his great eminence in the affairs of Iran".

Later in the conversation Sepahbodi obliquely again referred to the committee indicating the further aim of the committee was to establish a "close group of intellectuals interested in social and administrative reform".

I also discussed with Sepahbodi the part played by the Iranian Workers Party in the demonstration and riot of December 6. He stated

File

that it was imperative for me to realize that the struggle between the Iranian Workers Party and Tudeh is ideological and is not one which can satisfactorily be resolved by physical force. Dr. Sepahbodi again claimed that the platform of the Iranian Workers Party was based on that of scientific socialism but he also volunteered that social needs in Iran are so great and immediate that more "dynamic" action is necessary for Iran than for Britain. In fact, although he did not use these points of reference, he made clear that the alleged socialist philosophy of the Iranian Workers Party was substantially to the left of Fabians and more similar to that of the French and German syndicalists of the last half of the 19th century.

After a lengthy diatribe on the difficulties of intellectuals in Iran today, Dr. Sepahbodi suddenly stated, in connection with the December 6 riot and demonstration, that the Iranian Workers Party could not, of course, be held accountable, as a party, for the individual actions of its members and that if any members had used violence during the demonstration it was regrettable and those guilty should be chastised. He also stated that although the contest of the Iranian Workers Party and the communists was ideological and not physical, that it might "later" be necessary for all the democratic forces in Iran to punish the communists physically in order to make them realize ideological validity, importance, and power of their opposition.

Dr. Sepahbodi was completely at ease, self-assured and glib during the entire interview. He suggested by his ready answers his anticipation of the line of the questions. He has asked for a further appointment to discuss with me the current activities of the Iranian Workers Party. I have tentatively arranged to visit him at his home on the afternoon of December 13, barring any objection of the Embassy.

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*Dec 15*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TO: Mr. R. M. Malbourne  
FROM: Mr. C. C. Finch  
SUBJECT: Summary of Conversation between Mr. Sepahbodi and Labor Attache  
C. C. Finch (15 Dec 1951)

Mr. Sepahbodi called at his own request on the Labor Attache to discuss further details of the Iranian Workers Party. In response to a question by the Labor Attache, Mr. Sepahbodi alleged that the Workers Party was absolutely without any responsibility for the demonstrations and resulting riot of 6 December. He stated that the responsible rioters must have been those outside the Workers Party who claimed party membership in an effort to confuse the public and to discredit the party. Sepahbodi stated unequivocally that the agitators claiming Party affiliation did so without authority and with no encouragement.

Mr. Sepahbodi stated that the Party, which he had earlier described as socialist in concept, intended itself as a third force between the policies of the Soviet Union and those of the United States, with the Workers Party embracing neither set of concepts. As a consequence of the foregoing, Mr. Sepahbodi alleged that Dr. Baghai, the leader of the Workers Party, thought it necessary to speak out publicly against the United States. Mr. Sepahbodi believes that had Dr. Baghai done otherwise the mass of the people would have believed the stories in the newspapers, which are said to be communist inspired, that the United States Embassy in Tehran is giving financial aid and moral encouragement to the Party. Mr. Sepahbodi thinks it was in the interests of good Iran-American relations that America be castigated in order to preclude any possibility that Iranians would believe that the United States was a supporter of the Party. Mr. Sepahbodi was most uneasy at efforts of the Labor Attache to establish just what the Party believes constitutes a socialist philosophy. He revealed his lack of more than an elementary knowledge of socialistic history and his almost total unfamiliarity with the development of international socialism. Mr. Sepahbodi claimed that the leaders of the Workers Party did not find that its devotion to socialist ideals was incompatible with the aims of the Mosadeq Government.

Mr. Sepahbodi denied that Mullah Kashani was providing funds for the Workers Party out of Shrine funds, alleging that the largess at the disposal of Mullah Kashani was much exaggerated. He insisted that the total income of the Workers Party came from individual donations from its members and supporters; these sums varied from 5 rials per man per month to hundreds (Mr. Sepahbodi stated that "some" pay thousands) each month. According to Mr. Sepahbodi the Workers Party is in debt but he stated that was the usual status of Iranian political parties and that political parties were not organized in Iran or elsewhere to show a profit. He admitted that

the Workers Party had not received, is not receiving, nor does it expect to receive any sum from the United States Government officially or unofficially. He alleged that the communists were responsible for these "propaganda stories". He stated that no workers were paid to participate in the various demonstrations to which the Workers Party had lent support.

Mr. Sepahbodi claimed that there are now four active Party branches; 1) Tehran, with a total party membership of about four thousand of whom one thousand are enthusiasts (mostly students). 2) Ahwas, with a total membership of about one thousand of whom 200 are enthusiastic supporters. 3) Disful, with a total membership of about one thousand of whom 100 are ardent supporters. 4) Isfahan, whose total membership was uncertain since the Party branch was new but Mr. Sepahbodi thought it to be at least 500, about half of whom were enthusiasts.

Mr. Sepahbodi again admitted that there are no workers in the inner core of the Party. He is interested in workers only as giving numerical support (and consequent pressure?). The Party policy is to encourage the support of workers and Mr. Sepahbodi believes that the workers should be most anxious to understand the intention of the Party is to protect them and that that protection is most possible by leading them. Mr. Sepahbodi was doubtful regarding the possible useful leadership which could be provided by other than university men.

Mr. Sepahbodi ended this phase of the conversation by expressing regret over the damage done to newspaper offices and printing establishments on December 6. He believes that editors of "some" newspapers were guilty of mischievous anti-nationalism in their support of the communists and that other editors were equally guilty in their opposition to the Mosadeq Government.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TO: Mr. R. M. Melbourne December 19, 1951.  
FROM: Mr. C. C. Finch  
SUBJECT: Elections

Mr. Sepahbodi discussed the Iran Workers Party with the Labor Attache who later was joined by Mr. Melbourne; the following is a summary of the second part of the conversation. (S 2 Dec 51)

Mr. Sepahbodi believes that the elections will begin soon and that a "fast" election could be completed in three or four months. He stated he thought the balloting for elections to the Majlis would begin in the Northeast followed by the Northwest, North central area, central Iran and so on to the South, in the order listed. If it were necessary for political reasons, the timing of the elections in any one area could be abruptly changed and the elections could be held in the South regardless of the foregoing tentative schedule. Mr. Sepahbodi implied that elections in the South of Iran were likely to be held quickly if the Government were unable to pay the workers in the refinery and oil production areas. In that case the elections would be held before it became known that the Government was delaying wage payments and/or defaulting on contracted debts.

Mr. Sepahbodi believes that the new Majlis will assemble before the elections are completed. He stated that the return of at least 95 deputies was necessarily the first step toward the convening of the Majlis. Mr. Sepahbodi stated that he thought no communist would be returned and that none would dare to stand in the face of the opposition of the Shah, Mosadeq, police and other "resisting forces". He also stated that the Mosadeq call for a Majlis would be composed of 200 members was a long term plan and was not to be anticipated as a Government aim at this time.

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SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

September 15, 1952

BAGHAI, Dr. Mosafar

Supplementing Embassy's CBD of November 20, 1950.

Career:

|                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| Feb 1950 - Feb 1952: | Deputy to 16th Majlis from Tehran.             |
| Oct 1951:            | Member of Iranian Mission to Security Council. |
| April 27, 1952:      | Deputy to 17th Majlis from Tehran.             |
| Aug 26, 1952:        | Hospitalized.                                  |

Remarks:

Baghai was elected to the Majlis from both Tehran and Kerman, with a high number of votes. He virtually held a double seat in the Majlis until the deputies voted that he must accept only the Tehran election. He was among the National Front deputies whose credentials were rejected by Javad Ameri and Mir Seyid Mehdi Mir-Ashrafi, but after extensive debate he was accepted by the Majlis. 2

Still an active member of the National Front, Baghai has however concentrated most of his efforts since April 1951 on his own personal party, the Workers Party, a splinter group of the Front. Organized by Baghai, this ephemeral group is purely political in its aspirations with, incongruously, no following among the actual workers or trade organizations of Iran. Its main purpose seems to be furthering the political ambitions of Baghai himself, who recently reorganized it in order to eliminate elements which sought to seize its leadership. His efforts to establish the party in Khuzistan led to a serious clash with Hosein Maki, who resented Baghai's attempted infringement on his own territory. Maki requested Dr. Mosadeq to remove Baghai from the oil field area. Throughout the elections, the Workers Party clashed with Maki's personal following in various areas, and this internal friction within the National Front threatened to seriously weaken its entire structure.

Baghai is currently in a serious condition in the hospital. By his own report, he is suffering from paratyphoid and diabetes. Some say that he had a bad heart attack. An unconfirmed, but credible, story is that he was badly weakened by excessive indulgence in the drug cocaine, an addiction which he adopted after long-time opium smoking and which has not only made him seriously ill but has crippled his personal finances.

EMBASSY, TEHRAN

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October 27, 1952

## Conversation with a Prominent Leader of the National Front

The Labor Attache recently met with Dr. Mostafar Bagai, leader of the Iranian Workers' Party and prominent member of the National Front. Dr. Bagai was interviewed at his home, in a district of unlighted back streets, in an atmosphere of considerable secrecy. This was the fifth conversation of the Labor Attache with Dr. Bagai. He looked tired and his pallor properly reflected his recent, and serious, illness.

The common denominator of the conversation, so far as the reporting officer was concerned, was the complete absence, at this date in the deteriorating Iranian economy, of a plan. The conversation followed these lines:

1. The break-up of the Iranian Workers' Party is based on issues long buried, but early recognized by Bagai. The beginning was in 1948 when Bagai believed that he could make a strong labor party, based on socialist convictions, if he could unite with him in a middle-of-the-road policy the anti-communist socialists led by Maleki and the largely leaderless religious elements. He found the Maleki-men to be hard and efficient workers but not good socialists and too ambitious to attempt to dominate the party through their own faction. Dr. Bagai alleged that Mr. Maleki supported a change of government from a monarchy to a republic. When Dr. Bagai left on his trip to Europe and to the United States (and more lately) when he was ill, he left the power of the party in their hands. On his return to active participation in party affairs he found that although they paid lip service to socialist principles, they were in fact communist agitators, and not loyal to Dr. Mosaddeq.

Bagai therefore forced the issue and said that unless the party was purged of those elements, he would resign. Asked if he would return if the Maleki faction were forced out he agreed, and (having witnessed the discrediting of Maleki) he had no alternative but to keep his word and resume active participation, as leader, of the party. During this part of the conversation Dr. Bagai seemed abstracted and warmed up during the second phase of the talk.

2. The Government believes that once the British have gone that the spying and attempts by the British Government to control Iran will be reduced, but hardly eliminated. Bagai ascribed to pro-British officers of the Iranian Government the failure of the Government to collect income or duty taxes. He coupled a combination of those men and the premature Mosaddeq demand for rural reform as the basis for the refusal of the large landowners to pay the taxes levied on them.

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3. He professed to believe quite sincerely that the American Government has been the tool of the British in Iran (and the whole of the Middle East). He sees as the only succor to Iran either tankers sent from the United States (despite any legal actions which the British might take) or cash help. He at once discounted my estimate of the unemployment in Tehran at 40,000-50,000 (halving it), and yet said that Tudeh was growing daily, especially among the "great numbers" of unemployed.

4. He said that although it was true that his party was founded on the concept of raising the standards of living for the poor, that the development of such a program would not be possible without the preliminary step of ridding the country of the British. He claimed to agree with the Government that it must prepare an oil-less economy, but stated that the Government (and he) have no plans for the gradual movement away from the concentration of unemployed workers in Khuzistan. He said that earlier he had proposed to the Government that it use the unskilled labor to build irrigation canals in the south and roads in the north but the Government did not favor it.

5. He believes that his split with Maleki will go on indefinitely, with Maleki gradually losing the intellectuals' support he now has; that no worker does, or will, support Maleki. He pictures a withering away of Maleki as a Titoist communist element and symbol.

6. He contends that with the departure of the British that America will have an opportunity to have a new, independent and enlightened oil policy for Iran. He spells that out in terms of distribution and marketing facilities. Failing that he believes that America will be under deserved attack, not only by the leftist people and papers, but also by Iranian patriots who will realize that the Tehran Declaration was without meaning.

7. He apparently hinges a part of his hope on the coming American election, believing that a Republican President would at least act independently of (if not in open opposition to) the British. On this score he linked the American Democratic and British Conservative Parties in their international relations. He thought that Point IV was doing some good work, but that Iran not only did not need the "Military Missions, but that they were dangerous to Iranian neutrality. He suggested in an involved way, that Iran could hardly count on military defense from the United States, a country which would stand idly by, thus permitting the continuance of the British blockade, while Iranian nationals were starving.

8. His only comment on the reported infiltration of Tudeh elements in the Party and Government was that the greater danger of the moment was the retention of British elements in positions of power.

9. When questioned concerning the need to alleviate the desperate conditions of the workers, Dr. Bagai stated that the present labor law does not have adequate provisions for enforcement. He ascribed this to the machinations of the AIOC influence with the government just after the Second World War (when the labor law was passed). He stated that the proof of his allegations were in the documents captured by the Workers' Party from the AIOC information office. Dr. Bagai stated that it should be a primary responsibility of the deputies of the Parliament to

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pass a new, and enforceable, labor law. He personally believes that the only hope for effective enforcement is in the control by the government not only of labor wages but also of factory production and distribution.

In short, Bagai has an exaggerated idea of the strength of his own Party, of the readiness of Maleki's branch to fade quietly away. He is unwilling to recognize that the Tudeh Party has become a more important political agency than his by far. He has no plan for financing the Government deficit, no plan to reduce the concentration of dependent National Iranian Oil Company workers, nor for feeding or housing the unemployed, no plans to meet the economic crisis which winter is certain to bring.

He is waiting for the American election in the hope that the Republicans will be elected, that their election will mean the solution either of the oil question, or that it will generate an American urge to underwrite whatever budget deficits might exist.

For the Ambassador:

Roy W. Melbourne  
First Secretary of Embassy

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SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Tehran  
February 3, 1953

BAQAI, Dr. Mosafar

Supplementing Embassy's GMD of November 20, 1950, and Embassy's supplement of September 15, 1952.

Career:

Oct 4, 1952: Released from hospital

Remarks:

Known to have been a near-alcoholic and widely rumored to have taken dope, Baqai's condition apparently was improved when released from the hospital.

Long-standing differences over domestic policy and party organization between two factions within the Tollers (Workers) Party came to light when Deputy Baqai announced his resignation from the party on October 12. Opposition to Baqai led by former Tudeh leader, Khalil MALEKI. According to sources favorable to Maleki, the open break came as a result of Baqai's intention to participate in the "Zahedi conspiracy" to overthrow Mosadeq with the view of enhancing his own political position. Baqai was said to be looking toward the Prime Ministership at some point in the future, and to have felt that he needed a subservient party to accomplish these ends. Baqai supporters maintained Maleki attempted to subvert party for the purpose of instituting social change by revolutionary methods, while Baqai was represented as desiring legal basis for more moderate changes. The upshot was that the Baqai faction, retaining control of party newspaper, SHAHED, formally expelled Maleki and his group and recalled Baqai to leadership on October 15. Baqai was seriously hurt by Maleki's defection from an organizational standpoint, but nevertheless retains strong support among working class people as a political figure with considerable stature in the Majlis.

In an editorial in SHAHED, Baqai supported break with the UK, but insisted that British "hirelings" be purged from Government organizations. At the same time he warned that Government's liberal attitude toward Tudeh Party must cease. Although he collaborated in action leading to dissolution of the Senate, Baqai has become increasingly prominent as a leading opponent of major Government measures. Baqai has been accused by his opponents of flirting with Kashani for his own political ends. He has successively opposed the Public Security Law, the Press Law, the Electoral Law, and most recently, the extension of Mosadeq's plenary powers, going so far as to threaten resignation from the National Front on January 20. It is interesting to note that to date Baqai has stoutly affirmed his allegiance to the Nationalist Movement, while appearing in opposition to the Government in the role of champion of the Majlis and defender of democratic processes.

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AMERICAN EMBASSY, TEHRAN  
Memorandum of Conversation

December 15, 1954

SUBJECTS : 1. The Regency Council  
2. Constitutional Revision  
3. Opposition in the Majlis  
4. Baqai and Elections in Kerman  
5. Possibility of Political Parties  
6. Desirability of Decentralization

PARTICIPANTS: Sardar Fakhr Hekmat, President of the Majlis  
Dr. Abas Qoli Hekmat, his son  
Kurish Shahbas, Political Adviser  
William Koren, Jr., Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

COPIES TO : OTI (2)

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Sardar Fakhr Hekmat, accompanied by his son, whose French is better than his father's and who also speaks English, came to tea on December 11. When I asked for an appointment through Shahbas, Hekmat suggested that he return my call of several months ago.

The Regency Council

In answer to several questions on the Regency Council, Sardar Fakhr Hekmat explained that the only Imperial Firman had been the one naming the membership. His Majesty had however given oral instructions to the Council at its meeting prior to his departure. The Council was empowered to promulgate laws passed by the Parliament and so make them effective, but these acts of Parliament would nevertheless be forwarded to the Shah for the royal signature. Prince Qelam Raza, as the next eldest brother to the King, presides at the meetings of the Council.

Constitutional Revision

Hekmat confirmed what had already appeared in the papers, namely that the Majlis and Senate had decided to postpone any meeting of a congress of the two houses for constitutional revision until after the return of His Majesty. This was in accord with the Shah's expressed wishes.

As to certain concrete proposals for revising the Constitution, Hekmat explained that his position was as follows:

(a) The number of Deputies should be increased from the 136 to the 200 already allowed by the Constitution. Hekmat justified this by saying that already the original proportion of citizens to Deputies had been upset by the

increase in Iranian population, pointing out that 300,000 people in Baluchistan now had a single Deputy, and by saying that the lower house of Parliament in neighboring countries was larger than that in Iran. He was already working on plans for a new Majlis with a larger chamber that would accommodate 200 Deputies and provide improved arrangements for the press and the diplomatic corps both in the chamber itself and in the remainder of the building.

(b) He agreed that the term for the Deputy should be four years rather than two, but he did not think that the terms of the present Deputies should be extended. In this his view ran counter to that of most of the Deputies.

(c) He agreed with proposals for reducing the present quorum requirements. He thought that one-third of the Deputies present in Tehran rather than two-thirds would be sufficient to hold a debate and that the presence of a bare majority of those present in Tehran rather than of three-fourths of their number should suffice for voting.

(d) He was opposed to any royal veto power, even the suspensive veto on financial bills now requested by the Shah, namely one under which the Shah could require another reading for which a two-thirds majority would be necessary for approval. Hekmat thought that the Shah's power to dissolve the Majlis under Article 48 gave the Shah whatever authority he needed, but he expected that His Majesty would insist on getting the suspensive veto.

(e) He was opposed to giving power to the Senate in the matter of money bills or surveying the national accounts. When some Senators had come to talk over this matter with him, he had pointed out to them that many Deputies were angry over the way the Senate was behaving, that fourteen or so Majlises had gotten along without a Senate, and that if the Deputies voted as a bloc in the Congress, Senators might find that their institution had been abolished entirely. That calmed the Senators down. (The President of the Majlis was obviously pleased with this line of argument, and his listeners joined him in a good laugh at the expense of the discomfited Senators.)

#### Opposition in the Majlis

Hekmat assured us that His Majesty's desire for a calm Majlis during his absence would be met. He added that after the return of the Shah the opposition "might do something." When I asked him in French how large this opposition was, 5, 10, 20, he replied that it included some 12 to 14 Deputies. A few moments later however Shahbas put the question to Hekmat whether his own estimate of 18 or 19 opposition Deputies was not correct, and the President of the Majlis answered in the affirmative.

#### Baqai and Elections in Kerman

I asked Hekmat what the result would be if Baqai were elected to the Majlis, whether he could really create trouble. He replied by stating first of all that Baqai would not be elected and secondly by saying that it would be a bad thing

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to have him in the Majlis since his talents all lay in the direction of negating action and causing trouble. As Hekmat's son translated the phrase into French, he was the kind of fellow who "was always putting monkey wrenches in the works."

#### Possibility of Political Parties

Hekmat raised on his own initiative the subject of the possible creation of a political party or political parties in Iran. He said that he had been speaking for some time to the Shah on the need for a political party. The Shah had appeared to be coming around to his way of thinking but the matter had of course been put off until after the Shah's return. He hoped then to convince His Majesty.

Trying to avoid the implication that Iran might simply be imitating Turkey, I asked whether Hekmat meant that there should be a sort of national party that would have the support and patronage of the head of the state or whether he meant that Iran might have several parties right away. Hekmat replied that he was quite ready to have two or three parties, that there was a place, in fact a necessity, for critics of the Government and that there was no harm in having them organized as an opposition.

Comment: This revelation of a design to establish a party may explain why Ernest Perron, whenever he has introduced the subject of the need for some national "movement" to inspire Iranian youth, has always insisted that he did not mean the creation of a political party. I had not previously been aware that anybody was currently pushing for the creation of a party.

#### Desirability of Decentralization

The second topic which Hekmat raised without any question on my part was the excessive centralization in Iran. He felt that the people in the provincial cities and villages regarded the Government as a very distant entity and one which by its very remoteness was incapable of taking into account popular desires.

His proposal was to introduce municipal and provincial councils to advise the Governors General and their subordinates. When I questioned him as to the powers these councils should have, he made it clear that they were to be purely advisory; the Majlis should retain all taxing power.

Wafkoren/r/gld

AMEMBASSY, TEHRAN

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August 22, 1955

Rumors as to the Future of Dr. Mozafar BAQAI

About two weeks after the departure of General ZAHEDI, rumors began floating in Tehran to the effect that Dr. Mozafar Baqai, head of the Toilers' Party and a past close collaborator and later bitter opponent of MOSADEQ, would soon be released from the forced residence in Zahedan to which he had been sent by Zuhedi and would be brought back to an official position of power, either as a Cabinet Minister or as Prime Minister. Since that time, these rumors, or variants on the same theme, have been an almost constant part of the rumor pattern in Tehran. While these reports cannot be tracked to any one source, they show an amazing vitality. Having reached a peak in the last week of July, they seem to be dying away at the present time, but they may well come up again.

It has been reported that Baqai has been devoting his time in Zahedan to writing a book or a series of essays, and that his only recreation is going to the railway station every week to watch the train from Pakistan come in. More than two months ago, a letter from Baqai was read to an anniversary meeting of the Toilers' Party in Tehran. This letter was strongly leftist and anti-Western, although not in a doctrinaire fashion, and, needless to say, did not in any way attack the Shah or the institution of the Monarchy. At this meeting, incidentally, pictures of Baqai and Ayatollah KASHANI were displayed side by side.

The latest unconfirmed rumors have it that Ali ZOHARI, one of Baqai's political lieutenants, is conferring with him in Zahedan, having brought a sealed letter from the Shah to Baqai. It is also reported that Baqai has recently received two refrigerators from the court, and that each commercial aircraft flight from Tehran to Zahedan carries frozen meats and other delicacies from the Court to Baqai's larder. According to another very recent rumor, Baqai may soon leave the city of Zahedan and go to live on one of the estates of Interior Minister ALAM in eastern Iran. (Recent rumors about the return of Baqai have dovetailed with a rumor to the effect that Ambassador Chapin is friendly to nationalist and left-wing figures.)

Other rumors tell of supposedly clandestine publications by the Toilers' Party which strongly attack the Tudeh and the National Resistance Movement but praise the Shah, and which are actually encouraged by the security forces. Certain Third Force publications are reported to be written in the same general vein, a report which fits in with the very prevalent belief that the right wing of the Third Force is in contact with the Court.

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The rumors about the impending return of Baqai are heard equally among illiterate laborers and in the halls of the Majlis. Deputy Shams-ed-din QANATABADI went so far as to tell a newspaperman that the Majlis would never under any circumstances accept Baqai as a member of the Cabinet or as Prime Minister; he is reported to have told a personal friend a few minutes later that he himself would kill Baqai with his bare hands if the latter ever appeared in the Majlis building.

Politically-sophisticated observers assume that, whether the rumors are true or not, they are based on an assumption that the Shah, in his zeal to eliminate corruption and bring about social and economic reforms, is seriously considering calling on Baqai as the one man of great energy, ruthlessness, and revolutionary zeal who could be depended upon to smash the conservative and pro-Zahedi opposition, bring about immediate improvement in the living conditions of the people, and at the same time be acceptable to the intellectuals and the politically-conscious minority of the lower classes. It is also assumed that, while Baqai might be brought into the Cabinet at any time, he could become Prime Minister only if the Majlis had been dissolved.

As long as there is no confirmation for these rumors, they must be regarded as very probably untrue. Furthermore, there seems little likelihood that the Shah is seriously considering making a deal now with Baqai or with other nationalist groups as a means of speeding up action on his reform program, even should he feel that reforms are deliberately being throttled by conservatives in the Cabinet, the administration, and the Parliament. The Shah does not appear either so desperate or so divorced from reality as to think he could escape with a whole political skin from such a maneuver, or not to realize the Pandora's box he would be opening by turning a demagogue of Baqai's stripe loose on the Iranian political scene with royal backing.

Granted that the rumors are untrue, their continued circulation gives rise to the question of who started them and who keeps them moving. The three main possibilities as to the source of these rumors are described below in their order of probability.

The Shah, and possibly the Interior Minister, while not seriously considering the possibility of bringing such a dangerous and ambitious man into the Government, may have started and fed the rumors in order to keep the Parliament in line with the Government. Actually, the threat of the possible return of Baqai probably has been an element in inclining the conservative majority in the Parliament to the belief that they must not overturn the Ala Government lest the Shah in his anger inflict a much worse visitation upon the conservative interests of the country by bringing in strong-minded left nationalists and by dissolving the Majlis.

The partisans of Dr. Baqai, including his political lieutenants in the Toilers' Party, would have every reason to start such rumors, since the rumors add to the prestige of their group. It is difficult to understand, however, how such a small and unimportant body of politicians could keep the rumors going for such a long period of time. If they have in fact done so, their monetary resources must be far greater than has been heretofore known.

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It is also possible that various persons, observing the political scene, may consider it logical that the Shah seek new allies to put over his reform program and that they then spread the rumors about Baqai in order to give the impression that they are themselves in the know concerning future political developments.

It would be possible for the extreme conservative groups in and out of the Majlis who most strongly distrust the Shah to have spread such rumors early after the advent of the Ala Government in order to frighten more moderate conservatives from attempting to reach a modus vivendi with the Shah. However, the continuation of the rumors during the past two months has had a disheartening effect on the morale of many conservatives, including Majlis Deputies, who tend to feel that to compromise with the Ala Government is far better than to risk the tender mercies of Baqai and that the devil you know is safer than the one howling outside. It would therefore seem probable that if the pro-Zahedi extreme conservatives started the reports, they spread completely out of control after the first few weeks.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

William Koren, Jr.  
Counselor of Embassy  
for Political Affairs

Copies sent: AmEmbassy London  
AmConsulate Meshed  
Isfahan  
Khorramshahr  
Tabriz

BAQAI-KERMANI, Mozafar

Dr. Mozafar Baqai-Kermāni (usually referred to as Dr. Baqai), leader of the Workers' Party and once the second most important figure in the National Front, has made a political career as an oppositionist. Regardless of the political hue of the government in power, it perennially finds in Baqai a principal source of real or potential opposition. As a result, attempts have been made in the past to silence him by purchasing his formal adherence with cabinet portfolios and ambassadorships, which he has refused. The ambitious Baqai has set his sights no lower than the Prime Ministership. Recently he was reported to have assigned two specialists of his Workers' Party the task of preparing an action program and "shadow cabinet," ready for use in the event that the reins of power should ultimately fall to him. Agile and opportunistic though he is, however, there is no evidence that this is likely to happen.

Baqai's optimistic calculations stem from his belief that, with the deterioration of the political situation, the Shah (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi--see biography) will turn to him as the most moderate spokesman of the nationalist, reformist forces in Iran. In this

hypothesis the Shah would retain his throne, although his powers would be circumscribed. As of late 1959 such an eventuality seemed questionable however, in light of the fact that the Workers' Party can claim no parliamentary representation. It consists merely of the personal following of Baqāi and lacks organic structure, a mass base, and any political direction other than the shifting course adopted by its leader in response to the dictates of opportunism. Nationalist, anti-Communist, and vaguely socialist in its aims, the Workers' Party appeals mainly to factory workers and bazaar merchants, although it has achieved some success in attracting dissatisfied elements of all classes and certain segments of the army and the police. There is no evidence that the party has successfully appealed to those nationalists among the educated classes who look to former Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadeq (see biography) as the symbol of their opposition to the regime. Although it does not have the freedom of action enjoyed by Iran's two "official" parties, Baqāi's party is tolerated by the government within carefully circumscribed limits. It has been unsuccessfully wooed by the "official" opposition Mardom (People's) Party.

Born in Kermān, in 1908, Baqāi received his primary and secondary education in Iran and obtained a degree in philosophy and pedagogy from

the Sorbonne in Paris. He began his career in 1936 as assistant professor of philosophy and pedagogy at the University of Tehran, a position he held until 1954. In 1947 he was elected deputy to the 15th Majlis from Kermān, and was subsequently reelected to the 16th and 17th sessions of that body. In the Majlis Baqāi opposed the government's Supplementary Oil Agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and was one of the deputies who, under Mosadeq's leadership, forced through the oil nationalization bill. He freely attacked the army for interference in politics, and was an outspoken foe of the then Chief of Staff, General Ali Razmara. In 1949 Baqāi's all-out campaign against the government through his daily paper, Shahed (Witness), earned him widespread popular acclaim, but led to his arrest and a sentence of one year's imprisonment imposed by a military court. As a result of popular pressure, he was released within a month and the matter pursued no further.

By the time Mosadeq became Prime Minister in April 1951, Mozafar Baqāi was at the forefront of the nationalist movement and was considered second in importance only to Mosadeq himself in the National Front. In May 1951, Baqāi and Khalil Maleki, former leader of the

Communist-controlled Tudeh Party, joined in forming the Workers' Party, a move which enhanced Baqāi's position by enlisting Maleki's Marxist cadres in his own political cause. This alliance proved ephemeral, however, and a schism between the two factions in October 1952 terminated his association with Maleki. Soon after the split, Baqāi reverted to his natural posture of opposition and became one of Mosadeq's most bitter opponents. This rupture cost the Workers' Party much of its popular following. Baqāi's newspaper, Shahed, became a leading opposition journal, strongly critical of Mosadeq's flirtation with the Tudeh Party, which Baqāi considered a "foreign" party and therefore inimical to a "true nationalist's" interests. Pathologically xenophobic, Baqāi was particularly anti-British and charged that Mosadeq had not gone far enough in eliminating British influence in Iran.

With the overthrow of the Mosadeq regime in August 1953, Baqāi's vociferous opposition was directed at the successor government of Fazlollah Zāhedī (see biography), which he accused of corruption and treachery in reestablishing diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom in late 1953. Failing to come to terms with Baqāi, General Zāhedī moved against him, shutting down Shahed and frustrating his

attempts to be elected deputy to the 18th Majlis. Baqāi was twice placed under house arrest in 1954 for campaigning in Kermān, the second time for a period of one year. Released from forced residence in December 1955, he resumed active direction of his Workers' Party. By muting the tone of his opposition and refraining from criticism of the Shah in his appeals for reform, Baqāi, in May 1957, won the right to hold the first "unofficial" political meeting since the coup which overthrew Mosadeq's National Front. He has continued to hold meetings, exhorting the dissatisfied to rally to his party ("the only socialist party in Iran"), advocating the establishment of trade unionism, and attacking the Baghdad Pact and "British imperialism." Careful not to let his activities get out of hand, the government maintains a close check on the Workers' Party. With Baqāi still facing prosecution on a number of charges connected with his past activities, the government holds an effective weapon should it choose to strike him down.

Mozafar Baqāi is considered intelligent and shrewd, but unstable in his political philosophy and an unabashed demagogue. Although his attitude with regard to the United States is not a matter of record, he is believed to be less hostile toward this country than toward the

United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. Pleasant and soft-spoken socially, he is a fiery orator whose frenetic disagreements have on occasion involved him in parliamentary fisticuffs. Baqāi is described as a big man. In the past he has suffered serious illness from the effects of alcohol and drugs. He speaks Persian, French, and some Arabic. Dr. Baqāi is divorced.

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## FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

Embassy

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

COUNTRY Iran  
 SUBJECT Possibility of Baqai Candidacy in Coming Elections  
 REPORT NO. 11 4544  
 DATE OF REPORT 5 April 1960  
 NO. OF PAGES 2  
 REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. prior and up to 15 October 1959  
 PLACE & DATE ACQ. Iran, Tehran (late October 1959)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FORGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: an Iranian intelligence official with access to reports concerning internal security matters (C)  
Appraisal of Content: 3

1. according to Ali Farahani, leading member of the Tollers' party who is in charge of financial affairs for the party, prior to 11 October 1959 Dr. Mosafer Baqai was received in audience by the Shah, through the intercession of Princess Shams.
2. Dr. Baqai requested that he, as leader of the party, and Ali Zohari, a leading figure in the party, be permitted to take part in the coming election campaign. The Shah consented to Baqai's election to the Majlis, but refused to allow Ali Zohari to become involved in political activities.
3. Dr. Baqai gave instructions to his party leaders and prepared to take part in the campaign, with the aid and financial assistance of Kerman merchants.
4. Also according to Farahani, prior to 15 October 1959 Dr. Mosafer of the Melliyun party and Dr. Baqai decided to form a coalition in February 1960. Then, Dr. Baqai was to take part in the coming election campaign as the candidate of the two parties from Kerman.
1. Field Comment: The source of this report reported in May 1959 that Ali Zohari was a former deputy, publisher of the Tollers' party newspaper Shahed, and a very close friend of Dr. Baqai.
2. Field Comment: On 15 October 1959 the source of this report reported that according to Farahani,

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NOFORN CONTING TO CONTROL

Embassy

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Dr. Baqai was still exerting efforts to obtain the Shah's consent for his nomination. This is, of course, in conflict with paragraph 2 above.

*Copy to  
Ambassador*

3. Field Comment: On 9 March 1950 an Iranian security official with contacts among right-wing political groups (F) reported that he is certain that the Shah is seriously considering asking Dr. Baqai to become Prime Minister, as the qabai government continues to flail about unsuccessfully on the land reform question.

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OUTGOING  
A T R G R A M

CN: 182

NO A-182

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TO : Secstate WASHINGTON

INFO : Amconsul ISFAHAN A-44  
" KHORRAMSHAHR A-48  
" MESHED A-43  
" TABRIZ A-44

PRINOFF

DEP. PRINOFF

SY/POL OFF

PAO

ADMIN

ACCTS

ADM. ASST

FILE

FROM : Amembassy TEHRAN

DATE: 4 January 1962

SUBJ : Acquittal of Dr. Mosafar BAQAI

REF : Cirtel 427

The conviction of Dr. Baqai, leader of the Guardians of Freedom, on charges of inciting the police to disobedience was reversed by an Army Court of Appeals December 28. Dr. Baqai was arrested in September 1960 following anti-government electoral activities and was sentenced to two years imprisonment in June 1961.

In the course of his appeal, Dr. Baqai reviewed the history of his relations with the National Front and his later break with Mosadeq. His defense of his own activities constituted a strong attack on the National Front.

Dr. Baqai's appeal and his subsequent release have aroused a certain interest here and have prompted speculation about his future plans. The latter includes the belief on the part of some that Baqai will somehow or other be used by the Government to offset the opposition, particularly the National Front. Baqai himself has been at pains to deny this story in the press. Whatever political role he may find for himself, the Iranian political scene is likely to be affected by the reappearance of an astute and demagogic politician of the calibre of Dr. Baqai.

ROCKWELL

21 JAN 1962

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POL: FJCrawford/amp

1/3/62

POL: HHSchwartz

# FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

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**REPORT/CONTINUED CONTROL**

|         |   |                |                        |
|---------|---|----------------|------------------------|
| COUNTRY | <b>Iran</b>   | REPORT NO.     | <b>KIR-5367</b>        |
| SUBJECT | <b>Activities and Opinions of<br/>Mosafer Bagai Since His<br/>Release from Prison</b> | DATE OF REPORT | <b>16 January 1962</b> |
|         |   | NO. OF PAGES   | <b>3</b>               |
|         |   | REFERENCES     | <b>None</b>            |

DATE OF INFO. **Late 1961-January 1962**

PLACE & DATE ACQ. **Tehran (November 1961-January 1962)**

**SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.**

SOURCE: Para. 1: Political assistant (P) to Mosafer Bagai.  
Para. 2: Iranian Intelligence officer (C) with access to reports concerning internal security matters.  
Appraisal of Content: 3.

- Mosafer Bagai, head of the Guardians of Freedom and the Tillers Party, has said since his release from prison at the end of December 1961 that he would not attack Prime Minister Ali Amini or seek his removal until Amini admitted that he could not continue as Prime Minister and that he had failed. Bagai felt it was politically feasible to allow more time to see if Amini could succeed. Bagai claimed that he would not allow Amini to be retained in the Prime Ministership simply as a means of destroying Amini, nor allow the people's faith in every government, a little of which has been inspired by Amini's government, to be destroyed. Bagai recognized the fact that Amini was faced by tremendous odds: the army; right-wing forces such as Asadollah Rashidian, Sayed Jafar Bahabani, and the land-lords; and those hurt or endangered by the fight against corruption were all against Amini. Bagai was not anxious to join Rashidian, Bahabani, Sardar Fakher Rahmat or other opponents of Amini. At Bagai's first meeting on 5 January 1962 none of the speakers attacked Amini too strongly. The people of Kerman invited Bagai, his defense lawyers, and the editor of Keyhan to visit Kerman, and Bagai was planning to make the trip about 15 January.
- According to reports prepared in the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK), members of the Guardians of Freedom and the Tillers Party continued to meet during October, November, and December 1961, including calls for university students, civil servants, and probationary calls. These present discussed international topics such as the Algerian crisis, the Congo, the twenty-second congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and nuclear tests. On domestic issues the groups criticized education in Iran, the delay in elections, and the Amini government. 3 Among those attending different meetings were:

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Kosarin Makki<sup>4</sup>  
Sayed Hassan Vahidi  
Kosarin Rami  
Jafar Jahen  
Hosseinzadeh-Farmanid (fsm)  
Bosser Qandi  
Eng. Agili (fsm)<sup>5</sup>  
Alisheidi (fsm), professor  
Mohammad Reza Qavamini

Reza Mohammadi, member of labor cell  
Rajdar Kargar, member of labor cell  
Abbas Ahmadi, member of labor cell  
Sayed Hassan Hassani, member of labor cell  
Cholam Ali Bag, member of labor cell  
Rasgi (fsm), labor, member of labor cell

Sayed Javad Tahatabai, leader of some probationary cells  
Cholam Ali Hassani, teacher, leader of some student cells  
Vahidshah (fsm), employee of Radio Tehran

Mohammad (fsm), university student  
Rami (fsm), university student  
Sisavosh Rami, university student  
Abbas Lajvardi, university student  
Debaghin (fsm), university student  
Shokri (fsm), student at National Teachers Training College<sup>5</sup>

Rasmi (fsm)  
Shakriari (fsm)  
Bosserzadeh (fsm)<sup>5</sup>  
Yusefzadeh (fsm)<sup>5</sup>  
Vahidshah Qandini  
Bosser Karami  
Bosser (fsm)  
Mohammad Ali Akbari  
Saidina (fsm)  
Mohammad Yakhani

Farshadi (fsm)<sup>5</sup>  
Mirzadeh (fsm)  
Bosser (fsm)  
Mohammad Mirzi  
Sayed Jalal Hosseini  
Qandini (fsm)<sup>5</sup>  
Ali Akbar Kheirabadi  
Jahangir Akbari  
Javad Jafari

Field Comments

1. About five thousand persons attended Bagai's meeting, and a few policemen stationed on the street. The speakers were Cholam Hassan Rahimian, Hossein Makki, and Bagai. Rahimian pointed out that when Amini was in the Majlis he said nothing in favor of the people, but now as Prime Minister suddenly he wanted to do everything for the people, which Rahimian found hard to believe since Amini is from one of the old wealthy families. Rahimian said that Amini realized the difference between himself and those present at the meeting, and he knew that to eliminate corruption would affect his family and friends. Amini was afraid to hold elections because good persons would be elected and this would be dangerous for him and his friends.

Makki spoke briefly, introducing Bagai, and promising to continue the fight for freedom.

Bagai said they should advise Amini about elections. Amini should not make the same mistakes his predecessors, Jafar Sharif-Rasmi and Manuchehr Eghbal, made. The fact that Sharif-Rasmi and Eghbal were gone and Bagai was holding the meeting proved that they were not important and that they, Bagai and his supporters, were important. By failing to hold elections Amini disregarded the law, but Bagai swore to fight for elections. Bagai spoke for some time on the good job Amini was doing to eliminate corruption.

2. According to National Front leaders, the National Front had received information from several persons that the Shah wanted Bagai acquitted, and then would give him information with which to attack the National Front. According to rumor in some military circles, Bagai was released on a promise to attack the National Freedom Movement.
3. The Guardians of Freedom organization has distributed a few tracts,

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including a commemoration to students killed at the university in 1953, dated 7 December 1961 and signed by the student committee attached to the Guardians of Freedom.

4. The nine persons in this column were referred to by SAVAK as members of the high council of the Guardians of Freedom.
5. Based on attendance at Bagai's meetings about two years ago, probable identifications of some persons listed here are: Eng. Nemat-Din Agili, Abdollah Shokri, Hameh Boshroozhad, Mohammad Ali Yusefizadeh, Ali Farahani, and Ali Asghar Qannad.
6. This report was coordinated with the Embassy.

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Mr. Marshall - 15  
Mr. Crawford - 10  
Mr. Baghai - 10  
Mr. Amini - 10  
Mr. Land Reform - 10  
Mr. University Riots - 10

Mr. Frank Crawford - Political Section

June 7, 1962

Mr. Douglas Marshall - Consular Section

Conversation with Dr. Baghai on June 3, 1962

BACKGROUND: As you know, approximately a week ago I met an Iranian student, Mansur Rafizadeh, who is returning to the U.S. to complete his graduate work in Economics. Rafizadeh is the Vice President of the National Group of Iranian Students in the United States, which is the organization of the student supporters of Dr. Mozafar Baghai. He also publishes a monthly (soon to become bi-weekly) newspaper which supports the views and policies of Dr. Baghai and which is distributed to some 4,000 Iranian students in the U.S. and in western European countries.

Since he was a pleasant and interesting man and since he knows my wife's sister and her husband in the States, I invited him to my home to meet my wife and have a drink before his return to the U.S. He called me later to state that he would not be able to come since he was going to the house of a doctor who was a friend of his, and invited my wife and me to accompany him. I agreed, and on Sunday night (6/3/62) we met him at the Embassy about 9:00 p.m. and leaving my car there proceeded to his friend's house by taxi.

After arrival there I was surprised to find that the friend was Dr. Baghai himself. I believe he had told me this when he invited me but I did not understand to who's house we were going.

We spent some three hours at Baghai's and ate, drank and talked. In addition to much small talk the following items came up which may be of interest to your Section:

AMINI. The doctor and his group considers Amini as honest, but not capable of nor in a position to accomplish the things needed in Iran. Baghai's party is not openly campaigning against Amini, however. Even the N.G.I.S.U.S. newspaper in the U.S. does not attack Amini nor his policies at this time.

Land Reform. The present land reform program is doomed to failure. Conditions vary immensely from area to area. Some owners receive 10% to 15% return annually on their holdings and others are happy to receive 2% to 3%. There should be a flexible program to adapt to the varying conditions in different parts of the nation. Land reform is necessary, however, and must be carried out.

The University Riots: The recent riots, resulting in the closing of the University of Tehran, were the results of manipulations of General Bahhtiar. General Bahhtiar was encouraged and assisted in these activities

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by "that Colonel in the Military Attache Office at the American Embassy - the one with the Russian name." After some thought he came up with YATSEVICH as the name. I asked how it could be that the Embassy which is widely considered to be in favor of and to support Amini's government would tolerate one of its officers to support Bakhtiar in an effort to weaken or overthrow Amini's government. Baghai's reply was vague and more or less to the effect that the State Department and the military did not always agree on policy or act in cooperation. I disclaimed my knowledge of YATSEVICH'S activities and did not correct Baghai's misconception as to his position in the Embassy.

Shah. The Shah seems to be considered as a necessary evil. I get the impression that if Baghai were in power he would allow the Shah to reign but not to rule. He is considered useful as a figurehead for the masses of the Iranian people to identify themselves with.

According to Baghai, the Shah was in favor of Amini at the time he appointed him. However, at a later date he actually wanted to get rid of Amini and replace him with someone else. For unexplained reasons (unexplained to me) this could not be done and the Shah now is again strongly behind Amini. This bit confused me and I asked for an explanation and was left as confused as before.

Elections. None in view on the horizon.

Baghai's Party. Strongly advocates reforms in Iran. This would include just about everything apparently. Particularly, land reform and tax reform, and a clean-up of the government. Baghai feels that with proper taxation and collection Iran could reduce immensely the amount of foreign aid needed and the period for which it would be required. His party wants no dealings with the Russians and fears Russian influence or domination in Iran. Likewise, he wants as little as possible to do with the British. He seems to be strongly pro-American and would look to the U.S. for support and assistance if he formed a government.

I have been told incidentally, by an Iranian attorney, that Baghai talks pro-American when with Americans, pro-Russian when with Russians, pro-British when with Englishmen, and so on.

His party is strongly anti-National Front and consider Mossadegh a menace to Iran. Baghai has a photo on the wall in his house of a student killed in the demonstrations against Mossadegh's government some years ago.

The above is obviously no resume of three hours conversation, but if Baghai's views on any item not mentioned are of interest, I might be able to recall whether the subject was mentioned and what was said. My Farsi is inadequate and the doctor speaks only Farsi and French, so the conversation was carried on with Rafizadeh as interpreter.

While returning to the Embassy by taxi, Rafizadeh remarked that the doctor

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had suggested that we come by taxi since his home was watched all the time and if my car was seen outside, there might be rumors flying of an impending coup.

At the start of the evening I explained to Baghai that I knew very little of his country, its people, customs and politics, and that in my work in the Consular Section I was not aware of the Embassy's views or policies on any given question and could only make personal observations.

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# Memorandum

NOFORN/INTERNAL USE ONLY

Dr. Mozafar Baqai

TO : Chief, Political Section

DATE: 14 December 1964  
P-599/64

FROM : CAS *h*

SUBJECT: Leaflet Written by Dr. Baqai Against the  
Status of Forces Agreement


The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control NOFORN but need not cite CAS as the source.

1. Attached is a copy and a summary translation of a leaflet entitled, "Is It or Is It Not," which attacks the Status of Forces Agreement, and was written by Dr. Mozafar Baqai, head of the Toilers Party. Although dated 23 October 1964, it was not being circulated until about two weeks ago.
2. According to an official Iranian service report dated 16 November, Dr. Baqai stated on 10 November that his declaration should be printed during the next week and in order to distract the security officials, it should be printed in and distributed from another city. Dr. Baqai was quoted as saying that although the publication of his declaration shall be the cause of his arrest, this was not important. (Comment: See also P-534/64, 3 November, from another source.) At that time SAVAK planned to try to find out where the declaration was to be printed and to stop the publication of it.
3. When detached from this memorandum, the attachment may be considered for limited official use.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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*Memorandum* NOFORN/INTERNAL USE ONLY *PS*

TO : Chief, Political Section

DATE: 3 November 1964  
P-534/64

FROM : CAS *W*

SUBJECT: Plans of Dr. Baqai to Issue Pamphlet Attacking  
the Status of Forces Agreement

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control NOFORN but need not cite CAS as the source. The source is an Iranian official (B) with good contacts in the security services; from Baqai.

1. Dr. Mozafar Baqai said on 2 November 1964 that Ayatollah Khomeini had made a public speech in Qom on 28 October in which he attacked the Status of Forces Agreement and the 200 million dollar Arms Purchase Agreement recently passed by the Majlis.

*Auth. & find reason!* 2. Baqai stated that he himself was in the process of drafting a pamphlet to be signed with his name in which he would attack the government for sponsoring and passing the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. Baqai further stated that the line he would take vis-a-vis the Americans would be that the Americans were unwisely allowing this law to hurt their image and their reputation in Iran. Baqai also stated that he was prepared to face arrest in putting out this pamphlet, but felt it was necessary for him to take some initiative in this matter in view of the fact that he expected that others opposed to the Agreement would also attack it.

3. Baqai expressed the opinion that the Shah must have tacitly approved attacks against the Agreement made in the Majlis during the recent debate, for it was inconceivable to him that spokesmen against the Bill would have dared to do so without the Shah's prior consent.

**EXEC. AGENT**  
**OUSARMA IRAN**  
**64-1420**

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IRAN

Mozafar BAQAI-KERMANI

President, Toilers Party and  
Guardians of Freedom

Mozafar Baqai-Kermani has been a chronic oppositionist since 1949. He is a devoted nationalist, with overtones of socialism, wholeheartedly opposed to Communism, strongly anti-British but not unfriendly to the US. Within this framework, however, his politics tend to shift freely, depending on the conditions of the moment. A former supporter of ex-Premier Mohamad Mosadeq, Baqai was at one time the second most popular man in Iran. Since then his political fortunes have waned considerably. At the present time, he probably has little following beyond his two political organizations, the Toilers Party and the Guardians of Freedom--both of which are primarily personality cults without a significant political base.



(PRE-1966)

Baqai's activities are closely circumscribed by the government, and he is opposed by both the Tudeh (Communist) Party and Mosadeq's National Front. His strength lies in his nuisance value, and is derived largely from his skill as a demagogue. In his ambition for the Premiership he would probably sacrifice a few scruples to attain it. However, he has made so many political enemies during his long career that his chances are small. One source has asserted that the Shah is willing to allow Baqai a limited amount of freedom of action as a check on the government.

Baqai was born in Kerman in 1908. His father, Shahab Kermani, was a famous patriot and Constitutionalist. Mozafar received his early education in Iran, and earned a PhD in philosophy and pedagogy from the Sorbonne in 1935. Returning to Iran, he joined the faculty of Tehran University, where he has lectured on ethics off and on ever since. In 1939-41 he completed his military service as a reserve officer. Baqai reportedly joined the Tudeh Party in 1942, but left it soon after. In 1947 he was elected to the Majlis as deputy from Kerman. He first came into prominence in 1949, when his attacks on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and the army won him popular acclaim. In November 1949 he was arrested for publishing sharp criticisms of the army in his newspaper, *Shahed*. A court martial sentenced him to a year in prison, but he was acquitted by a civil court.

Baqai had joined Mosadeq's National Front while in the Majlis, and in May 1951 he founded the Toilers Party to serve as the right wing's answer to the growing popularity of the Tudeh Party. Baqai described the Toilers Party as "socialist in attitude so far as socialist policy is consistent with the policies of the government." By this

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Mozafar BAQAI-KERMANI (cont.)

time Baqai was regarded as second only to Mosadeq in the nationalist movement, and he accompanied Mosadeq in October 1951 to the UN, to answer Britain's protest in the Security Council against Iran's nationalization of the AIOC.

In early 1952 a split appeared in the Toilers Party between Baqai and a more radical faction led by Khalil Maleki. It became irreconcilable in October 1952, when Baqai returned after a period of hospitalization to resume his leadership of the party. Maleki and his followers bolted, forming their own organization. Meanwhile, Baqai had begun to disagree with Mosadeq over the role of the Tudeh Party in Iranian politics. He began to criticize Mosadeq's policies in Shahed and on the floor of the Majlis. In April 1953 Baqai was implicated in the murder of Mosadeq's chief of police, General Mahmud Afshartus. Mosadeq was still seeking to have Baqai's parliamentary immunity lifted in order to prosecute him when the Mosadeq regime was overthrown in August 1953.

Baqai cast his lot with the pro-Shah forces, led by the new Premier, General Fazlollah Zahedi. When it appeared that Zahedi planned to stay in office for an undetermined period, however, the ambitious Baqai reverted to the opposition. In December 1953, he was absolved in the Afshartus affair, but his newspaper was closed down for having attacked the government. When the Majlis was dissolved in January 1954, Baqai's parliamentary career ended. His efforts to win re-election to the Majlis in 1954, and the government's efforts to prevent it, resulted in several months of election postponement in Kerman. Baqai spent a month in jail in June 1954 and in December was again arrested and exiled to Zahedan for a year. Released in December 1955, he was again detained during an investigation into the 1951 murder of ex-Premier Ali Razmaza, Baqai's opponent during the 1949-51 period and one whose death Baqai had cheered. Baqai was cleared and released in December 1956. For the next several years he remained relatively inactive, but in 1960 he again ran for the Majlis. He was a vocal critic of the election rigging of that year, and he formed the Guardians of Freedom, who made fair elections a plank in their platform. In December 1960 Baqai was arrested on charges of sedition and confined to Tehran. When he tried to go to Kerman in February 1961 to campaign, he was jailed. Tried by the military, he was sentenced to two years in prison, but a civil court again acquitted him. Since then, his activities have been limited; during the 1963 elections he was again ordered to stay in Tehran. His party, unable to operate in Iran, has established branches in Europe and the US. Shahed is currently being published in the US.

Baqai is a big, stocky man and a fiery orator. Pleasant and soft-spoken, he is considered intelligent and well informed. He is

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Mozafar BAQAI-KERMANI (cont.)

divorced, reportedly because he believes that a politician can operate more efficiently if he is single. Baqai was seriously ill in 1952; he described it as paratyphoid and diabetes, but some sources claim he was suffering from alcoholism and cocaine addiction. Baqai speaks fluent French and some Arabic in addition to Farsi.

ABA:mpt

13 January 1966

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FOL - Mr. Ford

Sept. 28, 1971

FOL - ~~Donald~~ H. Toussaint

FOL's local adviser, Manuchehr Saidi, has reported the following which I thought you would be interested in:

1. Dr. Baghai Kermani -- long popular with pro-socialists and with university students -- has recently received permission to organize a political party (name unknown). He has already rented office space for the party near the Majlis on Baharestan Square.
2. Saidi speculates that Kermani's activities may prove a source of embarrassment to the government -- for he is somewhat of a rabble-rouser/demagogue and has a considerable following among disenchanted socialists and students.

I don't vouch for the veracity of the story but thought you might want to try and find out if there is anything to it.

Note: According to Saidi, Dr. Baghai Kermani is from an old and well-known family but is not very well off and is reportedly an opium addict.

cc: FOL/BIO

FOL:DEToussaint:viv

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① Circulate in POL

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VLW

30 September 1971

ADDENDUM FOR POL FILES

FROM : CAS, September 1971

SUBJECT: Dr. Mozaffar BAQAI (BAGHAI, BAGHAI-KERMANI)

② Bio File (Start  
new folder, if  
necessary)

CAS records - much of which include Embassy/POL reporting from the 1950's - indicate that Dr. Mozaffar BAQAI, born in 1910 in Kerman, was active throughout the 1950s and less so in the late 1960s as the leader of the Toiler's Party (Hesb-e-Zahmatkeshan). He was jailed periodically until 1962 for rabble-rousing. He was known for his opposition to the ("U.S. supported" and "corrupt") Zahedi government following Mossadeq's overthrow and has at one time or another been anti-Shah, anti-US, and anti-Communist. He has the reputation of being more intelligent than most Iranian politicians, and a reformer.

He has allegedly been covertly supported and funded by (in chronological order) Soviets, British, The Shah and SAVAK.

In August 1971 CAS learned that Dr. BAQAI had been given permission (possibly encouraged) by SAVAK to reactivate his Toiler's Party. Dr. BAQAI was said to be renting office space for the party's headquarters.

It is highly likely that in 1971 Dr. BAQAI will operate his party in a manner acceptable to SAVAK as a means of diverting leftist political energies into responsible channels.

CAREER:

- 1936 : Asst. Prof, University of Tehran (Embassy Bio-Form-1950)
- 1939-41 : Two years military service as a Reserve Officer.
- 1947-49 : Deputy in the 15th Majles.
- Oct 1949: Editor of "Shahid", which expresses views similar to the Tudeh Party's. BAQAI is suspected of secret contacts with the Soviet Embassy.
- Dec 1949: Arrested on charges of intriguing against the Iranian Army.

# S E C R E T

- Feb 1950: Retried by civilian court, released from prison, elected to the 16th Majles.
- Apr 1951: Reported to be a close advisor of Mossadeq. A knowledgeable source reported he had heard that BAQAI received money from the Soviets.
- Mar 1952: Elected to the 17th Majles from Kerman. His faction in the Majles is composed of petty bazaar merchants and craftsmen; it represented the right wing of the Iranian National Toilers Party which split in Feb 1952; it supports Mossadeq; it demanded the purging of communist elements from the Toilers Party; it reaffirmed the faction's allegiance to Islam.
- Aug 1952: BAQAI is considered the Majles' most intelligent member, also its most opportunistic and dangerous.
- Oct 1953: BAQAI is reported leader of right wing opposition to the Zahedi government. Allegedly in the pay of the British.
- Dec 1953: BAQAI is Professor of Esthetics at Tehran University. He was arrested in Baft and held incommunicado during elections for the 18th Majles. He is still publishing "Shahid" which attacks the Zahedi government.
- Jan 1954: Lt. Col. MOQADAM (probably the man who in 1971 is Chief, Dept 3, SAVAK) campaigned for BAQAI among junior officers in the Army. Speculation in Kerman is that the British are backing BAQAI through Sayed Zia Tabatabai.
- Mar 1954: BAQAI told his Toiler's Party (planning) committee that he intended writing Zahedi saying he will take revenge for Zahedi's persecution of him by harming Z's son, Ardeshtir.
- Jun 1-8 : Arrested and released by Prime Minister Zahedi. 1954
- Aug 1954: In enforced residence in Arak.
- Jan 1955: Arrested for inciting mobs. Sent to enforced residence in Zahidan. (Begins to sound like MONOPOLY.)



# S E C R E T

- Aug 1955: Still in enforced residence in Zahidan but rumors say a) Shah has sent him a sealed envelope, and b) BAQAI may leave Zahidan to live on the estate of Min Interior Asadollah Alam. Feeling is that the Shah may want BAQAI as a reforming Prime Minister.
- Dec 1955: Returned to Tehran.
- Jan 1956: Accused of being part of the successful plot to assassinate P. M. General RAZMARA.
- Jul 1956: Active again in politics. According to a reliable source, he is pretending to be pro-American.
- Aug 1960: Made an outspoken speech.
- Sep 1960: Blamed for distributing nationalist pamphlets at the University.
- Feb 1961: Offered to bring the Toiler's Party into the National Front.
- Mar 1961: BAQAI is supported by the Free Mason Lodge, therefore suspected of having the support of British. In prison again.
- Sep 1961: Released from prison.
- Sep 1961: Professor of Literature, Tehran University. On SAVAK's list of Iranian politicians as head of "Guardians of Freedom" and the Toiler's Party.
- Jan 1969: Professor of Statistics at Tehran University. Still has followers, especially in Kerman. In good health.
- Aug 1971: Has been given permission to reactivate the Toiler's Party. Is currently searching for office space for party headquarters.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL

*file bio*

TO : POL - Mr. ~~Mick~~  
THRU : POL - Mr. Bolster  
FROM : POL - ~~S.~~ Escudero

DATE: March 19, 1975

SUBJECT: Background Data: Mosafar Baqa'i

In view of his recent open letter to the Shah criticizing the establishment of the Iran Resurgence Party as both illegal and unwise, I thought you might find a little background data on Mosafar Baqa'i to be of use.

A congenital oppositionist, Baqa'i has been active in Iranian politics since the mid-1940s. He has espoused various leftist viewpoints but always with a sizeable dose of personal opportunism. He was briefly a member of the Tudeh Party, later joined the National Front and after his 1951 founding of the Toilers Party he became the second most important man in the National Front. He broke with Mossadeqh in 1952 and lost considerable support for his Party in the process. Later he first supported, and then opposed, General Zahedi and has generally been in opposition to every prime minister since. As a result of his constant opposition he has few friends among the establishment but many powerful enemies. These have imprisoned or exiled him a number of times but he has always rebounded in one way or another. He has been accused, for example, of complicity in the assassination of General Razmara, the murder of Mossadeqh's Chief of Police General Afshartus and a variety of lesser crimes but has usually been acquitted on appeal. As the Shah's power grew, Baqa'i's prominence decreased and he pretty much faded from sight with the rise of the Iran Novin Party.

Despite a long and tempestuous career he has had little influence on government policy except as a leader of the movement to nullify the rigged 1960 general elections. His position has been consistently nationalist, very anti-British and, perhaps beginning with the 1964 Status of Forces Agreement, rather anti-American as well. Though ambitious and opportunistic, he is regarded as honest where money is concerned, lives very simply in south Tehran and is respected by some for this.

He has used the open letter tactic at least twice in the past. Once in 1949 to criticize controls instituted by then Chief of Staff General Razmara, and again in 1953 when

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he published an open letter to then Vice President Nixon in his now defunct newspaper Shaheb (Witness). He has expressed a view that should he ever become prime minister (this was in the days when prime ministers counted for something in Iran) he would permit the Shah to reign but would circumscribe the Imperial power. The Shah on the other hand had appeared to give him greater rein than he has allowed to other leftist politicians and as recently as 1971 Baqa'i was given SAVAK permission to re-establish the Toilers Party. Presumably this was intended to attract support which might otherwise have been given to less malleable leftist groups. However, nothing further was heard from the Toilers Party or Baqa'i until he wrote the letter to the Shah.

POL:STEscudero:mjl

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~~Amor~~  
~~Don~~  
~~Pol. Sec.~~  
File Dissolved  
Letter

Tehran January 46, 1978

Honorable Mr. William Sullivan  
Ambassador of the United States of America in Iran

I acknowledge with thanks receipt of Your Excellency's letter dated January 4, and am particularly thankful for your attention and perusal of the Iranian Toilers' Party Declaration of December 9, 1977.

The explicitness with which you state that the policy of President Jimmy Carter's government is based on non-intervention in other countries' internal affairs seems hope-inspiring because we are confident that if foreign powers should refrain from intervening in our country's internal affairs and taking steps to the disadvantage of our people, the Iranian nation will succeed in establishing the rule of law and a democracy based on the ideals pursued by all freedom-loving peoples of the world.

I am pleased about Your Excellency's suggestion of exchanges of views on the matter of securing basic human rights. I have had the opportunity in the past to have meetings with United States ambassadors and high ranking officials on account of my positions and national responsibilities. I believe that such contacts can be beneficial to the understanding and betterment of relations between the two nations.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Mozaffar Bagha'i-Kermani  
Leader of the Toilers' Party  
of the Iranian People

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BIO NOTE

Dr. Mozaffar Baghai-Kermani - Born about 1908-10 in Kermar Province. Listed as Politician in SRF file.

Baghai-Kermani was leader of the Iranian Toilers Party in 1962. He was subsequently founder and president of the Iranian National Workers Party, a small, very old group which hung about the fringes of the National Front in the mid to late 1960s.

Baghai-Kermani is an ex-Majles deputy who was highly critical of the Shah during the Mossadeq period. He sent a letter to the Prime Minister in late November criticizing the government for its role in the Karadj road incident where ununiformed young men set upon a political group of oppositionists who were meeting and injured over a hundred. Dr. Baghai-Kermani was described to Embassy officer Stempel as "sort of the Sancho Panza of the Iranian National Front set". Although active and apparently respected in the past, he is not particularly well thought of by several of the individuals currently active in the oppositionist movement.

POL:JDStempel:1-4-78

BAGHAI-KERMANI, Mozaffar